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Abstract 
 
In 1949, newly-independent Indonesia inherited a health system that was devastated by 
seven years of warfare resulting from three-and-a-half years of Japanese occupation and four 
years of revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. The country suffered from an acute shortage of 
physicians, and those few physicians were mostly concentrated in the large urban centres where 
a minority of the population lived. Additionally, the Indonesian Ministry of Health had to cope 
with the resurgence of epidemic diseases such as smallpox and endemic diseases such as malaria, 
tuberculosis and yaws. The Ministry of Health had initiated a number of symbolic public health 
initiatives—both during the Indonesian Revolution (1945 to 1949) and during the early 1950s 
resulting in a noticeable decline of mortality. These initiatives fuelled the newly-independent 
nation’s confidence because they demonstrated to the international community that it was 
capable of standing on its own feet. The early 1950s were thus a period of great optimism in 
Indonesian public health. Unfortunately by the mid-1950s, Indonesia’s public health program 
faltered due to a constellation of factors (a) political tensions between Java and the Outer Islands; 
(b) administrative problems particularly as the provincial and local governments implemented 
health policy but depended on the centre for the disbursement of finances; (c) political 
deadlocks; (d) corruption; (e) rampant inflation; and, (f) political instability. The optimism that 
characterised the early years of independence paved way for despair. The Soekarno era could 
therefore be interpreted as the era of bold plans and unfulfilled aspirations in Indonesian public 
health.  
This thesis relates the history of health of post-World War II Indonesia to the political 
history of the 1950s and critically examines the way in which promoting the health of the 
population became closely related with nation-building. Beginning 1950, Indonesian physicians 
appropriated military metaphors associated with the revolutionary struggle for independence in 
order to depict campaign against malaria, tuberculosis, yaws and leprosy as a struggle against the 
‘big four’ endemic diseases that drained the overall vitality of the population. They 
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conceptualised disease eradication as symbolic battles that would lead to further victories of the 
nation such as those against poverty and illiteracy.   
In the post-World War II era—characterised by military rivalry between the US and 
USSR—the US in its bid to countervail the growing influence of USSR in newly-decolonised 
nations viewed the prevalence of poverty and disease as the breeding grounds of communist 
ideology. The US perceived the political significance of supporting disease eradication 
campaigns in developing countries as an attempt to lead these countries to a Western-style model 
of development, which made participation in these campaigns an essentially political act. 
Indonesian leaders were aware of the political ramifications of accepting foreign aid for the 
nation’s public health programs. They sought to cautiously balance the country’s ambitions of 
safeguarding its political sovereignty in health with increased openness to international 
assistance in health administered through the channel of UN agencies such as the WHO and the 
UNICEF. Indonesia did not uncritically accept the recommendations of international aid 
agencies. Indonesian leaders elected to follow what I have characterised as the ‘Bandung 
approach’ to health: it adhered to a non-aligned foreign policy which sought to minimise the 
intervention of either the US or the USSR, solidarity in health with nations in a similar socio-
economic position, and a creative appropriation of WHO recommendations in health to reflect 
the country’s unique demographic and epidemiological requirements.  
This study sheds light on the nature of sovereignty and postcolonial governance in 
Indonesia. The country’s sovereignty was more fissured than scholars have assumed. Political 
differences between Java and the Outer Islands were heightened as a result of these tensions, 
which affected policy outcomes. The fissured nature of Indonesian sovereignty was evident in 
the lack of coordination between the Ministries of Health, Finance and Education on one hand 
and the provincial governments on the other. This undermined the consistent implementation of 
the Leimena Plan for health—named after Indonesia’s most influential Minister of Health since 
independence,  Johannes Leimena—and medical education initiatives across the archipelago. 
The Indonesian bureaucracy proved to be the biggest impediment in the effective implementation 
of public health.  
This thesis reveals the benefits of linking the historiography of postcolonial Indonesian 
medicine with the political history of the 1950s more generally. The synthesis of these two 
streams of historiography serves as a useful vantage point to examine how Indonesia managed to 
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implement its health policy independently during the height of the Cold War with minimal 
external intervention. Although the achievements in public health during the Soekarno era (1949- 
1967)  pale in comparison to the authoritarian Soeharto regime (1967-1998), the holistic view of 
public health embraced by nationalist physicians during the 1950s that symbolically related 
health to nation-building form the backbone to the Ministry of Health’s Healthy Indonesia 2010 
campaign implemented at the turn of the 21
st
 century. Yet the realisation of these plans is still in 
jeopardy because of corruption, collusion, nepotism, and an inept bureaucracy, just like during 
the Soekarno era.  
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Special Note on Orthography and Translation 
 
Bahasa Indonesia is a dynamic language and has undergone several orthographic changes since it 
was adopted by the Indonesian nationalists in 1928 as the national language. Prior to 1972, the 
Indonesian spelling was influenced by the Dutch spelling system. The legacy of the Dutch 
spelling system survives in proper names. For purposes of consistency, I follow the old spelling 
system as it appears on documents published prior to 1972 for proper and common names. For 
example, Raden Kodijat, instead of Raden Kodiyat; penjakit (disease) instead of penyakit. With 
regards to place names in order to avoid ambiguity, I use the standardised spelling system 
adopted by the Indonesian government, Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan in 1972 (for example, 
Surabaya instead of Surabaja). All translations of Indonesian and Dutch sources, unless 
otherwise indicated, are my responsibility. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1955, during the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of Indonesian 
independence, the Minister of Health, Johannes Leimena stated: 
With the Declaration of Independence on August 17, 1945 the formation of a 
Government with its machine power (police and army), its territories and population, the 
Republic of Indonesia came into being. The Red-White flag was hoisted and the national 
anthem was heard in the smallest and most isolated places of Indonesia. It was previously 
gauged that this nation was going to face various difficulties if it was going to maintain 
its independence. These difficulties were felt in all fields of work, including Public 
Health, especially before the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949. Yet, it may 
be said that the Indonesians during its early stage of independence showed a strong will 
to maintain its freedom amidst hardships and difficulties and no less did it show its 
courage to surmount the barriers during the transition period, also in the field of health.
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This quote illustrates the enormous challenges faced by the post-colonial state of Indonesia as it 
built itself as an independent nation. With respect to health, it had the task to develop and 
implement a health policy throughout its entire territory, including many far-flung islands soon 
after the proclamation of independence in 1945 and the transfer of sovereignty in December 
1949. In 1950, the country inherited a ruined health system after seven years of warfare: the 
Japanese occupation (1942-1945) and the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949). Towards the close 
of the Indonesian Revolution, Indonesia had only 1,200 physicians for a population of 
approximately 70 million people. Not surprisingly, the country was unable to combat the 
resurgence of epidemics not only because of a shortage of physicians but also due to the scarcity 
of essential drugs.
2
  It was neither able to respond to these special challenges, nor to everyday 
challenges. During the Indonesian Revolution, nationalist physicians launched a number of 
highly symbolic albeit sporadic public health initiatives. When the armed struggle ceased, and 
the new nation was established, the tasks faced by Indonesian physicians had not become any 
easier. Despite the initial euphoria that surrounded independence, the Indonesian Ministry of 
Health still had to resurrect the health infrastructure destroyed by seven years of warfare.   
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 In 1950, with independence won, the Indonesian leaders were confronted with the 
enormous task of re-establishing the state’s administrative machinery, in many respects, building 
it from scratch. It confronted a situation in which there was a lack of transport and 
communication infrastructures and industrial productivity had been ruined. Reflecting on the 
challenges facing the newly-independent nation, President Soekarno lamented:  
 Thus ended our period of struggle. And thus began our struggle for survival. The deed to 
the house called Indonesia was now securely in our hands, but it was a badly damaged 
house. It leaked aplenty. Its windows, doors, roof, and walls were broken. Our economy, 
government, administration, transportation systems, communications, media, methods of 
production were all damaged. Even morally and mentally we needed repairs.
3
 
 
Following the transfer of sovereignty Indonesia found itself on the verge of bankruptcy as it took 
over a large debt from the former Netherlands Indies.
4
 This was a source of considerable 
bitterness, since it included some of the costs of the colonial war against the Republic and 
frustrated independent Indonesia’s plan for economic development. Later, in the 1950s, rampant 
inflation led to great problems.  
 Despite the many difficulties the new nation faced, the early 1950s were a time of 
optimism and promise. Indonesians worked together to realise the promise of the revolution and 
develop a state on the basis of Soekarno’s pantjasila principles (the five principles being the 
belief in the one and only God, just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy 
guided by consensus and social justice for all Indonesians) and the ideal of modernisation and 
development. But, while Indonesia was willing to receive international aid and advice about how 
to achieve this promise, it carefully guarded its own independence. It did not want to end up in 
the orbit of one of the larger powers and presented itself as a non-aligned nation. In 1955, at the 
Bandung Conference, Indonesia declared the solidarity of African and Asian nations as a 
countervailing force to the dominance of the Soviet Union and the United States. This 
conference resulted in the germination of the Bandung spirit, a notion that developing countries 
would embark upon their own path to modernity without undue influence from either the Soviet 
Union or the US. The Bandung spirit was reflected within the field of Indonesian public health as 
well. Indonesia sought to carve a niche for itself in international health by aligning its public 
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health programs with the objectives of the WHO, the intention being to maximise international 
aid while jealously safeguarding its political sovereignty. Indonesia was not a passive recipient 
of international aid; rather it creatively refashioned aid to suit its own requirements. The 
Bandung spirit expressed the optimism that Indonesia was capable of pursuing its own trajectory 
to modernity in public health.  
During the early 1950s, there was a sharp decline in mortality. This engendered much 
optimism in the Ministry of Health, i.e. the country had made satisfactory progress in meeting its 
milestones in public health despite an acute shortage of physicians. Between 1950 and 1955, the 
Ministry of Health launched an emergency program consisting of (a) infectious disease control, 
for smallpox, plague and cholera; (b) a campaign against endemic diseases, notably malaria, 
tuberculosis, yaws and leprosy; (c) public health education; (d) curative activities appertaining to 
the expansion of hospital beds; (e) training of health personnel; (f) the development of rural 
health services that would integrate preventive and curative health activities; (g) the 
establishment of maternal and child health bureaus; (h) nutrition research with the aim of raising 
the nutritional levels of the people; (i) health legislation intended to achieve an equitable 
distribution of physicians throughout the Indonesian archipelago, the regulation of private 
practice and subsidised treatment for the poor in the country’s private hospitals; and (j) enlisting 
the cooperation of UN agencies particularly the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and 
the WHO. 
Between 1950 and 1955, the progress for Indonesia’s public health seemed promising. 
During these years, bold plans had been formulated and a number of promising initiatives had 
been launched. Leimena presented an ambitious blueprint for public health (The Bandung Plan).
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During the second half of the 1950s, optimism yielded to despair. The Indonesian state became 
dysfunctional due to the lack of coordination between central, provincial, district and local 
governments in the implementation of policy, corruption and rampant inflation. Even though 
there was a lot of idealism in the few years after independence, the financial position of the state 
was very poor. When the Indonesian economy collapsed, health programs suffered as well.  The 
challenges that were encountered appeared much more difficult to solve than was initially 
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estimated. The everyday reality of most Indonesians remained desperate and with little prospect 
of improvement.  
 The initial exuberance that characterised the early years of independence made way for 
pessimism and despair, as evident in the literature of the period. For example, Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer expressed his disillusionment about the fact that the high expectations of independence had 
not materialised into a higher standard for the Indonesian working class, in his collection of short 
stories entitled Tales from Djakarta: Caricatures of Circumstances and their Human Beings. In 
his short story My Kampung, set in urban Jakarta when the campaigns against infectious and 
endemic diseases were underway, Toer mocked the promise of the Indonesian state to guarantee 
a minimum standard of well-being for its citizens. In his short story, he expresses disgust that not 
even a small cautious guerrilla squad (referring to the Indonesian revolutionaries immediately 
after independence) would lose ten people in two years but in his kampung (urban squatter) with 
its squalor, ‘people die one after another.’6 Toer then enumerates the numerous deaths in his 
kampung: there is the case of the person who died of chronic venereal disease, of a woman who 
overfed and killed her favourite child with an overdose of worm medicine, of the print setter who 
died from lead poisoning, and many routine cases of tuberculosis.
7
 Alternating between irony 
and despair, the tone of Toer’s short story implicitly criticises the Ministry of Health’s 
emergency public health program for its failure to address the socio-economic causes of ill 
health: ‘If killing by weapons is punished by the government, killing because of ignorance and 
poverty is not punished in my kampung, even if the killing is of one’s own child. It is a routine 
situation and is perhaps quite understandable.’8 Toer’s short story illustrated that it is easier to 
formulate plans than to execute them.  
I began with Leimena’s reflections on the state of Indonesian public health in 1955 to 
examine how health became an important component of nation-building. It aimed to resuscitate 
the newly-decolonised nation from three-and-a-half centuries of Dutch colonialism, three-and-a-
half years of Japanese occupation, and four years of revolutionary struggle. In this thesis, I argue 
that formulating and implementing Indonesia’s health policy constituted an enormous challenge 
which involved building a health infrastructure throughout the islands of the Indonesian 
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archipelago where none had existed before, without adequate financial support. At the same 
time, it meant achieving coordination between and within the state apparatus by negotiating the 
bureaucratic labyrinths at various levels, i.e., central, provincial, district and village. Of central 
importance to this thesis are: (a) the way in which health became a component of nation-building 
(pembangunan); (b) the way in which Indonesia sought to achieve an equilibrium between 
accepting international aid and ideas about public health while maintaining its hard-won political 
independence; (c) the way Indonesia positioned itself in the Cold War rivalry, which can be seen 
at both the Bandung Conference (1955) and in health matters; and, (d) the formulation of unique 
epidemiological strategies for disease eradication appropriate for Indonesia.   
 
 
Health and Nation-Building in Indonesia in the 1950s: Integrating Disparate 
Historiographical Streams 
 
This thesis endeavours to integrate four disparate historiographical streams: (a) the political 
history of Indonesia before 1965 (the Soekarno era); (b) the history of international aid in the 
area of health, with focus on the Indonesian context; (c) the history of science, technology and 
society (STS) in postcolonial Indonesia; and, (d) the history of Indonesian public health during 
the 1950s. The development of Indonesia’s health policy during the Soekarno era between 1949 
and 1967 sits uneasily at the intersection of colonial and postcolonial histories and coincides with 
the period of decolonisation in Southeast Asia.
9
  In postcolonial Indonesian political 
historiography, much of the literature is primarily focused on political developments and 
questions of political stability, the waxing and waning of parliamentary institutions and 
economic decolonisation. Two unexplored topics in the political history of Indonesia during the 
Soekarno era are how public health related to these political developments and how physicians 
and policy-makers related health to nation- building. Viewing politics as nation-building enlarges 
one’s perspectives and enables one to locate the importance of health in it. 
  The history of international aid focuses on the diffusion of modernisation from the West 
to Indonesia whereas the history of science and technology studies explores the role of 
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technology in the form of national identity, often focusing on large technological projects. 
Frequently, the transfer of aid and technology is viewed as a relatively unproblematic unilateral 
process; but neither of these two streams of historiography critically examines how Indonesians 
appropriated scientific ideas from international agencies and refashioned them to suit their own 
purposes. Within postcolonial Indonesian medical historiography, the 1950s remain lightly 
explored. By relating it to the previous themes, I aim to conceptualise the history of health and 
medicine in the Soekarno era as a central element in nation-building. More specifically, I would 
like to explore the ways in which Indonesians creatively received and transformed international 
ideas to apply them to their own context. Major gaps in the existing scholarly literature on 
Indonesia are the ways in which Indonesia critically engaged with public health at the national, 
regional and international levels, particularly within the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Indonesian 
House of Representatives), the annual SEARO sessions (WHO Regional Office for Southeast 
Asia) and at the World Health Assembly conducted at the WHO headquarters, Geneva. 
Integrating the four disparate streams of historiography will further scholarly 
understanding of how Indonesia attempted to achieve an equilibrium between the alignment of 
its public health programs with policy prescriptions of the WHO and other international agencies 
while remaining fully independent despite foreign intervention. The central political positioning 
of Indonesia as the leader of the developing nations of Africa and Asia, who sought to chart their 
own trajectories to development based on the Western model but without either Soviet or 
American intervention, can be called the Bandung spirit. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, 
Indonesia aimed to present itself as a non-aligned nation, which in solidarity with other recently 
decolonised nations, wished to negotiate its own path to development and international politics.  
This thesis represents a challenge to the writing of the history of postcolonial health of Indonesia 
inasmuch as it draws upon a rich diversity of primary sources, in particular Indonesian, WHO 
and Australian archives, medical biographies, novels and Indonesian parliamentary proceedings 
to critically situate the country’s health policies, the way it sought to negotiate a balance between 
accepting international aid while maintaining its independence, and its standing on international 
health.   
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Significance of the 1950s: How Historians Have Approached the Soekarno Era 
 
During the 1990s, historians of Indonesia depicted the 1950s as a disappearing decade due to the 
political polarisation between Java (the political core) and the Outer Islands (for example 
Sumatra and Sulawesi, the periphery) that complained of ‘Jakartaism’ or the diversion of natural 
resources from the Outer Islands to Java.
10
  In addition, the 1950s witnessed rising tensions 
between political parties, the rise of political infighting and the growing importance of 
corruption.
11
 The most influential question guiding the political historiography of the 1950s was 
the debate between Herbert Feith and Harry Benda as to whether Indonesia would follow 
Western-style modernisation or follow its own way. In 1955, Indonesia nurtured the Bandung 
spirit that sought to encourage developing countries to pursue their own trajectories to modernity 
without alignment with either the Soviet Union or the US, establish economic self-sufficiency, 
and develop solidarity with Asian and African countries in their struggle against imperialism.  
The early years of Indonesian independence were characterised by a permanent sense of 
crisis attributable to political instability. Henk Schulte Nordholt argued that if 1950 had been the 
zenith of nationalism, the general elections of 1955 illustrated the success of electoral democracy 
because 90 % of the voters cast their votes in the absence of irregularities.
12
 Nevertheless, the 
outcome of the 1955 elections was the failure of the Constituent Assembly to deliver a new 
constitution. The legitimacy of the nation-state was undermined by corruption.
13
 Everyday 
Indonesians were disillusioned by the fact that the promise of the Revolution to establish a just 
and prosperous society had not materialised. In his short story ‘Creatures behind Houses,’ 
written 1955, Pramoedya Ananta Toer expressed disappointment because promises of a better 
standard of living were not fulfilled for all classes of Indonesian society.
14
 In another short story 
‘The Mastermind,’ Toer sketches the career of Mas Kariumun, who became a civil servant 
during the era of Dutch colonialism, a debt-collector during the era of Japanese occupation 
(1942-45), a hero of the Revolution, a bureaucrat and finally as Member of the Parliament 
8 
 
following the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. Kariumun was the embodiment of the political 
opportunism and corruption that characterised post-independent Indonesia. He regarded the 
common people as sheep who could be manipulated to further his political ambitions.
15
 Toer’s 
disappointment regarding the growth of political corruption during the early 1950s turned to 
outright cynicism by 1957, expressed in Mochtar Lubis’ novel Sendja di Djakarta (Twilight in 
Jakarta) that captured the dark underside of urban life in Jakarta that was characterised by 
appalling poverty, inequality and the indebtedness of the common man.
16
 
  Ruth McVey, with reference to the general relationship between ideology and social 
change in Indonesia, observed that the fundamental question for historians dealing with the 
1950s was ‘commenting on what Indonesia should be like.’17 The New Order Regime (1967-
1998) represented the 1950s as Pandora’s Box, the lid of which must be kept firmly closed as it 
represented political deadlock, economic decay and social tension.
18
  
The chief disagreement between Harry Benda and Herbert Feith in 1964 had its genesis 
in the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia during the late 1950s.
19
 Benda 
maintained that political developments during the Soekarno era should not be seen vis-à-vis 
adjudging the country’s democratic institutions in terms of Western standards. Democratic 
institutions that functioned in the West were extrinsic to Indonesian culture. Feith argued that the 
process of modernisation of Indonesia arising from the nationalist movement in the pre-World 
War II period resulted in the establishment of Western-style democracy in Indonesia.
20
 While 
one may not fully embrace Feith’s thesis that the decline of constitutional democracy in 
Indonesia could be attributed to the different agendas of the ‘solidarity makers,’ personified by 
Soekarno and the ‘administrators,’ whom he identified with Hatta, opposition to liberal 
democracy was facilitated by the disillusionment of the Indonesian public with parliamentary 
institutions.
21
 Although modernisation theory is used to analyse social and political change in 
Indonesia, an important lacuna remains in historiography. Historians have not adequately 
addressed the influence of the Bandung spirit in international development, i.e., the argument 
that Indonesia was not a passive recipient of international aid but actively sought to refashion aid 
to meet its requirements.
22
 It sought to foster solidarity with the newly-decolonised African and 
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Asian nations and engineer its own path to modernity based on the framework of Western 
Science.   
As a continuum to Feith’s thesis, Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that ideological differences 
between different political alirans (streams) such as Islam (modernist and traditionalist), secular 
nationalism, communism and socialism made political consensus difficult given the Cabinets’ 
high instability on the eve of the 1955 elections.
23
 Besides the polarization that persisted between 
different political alirans, political forces in Indonesia were divided into ‘solidarity makers’ and 
‘administrators.’24 The ‘administrators,’ who were represented by Hatta, recommended that after 
achieving political sovereignty, Indonesia should leave the revolution behind and concentrate on 
rebuilding the national economy and advancing the welfare of the people. To achieve its goal of 
economic development, Indonesia needed to enlist the support of international organisations such 
as the World Bank which would provide monetary and technical assistance. The ‘solidarity 
makers,’ exemplified by Soekarno, thought that the revolution was far from over as West Irian 
was not yet liberated. During the 1950s, several political issues were contested such as whether 
to prioritise economic development over the liberation of West Irian, the proper relations 
between the central government at Jakarta and the provinces, or whether to have Islam officially 
recognised in the Constitution.
25
  
The initiation of the Bandung Conference of 1955 coincided with the need to improve the 
image of the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party or the PNI) prior to the 
1955 elections.  The events that precipitated the convening of the Afro-Asian Conference at 
Bandung were: (a) the failure of Indonesia to secure the liberation of West Irian by peaceful 
means; and, (b) the upcoming elections of 1955. The outgoing PNI’s poor record regarding its 
economic policies attracted criticism from the Masjumi. The Conference generated considerable 
political capital for Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo (from the PNI) as it established 
Indonesia’s credentials as leader of the Third World.  
Since 2005, historians have characterised the Bandung Conference as an epoch made up 
of little histories, reflecting unanswered questions as to whether the Conference was a 
continuation of Cold War concerns, a continuation of the struggle against imperialism, a protest 
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against centuries of racial humiliation or a communist plot.
26
 Throughout Indonesia’s tryst with 
multiparty democracy (1950-1957), foreign policy was a hotly contested issue among the 
nation’s political elite. This seven-year period saw the rise and fall of no less than seven cabinets 
in rapid succession and no single government could form an absolute majority. A number of 
political parties such as the Islamist Masjumi sought to forge closer relations with the US and 
weaken communism at home. Other parties, e.g., the PNI espoused a more radical foreign 
policy.
27
 During the Soekiman cabinet (1951-1952), when the dominant Masjumi politicians 
were vehemently anti-communist, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Subardjo secretly signed an 
agreement with the US, committing the country to US economic and technical assistance. 
Disclosure of the agreement led to the fall of the Soekiman cabinet in 1952.
28
 The impact of the 
Bandung Conference within Indonesia was not only profound but benefitted Ali 
Sastroamidjojo’s government and the PNI party (Partai Nasional Indonesia) prior to the 
country’s first general elections in 1955 at a time when Indonesia’s economic policies were in 
disarray.
29
 Leading Indonesian political analyst Dewi Fortuna Anwar observed that at the time of 
the Bandung Conference, Sastroamidjojo rallied the Indonesians under the banner of Third 
World solidarity against colonialism and imperialism, a good example of Feith’s ‘solidarity 
making’ activities.30 Anwar interpreted the Conference as a continuation of struggle against 
imperialism.  
The Conference established non-alignment with the two superpowers, the US and USSR, 
as the central pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Bandung provided the inspiration for the 
creation of a non-aligned bloc and subsequently the Non-Aligned Movement during the 1960s. It 
helped to link the idea of non-alignment, which had been confined to India, Burma and 
Indonesia, to the broader Afro-Asian family of nations. The Bandung Conference served 
Indonesia well, instilling a sense of self-confidence in its foreign policy and, for Soekarno, in 
distancing Indonesia from the West.
31
 The Conference talked about the need to promote 
economic and technical cooperation among African and Asian countries. Its most lasting legacy 
was the promotion of the Bandung spirit which signified Third World solidarity in promoting 
global peace, justice and solidarity.
32
 Dipesh Chakrabarty argued that Bandung was an attempt to 
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foster a sense of African-Asian solidarity in the midst of Cold War disagreements.
33
 The 
prevailing discourse in the nations that came together at Bandung reflected an uncritical 
approach to modernisation.
34
 Within the developing countries, the political leadership aspired for 
achieving modernisation, independent of Western intervention. Yet, the ideal of modernity was 
formulated in Western terms.
35
 The emphasis on development as catching-up-with-the-West 
produced a sharp differentiation between the elite nations and their subaltern counterparts.  
This thesis contextualises the history of postcolonial Indonesian medicine in the light of 
political developments. As Adrian Vickers points out, telling the history of modern Indonesia is 
complex as the nation does not have a single narrative.
36
 Most historical accounts either focus on 
the activities of a small group of political leaders who led the country to independence, the 
decline of parliamentary institutions, or whether Indonesia should follow the Western style of 
modernisation or follow its own way. This thesis represents part of a complementary trend in 
historical scholarship that seeks to contextualise postcolonial health of Indonesia from a 
transnational perspective. As well, it critically examines the ways in which maintaining the 
population’s health came to be seen as an essential part of nation-building.37 
  
Historiography of International Aid: The Indonesian Context 
 
The history of international aid in the Indonesian context is sparse and has largely remained the 
preserve of historians of Cold War and science and technology studies.
38
 Their accounts reveal 
that technical assistance was a new form of diplomacy during the post-World War II era that 
sought to spread ideas of modernisation from developed to less-developed countries, often 
motivated by political agendas. This thesis seeks to disentangle itself from modernisation and 
instead, explores how Indonesia appropriated technical assistance, particularly from the WHO, 
and sought to cautiously balance Indonesia’s hard-won sovereignty in the political sphere with 
increased openness to international aid.  
 In his monograph Machines as the Measure of Men, Michael Adas observes that the term 
‘modernisation’ was used with reference to the post-World War II era to denote America’s path 
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to political stability and prosperity through the rational management of its resources and the 
application of science and technology.
39
 American policymakers and social scientists cited 
America’s path to prosperity as the model for the underdeveloped nations of Africa and Asia. 
Modernisation theory was based on the postulate that non-Western societies not only could, but 
also would develop along scientific and industrial lines pioneered by the West. Though the 
modernisers regarded Western capital as critical to Third World development, they envisioned 
that Africans and Asians, not Westerners, were the major agents of transformation of 
underdeveloped societies.
40
 Along similar lines, Michael E. Latham argues that during the Cold 
War (1945-1990) modernisation theory provided the means for US to redefine who it was vis-à-
vis others.
41
 Modernisation theory, with its claims to universality and assumptions about the 
malleability of  traditional societies assumed that developing countries as diverse as Iran, 
Ecuador, Burma and the Congo could advance along a linear trajectory from tradition to 
modernity under the tutelage of America. Neither Adas nor Latham contextualise modernisation 
theory from the perspective of the birth of new nation states in Asia and Africa and the specific 
ways in which the UN agencies and the political elites of Africa and Asia reconfigured 
modernisation within the framework of state-mediated national development.  
 By the mid-1950s, Indonesia had become a major recipient of technical aid from the 
International Cooperation Administration or ICA, an American Federal agency that managed 
overseas assistance programs intended to promote American foreign policy.
42
 American political 
interests equated peace and security in Indonesia with the promotion of economic and technical 
aid based on an ideology of development that would countervail the rising influence of 
communism. Suzanne Moon argues that Indonesian and American bureaucrats differed on 
strategies about the proper approach to development.
43
 Whereas the Americans envisioned a 
linear transformation of Indonesian society from agricultural to industrial, the Indonesian leaders 
emphasised self-sufficiency, generally defined with respect to food and, by extensions to 
agriculture. In practice, technical assistance became a dialogue between the Americans and their 
Indonesian counterparts, rather than a unilateral transfer of technology from the US to Indonesia. 
Despite the ideological conflicts that persisted between the American and Indonesian technocrats 
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on how to achieve development, both shared the view that the goal of development was 
transformation to a Western ideal of economic growth and productivity.
44
 Technical assistance as 
a policy prescription for less-developed countries to plan and modernise is well-represented in 
the scholarly literature on international development in terms of American modernization theory. 
However, the role of the UN as an autonomous diplomatic actor in terms of assisting the 
economic planning of newly-independent nations (particularly Indonesia) is less visible.
45
 
Technical experts recruited by UN agencies tailored economic development according to the 
requirements of the recipient country through liaison with the central planning bureau and 
transmitted scientific expertise to less developed countries that would ultimately lead them to a 
Western—if not an American—economic model.46 
 The Indonesian Planning Bureau originated with a call for centralised economic planning. 
The UN assigned technical experts to advise the Indonesian government on planning and the 
controlled financing of the Technical Assistance program but mandated that the foreign experts 
report to the Indonesian government. For Djuanda Kartawidjaja, who was Head of the National 
Planning Bureau (Biro Perantjang Negara), centralised planning was a formalised expression of 
exerting the sovereignty of the state.
47
  In 1955, during the planning process, differences 
emerged between Djuanda and the foreign experts regarding the role of the state in economic 
development. Planner-politician conflict within Indonesia accelerated during the late 1950s as 
Soekarno and other nationalists began to turn away from developmentalist solutions and 
disengagement from international trade in favour of economic policies that ensured the country’s 
self-sufficiency in economic affairs.
48
 Although the existing historiography related to the history 
of international aid in the Indonesian context highlights the conflict between the foreign 
technical experts and the Indonesian politicians over the administration of the technical 
assistance programs, what needs to be studied is the actual implementation and evaluation of 
these programs.  
 Most scholarly literature pertaining to technical assistance focuses on the diffusion of 
modern technologies from the West to the newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa with 
a view to transforming the latter countries based on the Western model of development. Instead 
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of examining technical assistance solely as an American Cold War strategy intended to contain 
the spread of communism, this study seeks to examine the specific ways in which technical 
assistance (particularly in public health) was incorporated into Indonesia’s nation-building 
ideology.  
 
The Historiography of Science and Technology Studies  
 
Current scholarly literature on science and technology studies in Indonesia largely centres on the 
role of technology in the formation of a national identity.
49
  The contributions of individual 
Indonesian scientists are overshadowed by discussion of the institutionalisation of Indonesian 
science.
50
  What needs to be studied in conjunction with the role of science in the emergence of 
Indonesian identity is the contribution of individual Indonesian scientists and the specific manner 
in which they rhetorically aligned their research with nation-building.  
 Suzanne Moon’s article titled ‘Justice, Geography, and Steel: Technology and National 
Identity in Indonesian Industrialization,’ examines the interactions of technology and national 
identity through the lens of a steel plant in Cilegon, West Java.
51
 The issue of industrialisation in 
Indonesia was associated with the socialist ideal of achieving technological self-sufficiency. The 
location of the steel plant in the town of Cilegon was invested with symbolic significance. 
Cilegon, which was an ostensibly impoverished town, was a lively part of the Majapahit empire, 
a Java-based empire that established its influence over the Outer Islands, particularly Sumatra, 
Bali, Borneo and the eastern islands that constituted the Indonesian archipelago. For Soekarno, 
the site of the steel plant symbolised the aspirations of the postcolonial state in its march towards 
modernization. Moon’s article, however, does not examine the contribution of how individual 
Indonesian scientists sought to align their research with nationalist ideology.
52
  
In his monograph The Floracrats: State Sponsored Science and the Failure of the 
Enlightenment in Indonesia, Andrew Goss contends that Indonesian science has had broad 
middle-class support since independence. It was linked to the global culture of science and 
scientists. For many Indonesians, the appeal of science was its enlightenment ideal of revealing 
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the workings of nature.
53
 Viewed internationally, Indonesian research has been less competitive 
internationally as Indonesian scientists have sought to measure their success by their usefulness 
to the nation and the creation of a scientific community. The scope of Goss’ monograph is 
restricted to biology, in particular to botany. Although nationalist physicians particularly 
Sarwono Prawirohardjo were influential in establishing a blueprint for Indonesian science during 
the early years of independence, the role of applied sciences (particularly medicine), while 
significant, remained marginal in Goss’ narrative. A significant gap in the historiography of 
science and technology studies is the symbolic significance of the applied sciences such as 
agriculture and medicine in the furtherance of nationalist rhetoric of ensuring Indonesia’s self-
sufficiency in economic affairs (berdiri di atas kaki sendiri).  
 Physicians dominated the first generation of nationalists in the Dutch East Indies. 
Decolonisation was yoked to scientific progress as the physicians deployed organic metaphors of 
society and state, gained from their medical training, to diagnose and treat the ills affecting the 
proto-national body politic.
54
 As Toer writes in his novel Jejak Langkah (Footsteps), ‘A doctor 
not only aids in the recovery of a patient but also awakens the spirit of his people weakened by 
ignorance.’55 This thesis contends that subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian 
Republic in 1949, the legacy of physicians in shaping scientific thinking continued in terms of 
symbolically aligning medical research with Soekarno’s characterisation of the Indonesian 
Revolution as a period of investment.  
 
Representing the Historiography of Indonesian Health within the Context of International 
Health: The 1950s 
 
The lack of interest in the history of public health in Indonesia during the 1950s may 
come as a surprise given the fact that there is a well-established scholarship on the history of 
welfare.
56
 Anne Booth argues that despite the political instability that characterised the 1950s, 
there was some progress aimed at establishing planned economic growth in the Natsir 
government in 1951. The fruits of economic growth during the 1950s were unevenly distributed 
with bureaucrats and politicians benefitting in real terms whereas in the case of estate labour, 
16 
 
wage rates were falling in real terms due to inflation.
57
 Between 1951 and 1960, the Gross 
National Product (GNP) grew at a rate of 36%; but, the population growth of 18% for the decade 
neutralised the growth of the GNP.
58
 Human development improved somewhat in the late 1950s 
compared with two decades earlier. Life expectancy improved marginally due to the control of 
malaria and other diseases. Eminent economic historian of Indonesia Pierre Van der Eng 
sketched a nuanced picture of Indonesian famines during the 1950s characterised by the high 
prevalence of endemic malnutrition and hunger oedema that affected some regions of Indonesia 
more than others. He attributes the recurrence of famine in some regions of Indonesia to 
localised food shortages that resulted from population growth that outstripped the supplies of 
food, natural disasters, and excessive government controls related to the marketing of rice. These 
occurrences diminished the incentives for surplus food production and inhibited the capacity of 
the free market to alleviate supply shortfalls in deficit areas.
59
 As the above authors indicate, the 
history of health in postcolonial Indonesia is closely related to the history of welfare.  
Within the history of social welfare in post-colonial Indonesia, the question of health is 
invariably overshadowed by the housing problem. Freek Colombijn argues that in post-colonial 
Indonesia, political leaders were imbued with the conviction that they had to do better than the 
colonial state in fulfilling the basic needs of all Indonesians, particularly housing.
60
 In August 
1950, administrators from various Indonesian provinces congregated in Bandung to attend 
Kongres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat (Congress on Healthy Public Housing), their aim being to 
explore how the houses of the less well-to-do could be improved.
61
 The Congress delegates were 
convinced that Indonesians had to shake off their inferiority complex. They should no longer 
regard small houses as inferior; rather they should pay specific attention to the construction of 
houses that were healthy, both in the physical and social senses. In 1952, Hatta observed that 
most houses in Indonesia resembled cowsheds and were inappropriate for an independent self-
confident nation.
62
 The implementation of rumah sehat (healthy housing) was entrusted to the 
local government; and the Ministry of Public Works and the Indonesian parliament pledged 
financial support for the project. Nevertheless, economic constraints dampened the lofty ideals of 
the Congress of Healthy Housing. Limited state funds, available for public housing, became 
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eroded by inflation. As a result, the Ministry of Public Works had to restrict public housing to 
civil servants. Despite the empty rhetoric of rumah sehat for everybody and the notion of ‘self-
help housing,’ a major difference between the colonial period and the 1950s was the fact that the 
Indonesian administration, at least in principle, professed a responsibility to house the whole 
population.
63
 Colombijn’s article, which addresses the relationship between health, housing and 
national self-confidence, does not spell out how health embodied the notion of social justice as 
enshrined in the Pantjasila.  In the history of welfare and housing, health concerns have played a 
central role. Yet, in these histories, the history of medicine did not receive any attention.  
The history of medicine in the post-World War II Soekarno era in Indonesia remains 
overlooked within the current literature on international health. Since 2006, some attempts have 
been made to study the history of public health from a transnational perspective that sought to 
include some South and Southeast Asian nations including India, Burma and Indonesia.
64
 But, 
Indonesian contributions to international health during the 1950s have been largely overlooked in 
the existing historiography in favour of developments within India. Similarly, the extant 
literature on the history of medicine in the Soekarno era is scarce and focuses on medical 
pluralism, family planning or the implementation of public health initiatives in Java whereas 
public health initiatives on the Outer Islands of the Indonesian archipelago, particularly Sumatra, 
Bali, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Lombok, or the development of medical education remain 
unexplored.
65
  In addition, there is no authoritative work that examines the nature of colonial 
medicine in the Dutch East Indies although there is a modest literature that explores the debate 
surrounding acclimatization in the nineteenth century (the effect of tropical climates on the 
health of Europeans), the limited reach of the Netherlands Indies Health Service, the initiation of 
medical education and how and why public health became a nationalist issue during the 1930s.
66
 
 One of the earliest studies of the history of post-World War II international health was 
undertaken by Sung Lee, who accorded primacy to the role of the WHO in international health 
subsequent to its creation as an arm of the UN in 1948. He argues that as an intergovernmental 
organisation operating within the jurisdiction of sovereign nation states, the WHO could not 
override the will of its member governments. Consequently, the historical, political and 
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economic relationships among nations were played out in the WHO arena.
67
 The WHO saw itself 
both as waging a war against disease and an agent of modernisation, viz. leading the ex-colonial 
nations to Western-style society. The modes of assistance to newly-independent nations were 
hotly debated, but always within the paradigm of Western medicine. Western powers were 
adamant about restricting their aid to technical assistance whereas for the leaders of the newly- 
independent nations, the WHO served as a forum through which they could air their grievances 
against the ex-colonial powers and extract aid (medical supplies or funds). Randall Packard also 
privileges the role of the WHO as the agent of socio-economic modernisation of ex-colonial 
nations through the inauguration of the malaria eradication program and the association of 
malaria eradication with development.
68
 Packard contends that within the US, there was a 
growing awareness that the development of the so-called underdeveloped world through the 
control of tropical diseases including malaria was a critical ingredient for US post-World War II 
economic interests in ensuring the uninterrupted supply of raw materials to American industries 
and creating an overseas market. Additionally, the control of tropical diseases such as malaria 
was perceived as a critical weapon in the fight against communism. Central to the malaria 
education campaign was a highly technological top-down solution to a health problem, which the 
WHO and technocrats hoped would be a model for other disease eradication programs. It 
required neither public health education nor extensive cooperation with local health agencies. 
In Cold War, Deadly Fevers, Marcos Cueto contextualises malaria eradication within the 
context of the Cold War between the US and USSR from the late1940s up to the mid-1960s that 
was marked by US technical assistance to developing countries to overcome poverty and 
disease.
69
 During the 1950s, Mexico subscribed to a modernisation model of development that 
eased its strained bilateral relationship with the US. Malaria eradication was perceived by the 
Mexican government as a process of political centralisation and state building and a tool that 
would increase the national productivity of the population.
70
 Cueto attributes the failure of 
malaria eradication in Mexico to resistance of the anopheles species to the insecticide DDT 
(dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane), and popular resistance to anti-malarial operations. The 
literature on international health has not sufficiently explored how disease eradication campaigns 
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undertaken in developing countries shaped the epidemiological strategies of the WHO. Even less 
attention is paid to the differences between the WHO and the governments of developing 
countries related to the organisation of disease eradication campaigns. Unlike the majority of the 
literature on international health, I do not view the campaign against malaria and other endemic 
diseases as a Cold War strategy of the US to contain the spread of communism in the Third 
World. Rather, I seek to understand the motivations of the Indonesian state in aligning endemic 
disease control with the agenda of international agencies in which the continued interplay of 
nationalist health priorities with international development was crucial for ensuring financial 
support for the program.  
 Sunil Amrith represents the newer trend in the historiography of international health, 
which has transcended the politics of the Cold War. He explores the transnational circulation of 
public health technologies across the Southeast Asian region under the umbrella of the WHO. In 
his influential monograph Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-
1965, Amrith highlights the tension between the increased involvement of postcolonial states in 
international organisations, particularly the WHO, and the ineffectiveness of the states to govern 
the health of their populations.
71
 Amrith contends that the history of public health in Asia during 
the twentieth century was irreducibly transnational and international. The problem of Asia’s 
health emerged as a result of transnational debates between nutritionists and rural health officials 
channelled through international organisations. The WHO emerged out of a widely shared belief 
in the post-World War II era that modern disease control strategies could be standardised and 
implemented across national boundaries. India played a greater role in shaping Asia’s problems 
than did the Burmese and Indonesians, who were preoccupied with the fundamental problems of 
establishing the legitimacy of the state amidst much ethnic violence.
72
 This line of argument fails 
to do full justice to the Indonesian initiatives in transnational health that were implemented 
across the Southeast Asian region of the WHO, particularly the nurturing of the Bandung spirit in 
public health that sought to achieve an equilibrium between increased participation of Southeast 
Asian nations in the activities of the WHO and safeguarding their political sovereignty. 
Indonesia was not a passive recipient of international technical assistance in public health. 
20 
 
Rather, it questioned the very integrity of the epidemiological strategies designed by the WHO 
epidemiologists at Geneva. The Indonesian experience regarding the control of endemic diseases 
informed the WHO about the practicalities of executing disease eradication campaigns in 
developing countries with diverse socio-economic, demographic and climatic conditions where a 
uniform epidemiological strategy would not work.  
 Within the existing literature pertaining to the post-World War II Indonesian public 
health of the 1950s, the country’s collaboration with the WHO in its campaign against endemic 
diseases and Indonesian appropriation of WHO ideas, remain lightly explored areas deserving 
further investigation. Steve Ferzacca argues that health became a part of nation-building in 
postcolonial Indonesia.
73
 Ferzacca’s essay overlooks the political significance of the 1950s in 
terms of how Indonesian physicians critically engaged with social medicine and reinterpreted it 
within the context of pembangunan ideology.  
In People, Population and Policy in Indonesia, Terence and Valerie Hull move beyond a 
simple series of propositions that state that Soekarno was pro-natalist to argue that Soekarno was 
sympathetic to family planning and birth control in the interests of maternal health. Nonetheless, 
as President, he did not want to be seen as accepting advice from international aid agencies or 
advocating family planning programs that were associated with immorality.
74
 Hull and Hull offer 
a nuanced reinterpretation of family planning during the Soekarno era and situate the controversy 
surrounding family planning within the broader political context. Their findings on family 
planning during the 1950s reveal that uncritical receipt of international aid for Indonesia’s 
development projects was regarded within the Indonesian political establishment as an erosion of 
Indonesian political sovereignty.    
 In his essay ‘Hygiene and Decolonization: The Rockefeller Foundation and Indonesian 
Nationalism, 1933-1958,’ Eric Stein highlights the role of the Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored 
hygiene projects in contributing to the growth of a unified Indonesian geography even prior to 
the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence which continued into the Soekarno era. Stein 
argues that health professionals and physicians of the Soekarno era saw their work as 
revolutionary, tied to a particular feeling of struggle that arose from decolonisation and perceived 
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the vast rural populations as primitives.
75
 Yet, many Indonesian health workers and physicians 
imagined a citizenry united by a shared scientific modernity through the health of its individual 
bodies.  
 Two important gaps remain in the existing historiography of postcolonial Indonesian 
health of the 1950s. First, whereas health issues are dealt with from a holistic perspective within 
the history of welfare, the history of medicine remains marginal in such narratives. Second, how 
did Indonesia carve a niche for itself in international health during the first two decades of the 
Cold War that sought to creatively appropriate international aid from the US and the WHO 
without compromising its political independence and following a Western trajectory of 
development without external intervention? 
 
Indonesian Medical Modernity: The 1950s 
 
Indonesia’s vision of development during the 1950s was shaped by Soekarno’s notion of 
pembangunan that sought to unify the country’s centrifugal forces through a common project of 
shared national modernity.
76
 The President’s aspirations were evident in the government’s efforts 
to promote comprehensive pembangunan by modernising agriculture, pilot health projects, a 
massive telecommunications system that aimed to knit the disparate islands of the archipelago 
together, and the construction of numerous monuments in Jakarta. These showcase projects 
epitomised the notion that a unified Indonesia was capable of pursuing its own path to modernity 
without external assistance.  During the 1950s, the US supported disease eradication programs in 
developing countries as a Cold War strategy, to buy their political allegiances. The participation 
of the postcolonial nations of Africa and Asia in these programs had distinct political 
ramifications. In addition, accepting technical assistance often resulted in the continued 
dependency of these nations on Western technological knowhow. Instead, Indonesia favoured 
the Bandung approach that emphasised technological self-sufficiency, non-alignment and 
solidarity with nations in a similar position. The country’s medical modernity, if viewed in terms 
of a tension between Indonesia’s ambitions to maintain control over its public health programs 
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and the need to enlist support from international agencies. It reveals that the country’s political 
elite engaged with medical modernity within the framework of Western medicine but wanted to 
implement it under its own auspices.  
There is a rich international health literature that examines how nationalist leaders 
refashioned long-standing organicist ideologies that equated the strength of the nation with the 
health and vitality of its ordinary citizens.
77
 Gilberto Hochman highlights the asymmetries in the 
relationships between international agencies, governments, epidemiologists and individual 
physicians which at particular junctures influence the design of health policies.
78
 Brazilian 
malariologists for example, opposed the WHO’s decision to convert the country’s malaria 
control program to eradication as it threatened the pre-eminence of Brazilian malariologists and 
could lead to changes in national malaria eradication strategies considered to be Brazilian. 
Conversion of malaria control to eradication would lead to subordination of Brazilian 
malariologists to international organisations such as the WHO.
79
 A major gap in the scholarly 
literature addressing international health is the way in which political leaders from the Third 
World selectively appropriated international health ideas from the WHO that reflected their 
countries’ demographic and cultural particularities (for example, the execution of the Indonesian 
anti-yaws campaign) as well as their desire to maintain control over the process.  
The extant historiography pertaining to the Soekarno era is heavily biased towards the 
study of Indonesia’s parliamentary institutions, the country’s role in cementing Afro-Asian 
solidarity at the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung and economic decolonisation. To 
substantiate Prasenjit Duara’s argument that nationalist movements in Asia and Africa were 
faced with the challenges of fulfilling the promise of their humanistic ideals and create the 
conditions for international competitiveness, it would be interesting to examine how Indonesian 
physicians of the Soekarno era critically refashioned social medicine to reflect the nationalist 
aspirations of achieving a just and prosperous society.
80
 The history of medicine during the 
Soekarno era serves as a lens to examine Indonesia’s initiatives in international relations, 
particularly its role within the WHO. Indonesia’s initiatives in transnational health reflected the 
newly-independent nation’s self-confidence of pursuing its own path to medical modernity, 
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independent of US intervention but within the ambit of Western science. Between 1950 and 
1955, there was a lot of optimism that Indonesia was making satisfactory progress in public 
health as the nation’s leadership was faced with the daunting task of establishing a health 
infrastructure, particularly in the Outer Islands from scratch where none had existed prior to 
World War II. But by 1955, as the Indonesian state machinery became increasingly 
dysfunctional due to administrative frictions between the central, provincial, regency and local 
governments and corruption the overall optimism about the state of the nation’s health proved 
elusive.  
 
Plan of the Thesis 
 
Two gaps remain unaddressed in the scholarly literature appertaining to the history of medicine 
in Southeast Asia. First, few studies have analysed the development of post-World War II public 
health.
81
 Second, none of the scholars have attempted to integrate perspectives combining WHO, 
Southeast Asian Ministries of Health and local dimensions of health interventions that involved 
the provincial governments. In other words, this thesis examines the contradictory process of 
formulating international public health campaigns by the WHO, appropriation and 
implementation by Indonesian authorities and the local response that they generated, particularly 
within the Indonesian parliament and the general population.  
 This thesis is organised as a pentaptych consisting of five main chapters.  Chapter 2 
traces the genesis of social medicine which originated in the context of the Industrial Revolution 
to examine the influence of specific factors such as age, sex, economic circumstances, domestic 
environment, occupation and nutrition on the incidence and prevalence of disease. At the turn of 
the twentieth century the two approaches to social medicine that emerged were: (a) a narrowly 
oriented biomedical approach that focused on disease control; (b) a broader social version that 
investigated the socio-economic causes of ill health. Indonesian physicians opted for the second 
approach, i.e. relating social medicine to nation-building. This chapter traces the genesis of 
Indonesian social medicine during the 1930s as a critique of Dutch colonialism, the formulation 
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of an Indonesian alternative to Western medicine during the Japanese occupation, and the ways 
in which Indonesian physicians aligned their vision of social medicine to nation-building after 
1945. Eclectic in their approach, Indonesian physicians sought to creatively incorporate elements 
of public health from foreign countries into their own health system without blindly imitating the 
public health system of any country. Adopting a holistic approach, Indonesian physicians 
contextualised health in the light of socio-economic factors such as the availability of food, the 
diversification of the people’s diets and the affordability of food and health services.  
Chapter 3 examines the ideas and influence of Johannes Leimena, Indonesia’s most 
influential Minister of Health in formulating the country’s health policy. Leimena attempted to 
subordinate Indonesia’s regional and religious identities to the cause of nation-building. He 
sought to establish Indonesia’s pre-eminence in international health in the Southeast Asian 
region of the WHO by cementing solidarity with the Indian Ministry of Health from 1950 
onwards. In addition, he closely adhered to WHO prescriptions on public health with a view to 
secure international funding for Indonesian public health programs. The Bandung Plan—the 
nucleus of Leimena’s health program conceptualised in 1951—was an initiative to integrate 
preventative and curative public health activities based on the notion of community 
participation. Initially implemented with some success in the Bandung regency, the Bandung 
Plan was extended throughout Indonesia in 1954 as the Leimena Plan. Leimena’s aim of 
extending the Plan throughout Indonesia proved somewhat premature due to financial 
difficulties attributed to the central, provincial and regency governments’ jurisdiction of the 
Plan’s activities. 
Chapter 4 continues to examine Indonesia’s initiatives in building national health. 
Concomitant with the onset of the Cold War, the US devised a political strategy encouraging 
developing countries to participate in disease eradication programs, the aim being to prevent 
the spread of communism to these countries. But, participation in these projects was essentially 
a political act. While executing its disease eradication campaigns, Indonesia maintained the 
Bandung spirit, i.e., maintaining a delicate equilibrium between maintaining its political 
sovereignty in health without superpower interference and emphasis on solidarity against 
25 
 
disease with developing nations.  In this chapter, I critically expatiate how Ministers of Health, 
particularly Leimena and Azis Saleh, sought to redefine national health priorities within the 
agenda of international agencies, particularly the WHO, which related the control of endemic 
diseases particularly malaria, tuberculosis and to a lesser extent, yaws with maximising 
economic productivity. Compared to malaria, tuberculosis and yaws, the economic loss 
attributed to leprosy is negligible. But, within Indonesia leprosy patients were stigmatised due 
to superstition; therefore, the rehabilitation of leprosy patients was symbolically perceived 
within the Ministry of Health as recreating a modern Indonesia based on science. The way in 
which Indonesia received and refashioned international aid for disease eradication projects was 
determined by local factors such as the desire for self-sufficiency and ideology.  
Chapter 5 traces the growth of medical education in the Soekarno era in Indonesia. After 
independence, Indonesia suffered from an acute shortage of physicians. The country was able 
to graduate only a modest number of approximately thirty physicians annually during the 
1950s from its three medical schools at Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta. Indonesia attempted 
to increase its output of physicians by: (a) changing the curriculum at the medical schools at 
Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta; and, (b) establishing new medical schools at Medan, 
Bukittinggi and Makassar on the Outer Islands. In 1952, Indonesian academics proposed 
transforming the medical curricula at the medical schools in Jakarta and Surabaya from the 
existing Dutch model—that emphasized research, individual study and allowed individual 
students the freedom to appear for annual examinations whenever they felt prepared—to the 
American model, which facilitated cohort-based rather than individualised examinations and 
the development of critical thinking. The transformation of the medical curricula across all of 
the medical schools in Indonesia was never fully accomplished, due to the lack of 
infrastructure and the shortage of teaching staff in the medical schools at Surabaya and on the 
Outer Islands.  
Chapter 6 explores the nature of Indonesian scientific thinking during the 1950s. 
Soekarno argued that science could support the cause of the Indonesian revolution by 
discovering new solutions to the country’s existing problems. To this end, he urged scientists 
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to contemplate on how science could contribute to the achievement of a just and prosperous 
society. Problem-oriented research, particularly the work undertaken by the Department of 
Paediatrics at Universitas Indonesia (UI) that was symbolically related to Soekarno’s 
conceptualisation of the Indonesian Revolution as a period of material investment in the human 
skills of the population, received considerable support from the government. In this chapter, I 
critically examine how a number of Indonesian physicians represented a medical problem as a 
national problem, thereby rhetorically aligning their research with Soekarno’s interpretation of 
science. Two shortcomings that impeded the growth of scientific research in Indonesia 
included: (a) the weak foundation of most undergraduate students in basic science; and (b) a 
shortage of scientific manpower.  
Analysis of  the approximately twenty-year time period between the process of 
decolonisation (1945-1949) and the commencement of the New Order era in 1967 provides the 
opportunity to analyse Indonesian participation within the WHO and alignment of its health 
policy to WHO recommendations with a view to securing international legitimacy for its 
disease eradication and other public health programs. However, continued receipt of 
international support for Indonesia’s disease eradication and other public health projects was 
not forthcoming due to political factors such as Soekarno’s suspension of Indonesia’s 
parliamentary institutions and political differentiation between Java (the political core) and the 
Outer Islands (the periphery). I reiterate my thesis statement that the implementation of 
Indonesia’s health policy during the Soekarno era was indeed an administrative challenge. The 
incorporation of the political history of Indonesia during the 1950s into the history of 
Indonesian medicine will help to impart an understanding of how the framing of health policies 
during the Soekarno era reflected the President’s interpretation of the Indonesian Revolution as 
investment in the human skills of the population. The limitation of the timeframe of this thesis 
to the Soekarno era provides me with an opportunity to thoroughly interrogate how and why 
certain physicians emerged influential within Indonesian policy thinking on health and their 
political agendas.  
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Year 1949: Indonesia Inherits a Health System Devastated by Three Years of Japanese Occupation and 
Four Years of Revolutionary Struggle Against the Dutch.  
 
 
Two seriously ill women (South Asahan, 1949).  
In the regency of South Asahan (North Sumatra province), numerous roads and bridges were in a poor condition that 
hindered the native population’s access to timely healthcare. The poor state of the infrastructure and health services 
in South Asahan was symptomatic of the ruined health system that newly-independent Indonesia inherited in 1949.   
Source: Accession Number 2.24.04.01, Component Number 4403, Dienst voor Legercontacten Indonesië (Nationaal 
Archief, The Hague). 
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President Soekarno arrives in the newly-created Republic of Indonesia, 28 December 1949. Soekarno declares that 
Indonesia, now free, will live in friendship with the world as he addresses his people for the first time from his 
palace at Jakarta. Formal transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia took place 
on 27 December 1949.  
 
Source: United Nations Photo 332531 (UN Photo Library, New York). 
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CHAPTER TWO   
 
THE APPROPRIATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL MEDICINE BY 
INDONESIAN PHYSICIANS 
 
Social medicine was born during the industrial revolution in the mid-nineteenth century when 
physicians became worried about the effects of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation on the 
state of health of the new working classes. Instead of focusing on sick individuals, physicians 
interested in social medicine and public health aimed to investigate the relationship between 
social factors, health and disease. Thus, their focus was in the main upon statistics and 
epidemiology. Social medicine investigates the influence of specific factors such as age, sex, 
socio-economic status, domestic environment, occupation, nutrition, geography and education on 
the incidence and prevalence of disease. It proposes systematic interventions to improve health 
conditions.  
In the 1950s, physicians from newly-independent Indonesia appropriated social medicine 
to articulate a perspective on public health in a country where the health system was under-
resourced, medical personnel were sparse, and the state was weak. These physicians, who had an 
open eye for the importance of economic factors, interpreted social medicine in the context of 
availability of food, economic development, diversification of diet and other factors that affected 
health. A salient feature of Indonesian social medicine during the first decade of independence 
(1950-1959) was its emphasis on ensuring an adequate and equitable distribution of food for all 
its citizens. This was in part due to its symbolic significance in realising the nationalist goal of 
achieving a just and prosperous society and partly due to the significance of adequate nutrition 
for health.  
This chapter contextualises the emergence of Indonesian social medicine during the 
1930s as a nationalist critique of colonial medicine. Its emergence led to the formulation of an 
Indonesian alternative to the organisation of colonial medicine during the Japanese occupation 
and the articulation by Indonesian physicians of their vision of social medicine as a significant 
element of nation-building after 1945. Indonesian social medicine was eclectic and reflected the 
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Bandung spirit by selectively adapting and transforming public health ideas from an international 
context to suit the country’s requirements.  
 
Social Medicine and Public Health 
 
Social medicine emerged as a means to investigate the poor health conditions attributable to 
industrialisation and urbanisation that followed the industrial revolution in Europe during the 
nineteenth century. It proposed measures to ameliorate these conditions. By assigning medicine a 
prescriptive role to correct social disequilibrium, advocates of social medicine including Rudolph 
Virchow reacted to the relationship they had established between poverty and ill health. 
Nineteenth century public health was loosely aligned with sanitarianism and focused on 
preventive measures such as improved water supplies, the building of sewers and housing 
reform. By the mid-nineteenth century, public health based on the principles of sanitarianism 
was criticised as it overlooked the underlying causes of disease such as poverty. Social medicine 
is more holistic than public health in its approach to understanding the aetiology of disease.   
 Public health is inspired by an environmentalist philosophy and examines the origins, 
causes, distribution and prevention of communicable diseases.
1
 Social medicine investigates the 
incidence and prevalence of communicable and chronic diseases, and relates the epidemiology of 
these diseases to social, geographic and occupational conditions. In this way, social medicine 
extends the scope of public health by contextualising disease not only in the immediate 
environment such as inadequate housing or lack of drainage but encompasses economic, 
nutritional, occupational and educational variables as well.  
 In 1848, Virchow, a liberal physician and founder of cellular pathology, was employed 
by the Prussian government to investigate an epidemic of typhus in Upper Silesia, an area then 
under Prussian occupation. He stated that the epidemic could not be resolved merely by treating 
individual patients with drugs but only by improving the socio-economic conditions of the 
people. He developed a ‘socio-logical’ epidemiology that attributed the spread of typhus to the 
population’s impoverished living conditions resulting from their political subjugation to Prussian 
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occupation.
2
  He envisioned the elimination of famine and ignorance in the prevention of 
population decimation from epidemics and advocated greater political participation by the 
population, the use of their language in education and other social measures. He outlined a 
political role for the physician as ambassador of the poor.
3
 He advocated that ‘Social Medicine’ 
served as a means to articulate three principles:
4
 
 1) People’s health was a matter of social concern; 
2) Social and economic conditions had a bearing on disease and must be the subject of scientific 
investigation; and 
3) Measures involved in the prevention of disease must take into account social and economic 
factors. 
 Public health in early nineteenth century Europe and the United States was loosely tied to 
sanitarian efforts. Sanitarians were preoccupied with addressing the adverse consequences of 
industrialisation such as overcrowded and insanitary housing, and inadequate facilities for the 
disposal of human and animal waste. Sanitarians including Edwin Chadwick advocated the 
centralization of public health through the creation of public health authorities, who would 
supervise local health boards and the construction of sewage systems. The sanitarians further 
argued that disease was caused by general filth and could be remedied by the construction of 
drains and ensuring supplies of clean drinking water.
5
  It is important to note that health could be 
improved by measures, mostly engineering such as city planning, measures of which the 
population did not need to be aware of. 
 The acceptance of the germ theory of disease in the 1890s coincided with the progressive 
reform movement in health in the US towards the close of the nineteenth century. Focus was 
centred on social and environmental reform; at the time, the new public health concentrated on 
changing individual behaviour by, for example, educating mothers about aspects of preventive 
hygiene in a bid to reduce infant mortality and the anti-spitting campaigns to prevent the spread 
of tuberculosis.
6
 The new public health believed that further gains in health could only be 
achieved when individuals changed their behaviour. A salient feature of new public health was 
the emergence of the health centre, which sought to educate the public about disease and 
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hygiene. After the advent of the germ theory of disease, two approaches to disease became 
common in the US. On the one hand, there were physicians who adopted a narrow, biomedical 
approach towards public health by identifying germs, disease carriers and disease vectors. On the 
other hand, there were physicians who believed in exploring the socio-economic causes of ill 
health as well. For example, progressive health reformers such as Charles Chapin subscribed to 
the notion that new public health methods, such as the isolation of infected patients after 
bacteriological tests and a program of disinfecting the dwellings of victims, could control disease 
whereas epidemiologists such as Joseph Goldberger emphasised the link between poverty and 
disease.
7
  
 Indonesian physicians adopted the second holistic approach to public health during the 
twentieth century by relating it to the socio-economic development of their country. This form of 
holistic approach to health was related to nation-building and emphasised an adequate intake of 
nutrients in the diet and an equitable distribution of food.  It was also emphasised that for a 
newly-independent country, nation-building in all respects was a priority.  
 
International Health during the Inter-War Period, 1918-1939 
 
From the mid-nineteenth century until around 1920, international health efforts were mainly 
directed to protect Europe from epidemics of plague and cholera.
8
  After 1920, international 
health was no longer centred exclusively on the prevention of infectious diseases but expanded 
its scope to include the promotion of health through public health education and preventive 
measures. International health was marked by a tension between a narrow focus on combating 
infectious diseases and a much broader perspective that embraced socio-political and economic 
factors. After 1920, due to the impetus of Health Organisation of the League of Nations and 
philanthropic organisations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, international health activities 
expanded from Europe and North America and to other parts of the world including the 
European colonies of Asia. 
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 In 1909, the Rockefeller Foundation was established to advance the health and well-being 
of people both within the US and abroad. The Foundation was based on the premise that disease 
was the supreme ill of human life and the source of poverty, ignorance, vice, inefficiency and 
other evils.
9
  Therefore, the key to both economic advancement and social improvement was the 
eradication of disease.  In 1909, the Sanitary Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation chose 
hookworm as the target disease for eradication, given that it was an international health problem. 
Sufferers of hookworm exhibited a retardation of physical and mental growth and a decline in 
economic productivity.
10
  It was a demonstrable disease as there was a clear link between 
hookworm infestation and loss of economic productivity; and, the cure was relatively 
straightforward. Diagnosis was relatively easy; however, for a permanent solution to the 
hookworm problem, the population had to be educated in preventative hygiene as well. The 
Sanitary Commission, which operated in the Southern states of the US including Virginia, 
initiated programs involving hookworm surveys, curing the disease, and educating the public 
through illustrated lectures about the importance of sanitation.
11
  The Sanitary Commission used 
hookworm eradication was an example to inform governments that specific diseases could be 
stamped out with increased public investment. Importantly, it reflected American Progressive era 
concerns that science could aid the solving of human ills.
12
  The successes of the Sanitary 
Commission in reducing the incidence of hookworm in the southern states of US encouraged the 
Rockefeller trustees to expand the anti-hookworm campaign on a worldwide basis through the 
International Health Division which would undertake hookworm surveys and formulate policy 
recommendations for colonial and national health authorities. This organisation would include 
training public health personnel, and financing the development of model health units in 
countries such as Chile, Brazil, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies. These units served as models 
through which the International Health Board demonstrated new scientific knowledge applicable 
to local conditions.
13
  
 International philanthropy for the advancement of public health was a delicate issue for 
the Rockefeller Foundation as any kind of external assistance was construed as infringement of 
the political sovereignty of nation states. The Foundation was faced with a dilemma:  should 
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international health should be solely left to the domain of philanthropic agencies or should the 
advancement of international health become the responsibility of the newly-founded League of 
Nations that represented the interests of its member states.
14
  As a solution, the Foundation 
awarded grants-in-aid to the League of Nations enabling it to represent the sovereign states. 
 The League of Nations Health Organisation (LNHO) was founded in 1920, two years 
after the conclusion of World War I. LNHO contributions included: (a) the international 
circulation of medical discoveries; (b) the creation of  an epidemiological intelligence bureau for 
the collection and dissemination of data on infectious diseases; (c) the  international 
standardisation of vaccine production; (d) the expansion of the frontiers of  social medicine with 
studies related to nutrition, housing, rural hygiene and water supplies; and,  (e) furnishing 
technical assistance to governments needing external assistance to suppress epidemics, conduct 
health surveys, evaluate health services, advise on port sanitation and reorganise health 
administrations. The International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation closely liaised 
with the LNHO to establish hygiene institutes which served as bulwarks against epidemics.  
  The relationship between the LNHO and the Rockefeller Foundation was symbiotic. The 
Foundation supported the LNHO’s weekly, monthly and annual epidemiological reports and its 
research pertaining to social deprivation whereas the latter provided a coherent structure for the 
Rockefeller-funded research institutions. The Rockefeller Foundation supported the LNHO’s 
recruitment of staff. Between 1922 and 1930, the Rockefeller Foundation invested US$1.3 
million in the LNHO.
15
  The complexities of Rockefeller’s relationship with the LNHO were 
noticeable in the differences between Foundation Officers Selskar Gunn on the one hand and 
Frederick Russell on the other vis-à-vis their divergent conceptions of public health. Russell 
perceived the LNHO as a public health department and therefore was in favour of supporting the 
latter albeit for a short-term period only whereas Selskar Gunn argued that the LNHO was 
responsible for the ‘welfare of mankind’ and the prevention of war and was therefore eligible for 
long-term funding from the Rockefeller Foundation.  
 Gunn, who was the Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation in rural China, intended 
to use health measures to facilitate entry into rural development with a view to raising the 
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educational, social and economic standards of the people. This was at odds with the International 
Health Board’s policy in the 1930s that emphasised control of specific infectious diseases. Gunn 
argued that the development of a medical policy was closely linked to progress in industry and 
agriculture.
16
 His views on rural development were shared by Andrija Štampar, a distinguished 
Yugoslavian scholar of social medicine and Ludwik Rajchman, a Polish bacteriologist, who was 
Medical Director at the League of Nations. Rajchman provided Gunn with an opportunity to 
articulate his notion of using public health as a means to further rural development at a meeting 
on rural hygiene organized by the LNHO in Bandung, Indonesia in 1937. The meeting was held 
in Bandung—then known as Parijs van Java (The Paris of Java) in Dutch—due to its salubrious 
climate. The government of the Dutch East Indies intended to showcase the efficient organisation 
of their health centre at Purwokerto in Java as an exemplar for organising the health systems of 
other colonies. Raden Kodijat (then a regency doctor) represented the Dutch East Indies in the 
meeting.   
 The Bandung Conference approached the question of rural hygiene from an 
interdisciplinary perspective that involved collaboration of medical professionals with sanitary 
officers, architects, engineers, scientists, and agriculturalists. The Conference acknowledged that 
in the Eastern countries, preventive medicine was a cost effective way of improving health.
17
 
Such an approach would involve tracing the socio-economic causes of ill health; for example, the 
Conference recognised the correlation of overpopulation with a high rate of infant mortality in 
the East.
18
  Poor diet, a low standard of living, and oppressive land laws were regarded as 
causative factors for malnutrition that led to infant mortality. Scientific research into nutrition, 
and demonstrations of the nutritive value of certain foodstuffs through village lectures, could 
help mitigate the problem of malnutrition in some Asian countries. The Conference 
acknowledged that good health was a part of overall population wellbeing. Decentralised health 
delivery to the rural areas (focusing on preventing disease) would likely prove a cost effective 
public health measure; but, first the rural public had to be educated through practical hygiene 
demonstrations.
19
 The Bandung Conference was revolutionary in perceiving public health as a 
cog in the wheel of rural development, addressing sensitive political issues such as land reform 
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in colonial countries, and placing the villagers at the forefront of the development process. The 
delegates to the Conference saw public health as a means of nation-building. Nationalists such as 
India’s Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) were inspired by the ideals of rural 
reconstruction and incorporated them into their thinking.  
 During the inter-war period, with the active participation of the LNHO and philanthropic 
foundations, the scope of international health widened to include not only the prevention of 
infectious disease but also the promotion of primary healthcare, especially in the European 
colonies of Asia. Within the domain of international health, there was an unresolved dilemma 
related to the degree of involvement of philanthropic foundations within the sphere of what was 
otherwise considered a state responsibility. The Rockefeller Foundation developed a symbiotic 
relationship with the LNHO in the post-World War I period by funding the activities of the latter. 
At the same time, the LNHO provided a forum for Rockefeller Foundation officials such as 
Gunn to articulate their notions of public health.  
 
Colonial Medicine in the Dutch East Indies 
 
Medical initiatives in the Dutch East Indies prior to the twentieth century were limited to 
curative care and catered to the European populations in the larger cities such as Batavia, 
Semarang and Surabaya. In the nineteenth century, the impact of Western medicine upon public 
health was marginal with the exception of smallpox vaccination.
20
  Additionally, due to the 
shortage of doctors, both the local population and the Europeans relied on indigenous healing 
practices.
21
  But, towards the beginning of the twentieth century, with the initiation of the 
effective anti-yaws campaign using salvarsan, the acceptance of Western medicine became 
widespread. This section explores colonial public health in the Dutch East Indies, the 
unpopularity of certain public health measures due to the highhandedness of the Public Health 
Service, and the ways in which health became part of the anti-colonial struggle at a time when 
colonial public health measures were subject to critique by Indonesian nationalists.  
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 In the nineteenth century, the health personnel of the colonial state were attached to the 
Military Health Service (Militair Geneeskundige Dienst). A separate Civil Medical Service was 
established in 1911 and subsequently renamed Dienst voor den Volksgezondheid (DVG or Public 
Health Service) in 1925. The Public Health Service launched campaigns against endemic 
diseases such as yaws, malaria, hookworm and other epidemic diseases, such as cholera and 
plague. The Propaganda Division of the Public Health Service was established in 1924 to 
inculcate hygienic practices in the native population. In addition, the improvement of housing 
conditions was undertaken with a view to prevent outbreaks of plague after the Public Health 
Service acknowledged that faulty housing construction led to rat infestation. In particular, rats 
infested the bamboo used for the construction of houses by the indigenous population.  In 
response, the colonial government advocated the destruction of houses. But such measures 
resulted in physical displacement of the people and ensuing economic hardship.
22
  For these 
reasons, the Public Health Service’s anti- plague measures were resented.   
  Between 1912 and 1940, the budget of the colonial administration of the Netherlands 
East Indies allocated to the Health Service ranged from 2.5 to 5%; but, this allocation registered 
a declining trend for much of the period.
23
  Health was one of the foremost issues on the 
nationalist agenda in the Dutch East Indies.
24
 During the colonial period, the Volksraad served as 
a political space for Indonesian nationalists to enter debate about the policies of the colonial 
government and present their own alternatives. The Volksraad was conceived as an advisory 
body by the Dutch government for the Dutch East Indies in 1918, and under the jurisdiction of 
the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies and the Dutch parliament. A few prominent 
Indonesian nationalists, including physicians, were members of this advisory body: among them 
was Abdul Rasjid.  I will now briefly examine the contributions of Abdul Firman gelar 
Maharadja Soangkoepon (the Volksraad delegate from Eastern Sumatra) and nationalist 
physician Abdul Rasjid, also from Eastern Sumatra (in fact they were brothers), both of whom 
attempted to envision an Indonesian alternative to the dominant colonial health model, which 
focused largely on the prevention of infectious diseases in the 1930s.  
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  Soangkoepon, who was critical of the high cost of healthcare in the Dutch East Indies, 
encouraged private initiatives for promoting hygiene and sanitation in rural areas, a task which 
could well be accomplished by enlisting Indies doctors, who were better placed than their Dutch 
counterparts to determine the health needs of the community. Rasjid argued that medicine not 
only affected the physical but also the spiritual wellbeing of the person and could be studied 
from scientific, religious and humanist considerations.
25
  Rasjid’s view of health embraced not 
only the narrow defence against disease but engaged broadly with the socio-economic aspects 
affecting the overall wellbeing of the people by orienting  medical education to health conditions 
in the rural areas . Medicine anchored to Western science and adapted to the Indies way of life 
was essential for promoting the acceptance of basic hygiene practices.  The nationalist leaders 
such as Soangkoepon and Rasjid thus used the Volksraad as a political space from which to 
critique the nature of colonial medicine of the 1930s.  
  A major dichotomy evident within public health between 1924 and 1939 concerned the 
authoritarian approach of the Dutch and the Rockefeller Foundation initiative of using health 
education to promote hygiene.
26
 The hookworm eradication campaigns implemented by the 
Rockefeller Foundation in Java were a part of a much larger campaign that extended worldwide 
from Europe, Asia, Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific islands such as Fiji to the American South. In 
the Dutch East Indies, the hookworm campaign spanned a fifteen year period from 1924-1939 
under the leadership of J.L. Hydrick. One of the consequences of the hookworm campaign was 
the emergence of small rural health units, which focused on preventative hygiene.
27
  Hydrick 
visualised preventive hygiene as the lynchpin upon which medical care would be based. 
Educating people regarding hygienic habits would ensure efficient utilisation of the medical 
facilities available, thereby reducing the general cost of sickness. In contrast to the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s approach of using health education to prevent hookworm, the Public Health 
Service of the colonial government insisted on mandatory treatment of hookworm patients with 
chenopodium (a worm medicine).  
  In 1936, Hydrick built a Hygiene Mantri school in Purwokerto to train doekoen bajis 
(traditional birth attendants) in safe birthing practices as the Dutch East Indies had a high rate of 
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maternal and neonatal mortality. Western educated doctors did not have the numbers to address 
this problem on their own; thus, maternal mortality was a significant cause of death in the rural 
areas of the archipelago.
28
  Villagers in the rural areas were rather hesitant to seek Western 
medical help for childbirth as the costs were prohibitive.  
  By 1938, Hydrick’s proposal to enlist the assistance of doekoen bajis provoked a debate 
between Poorwo Soedarmo on the one hand and Raden Mochtar and Sardjito on the other.  Both 
were widely acknowledged as the doyens of Indonesian medical science during the 1950s (their 
contributions will be assessed later in Chapters 2 and 6). Poorwo Soedarmo specifically rejected 
the idea of training doekoen bajis as he considered them too set in their ways to adopt hygienic 
birthing practices. Instead, he proposed that women who had basic training in nursing be given 
short period of training as midwife helpers.
29
 As he was presenting his case at the first congress 
of the Vereeniging van Indonesische Geneeskundigen (Association of Indonesian Physicians) at 
Semarang in December 1938, Sardjito, who served as the moderator, sidelined him. In contrast, 
Raden Mochtar presented a much longer argument that advocated the training of doekoen bajis 
in hygienic birthing practices which attacked Poorwo Soedarmo’s argument.30 Towards the close 
of the Congress, delegates adopted a resolution that supported Mochtar’s advocacy of training 
doekoen bajis as a stopgap measure to address the shortage of doctors in rural areas.
31
 The debate 
between Poorwo Soedarmo and Raden Mochtar illustrated the competing strategies amidst native 
physicians regarding the question of how to efficiently extend modern obstetrical services to the 
rural areas of the Indies archipelago where doctors were in short supply.  
  Even following the inauguration of the Public Health Service in 1924, the Dutch were 
still reluctant to launch health educational campaigns in the rural areas of the Indies archipelago 
due to enormous financial costs and the risk of disrupting the local adat (village customs). As a 
result, the colonial public health campaigns embodied narrow technocentric approaches such as 
the use of salvarsan to cure yaws, where concrete results of Western medicine were apparent to 
the indigenous population. Additionally, two anti-plague measures initiated by the colonial state 
including: (a) puncturing the spleen of corpses to detect the presence of plague; and, (b) rat 
proofing of houses were authoritarian and provoked considerable opposition from the native 
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population. The former measure was held by pious Muslims to violate the sanctity of the body 
after death.
32
 In contrast, the Rockefeller Foundation promoted an educational approach to public 
health that sought to cultivate hygienic habits in villagers. Neither the authoritarian/technocentric 
public health approach of the Dutch nor the educational approach of the Rockefeller Foundation 
addressed the socio-economic causes of ill health.  
 
Challenges Confronting Indonesian Public Health: Japanese Occupation to Independence 
(1942-1949) 
 
 Between 1942 and 1949, the Indonesian health infrastructure was ruined by seven years of 
warfare, three-and-a-half years of Japanese occupation and four years of revolutionary struggle 
against the Dutch. During the Japanese occupation, public health became a vehicle of political 
propaganda. The Japanese were never tired of stressing the superiority of spiritualism (semangat) 
over technical skills and discipline in ensuring their victory in the Pacific War and achieving 
Indonesian independence.
33
  Within this framework, Soekarno and nationalist physicians 
envisioned a niche for Indonesian doctors, not only for treating the sick but also in the creation of 
a strong and healthy citizenry free of disease.
34
 Nationalist physicians such as Abdul Rasjid and 
Boentaran Martoatmodjo, who now had more responsibility than ever before, envisaged a 
holistic approach to public health characterised by (a) improvements to the standard of living; (b) 
increasing the nation’s population; (c) reducing the high prevalence of maternal and infant 
mortality; (d) promoting nutrition; and, (e) ensuring the cost-effective measures of preventative 
health through recourse to djamu (Indonesian traditional medicine). After the Japanese 
occupation of the archipelago ended in August 1945 and Indonesia claimed independence, the 
fledgling Ministry of Health, fired with the spirit of freedom and self-confidence, under the 
revolutionaries initiated a number of scattered but symbolic initiatives for public health, which 
indicated that the Indonesian nation was capable of standing on its own feet. Unfortunately, most 
Indonesian public health initiatives failed to materialise due to the Dutch military action against 
the revolutionaries between 1947 and 1949.  
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 During the Japanese occupation, the subordination of health initiatives of the Indonesian 
archipelago to the military, the appropriation of 50 per cent of the harvest for the military 
(Gunseikanbu), and the forced labour of Indonesians were responsible for many deaths by 
starvation.
35
 The Japanese realised that ill health among the Javanese labourers was a constraint 
to their productivity, and would eventually thwart the success of the Japanese goal of 
establishing a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ in Southeast Asia.36  Under the 
Japanese, the focus of the Central Office of Public Health (Eiseikyokutyo) was entirely upon its 
Djawa Sehat (Healthy Java) campaign, which was mainly intended to prevent endemic diseases 
such as malaria and yaws that affected economic productivity.
37
  The implementation of the 
actual disease eradication campaigns was entrusted to the regencies. But, they were suffering 
from an acute shortage of medical supplies due to budgetary cuts and lack of access to supplies 
from abroad. As a result, the Djawa Sehat campaign was ineffective.  
 Unlike the Eiseikyokutyo, which used public health as a tool for political mobilisation of 
the population through mass disease eradication campaigns, Martoatmodjo advocated a 
comprehensive health program that envisioned raising the standard of living of the Indonesians 
through a reduction of maternal and infant mortality, malnutrition and chronic tuberculosis. This 
would require a comprehensive program of health education in schools.
38
 Martoatmodjo 
attributed the high prevalence of tuberculosis during the War in the Pacific to the poor nutritional 
status of the average Indonesian family whose per capita consumption of protein-rich food was 
sub optimal.  To alleviate the tuberculosis problem, Martoatmodjo recommended the 
introduction of nutrition education within the Indonesian family.  
  In 1945, shortly after the Japanese surrender, Indonesian medical care became mired in 
political uncertainty resulting from the Indonesian Revolution, the Dutch reoccupation of the 
archipelago and financial problems. The two Dutch Military Actions (1947 and 1948) caused 
displacements of the population and interrupted the supply of medications.
39
  The revolutionary 
government’s Ministry of Health was translocated from Jakarta to Yogyakarta soon after the 
First Military Action. The Ministry attempted to address the problem of ill health by 
implementing a program to combat infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, yaws, 
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plague, typhoid and dysentery.  Thus, unsurprisingly, the implementation of the program to 
combat infectious diseases fell short of expectations. 
 The Office of the Division of Hygiene and Health Education of the Ministry of Health of 
the Revolutionary government was conducted from Magelang in 1946. The Division of Hygiene 
and Health Education commenced enlisting the cooperation of the local people in the 
establishment of a rural hygiene service, which was active in promoting health education. The 
main feature of the health education work in Magelang which began as a health demonstration 
unit, was the campaign against soil and water pollution that enlisted the support of villagers in 
constructing a water supply facility and in mobilising joint action on health issues. In the regency 
of Banyumas in Central Java, paramedical personnel and health educators launched guerrilla 
warfare against the Dutch, marking the beginning of the First Dutch Military Action.  In 1948, 
The Rockefeller Foundation had provided a financial aid of Rp. 165.000 to pay sanitary workers 
in Yogyakarta.
40
 The rural hygiene demonstration units established during the Revolutionary 
period were particular instances of Indonesian initiatives in public health. Under the 
revolutionaries, the Indonesian Ministry of Health was unable to coordinate the activities of the 
rural hygiene units due to the Dutch Military Actions. Following the ‘Madiun Affair,’ and the 
Second Military Action, the rural hygiene services programs ceased.
41
 After the proclamation of 
Indonesian independence, the Ministry of Health prioritised the upgrading of the qualifications 
of paramedical personnel as a means of alleviating the acute shortage of physicians. The 
Rockefeller Foundation supported the training of paramedical personnel such as vaccinators, 
public health instructors, and malaria campaign officials in Magelang.   
Between 1942 and 1949, nationalist physicians were in the process of developing an 
Indonesian approach to public health that was holistic: it eschewed the narrow emphasis on 
preventing communicable diseases. Additionally, the Indonesian approach emphasised 
improving the living standards of the people in the expectation that it would reduce the 
prevalence of maternal and infant mortality, malnutrition and tuberculosis through a program of 
health education. During the Japanese occupation, Indonesian physicians created imageries of a 
strong and healthy citizenry free of disease and a hard-working population as necessary 
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preconditions for the attainment of independence.   Between 1945 and 1949, challenged by 
Dutch military blockades and shortage of essential medical supplies, the country’s leaders were 
optimistic that Indonesia could rebuild its health infrastructure devastated by war. But they 
initiated symbolic yet uncoordinated public health initiatives that suffered from lack of 
infrastructure and financial support. As a result, the holistic Indonesian approach to public health 
had failed to reach fruition by 1949.  
 
Indonesian Thinking on Social Medicine 
 
During the 1950s, the nationalist ideal of creating a strong and healthy population was influential 
in shaping the course of Indonesian social medicine. Broadly aligning themselves with the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), which defined health as a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely as the absence of disease, Indonesian physicians adopted a 
holistic interpretation of social medicine that envisioned raising the population’s standard of 
living through the reduction of maternal and infant mortality, the elimination of malnutrition and 
the provision of health education. In addition, they viewed the symbolic significance of nutrition 
not only in terms of safeguarding health but also as ensuring an equitable distribution of food for 
all Indonesians. They saw it as the key to realise the nationalist dream of a just and prosperous 
society. Syncretic in its approach, Indonesian social medicine critically evaluated and adapted 
healthcare models functioning elsewhere to Indonesian conditions. In this section, I will assess 
the contributions of Seno Sastroamidjojo, Raden Mochtar, Johannes Leimena and Poorwo 
Soedarmo and, to a lesser extent, of Soetopo in order to understand the comprehensive agenda of 
social medicine in postcolonial Indonesia that perceived health not only as the means of 
preventing disease but also its symbolic significance in nation-building.  
The WHO was founded in 1948. The preamble to the Constitution of the WHO was 
revolutionary because it stated that the enjoyment of the highest standard of health was the 
fundamental human right of every human being. Within WHO circles, planners had recognised 
the need to convince governments about the cost-effectiveness of preventative health measures 
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and to translate figures related to infant mortality into national economic loss.
42
  C.E.A. 
Winslow, who served as a consultant with the Public Health Administration for the WHO in the 
1950s, emphasised that in the mid-twentieth century, public health was not limited solely to the 
controlling of communicable diseases: it also sought to raise the general efficiency of the 
population.
43
 In Africa, tropical diseases such as the vector-borne African trypanosomiasis 
(sleeping sickness) inhibited the newly-independent nation’s exploitation of cultivable land. 
Physicians working for the WHO recognised that public health was a vital part of a broader 
program of social improvement. 
In its first decade of its operation (1948-1958), the WHO focused its attention largely 
upon mass campaigns against the treatment of endemic diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, 
yaws and syphilis. To this end, it initiated a series of pilot demonstration projects, particularly in 
the Southeast Asia region.
44
 Penicillin was used as the magic bullet in the campaign against yaws 
and venereal diseases. People in developing countries were urged as follows:  
Let us spray your house, this will prevent malaria. Let us give you an injection, this will 
cure your syphilis and your yaws. Let us inoculate you, this will protect you from 
tuberculosis.
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In the early 1950s, the WHO approached the problem of public health in newly-decolonised 
nations of Asia through an amalgam of campaigns intended to control endemic diseases. Its 
ultimate aim was to provide a technological fix to the problem of disease. The WHO 
implemented its campaigns in a top-down manner that overlooked fundamental questions such as 
addressing the basic needs of the population in developing countries.  
Unlike the narrow technocentric approach to public health pioneered by the WHO, 
Indonesian physicians interpreted public health from the perspective of resuscitating a newly- 
independent nation that was enfeebled by three-hundred-and-fifty years of colonialism, three-
and-a-half years of Japanese occupation and four years of revolutionary struggle against the 
Dutch. In contrast to the reductionist perspective of the WHO physicians, who associated public 
health measures with the elimination of disease and improving the overall productivity of the 
population, Indonesian physicians advocated a comprehensive program that envisioned raising 
49 
 
the living standards of the people. This involved the introduction of initiatives to reduce maternal 
and infant mortality, improve the nutritional standards of the people and ensure an equitable 
distribution of food.  
 President Soekarno’s vision of Pembangunan (nation-building) had left a deep imprint on 
the development of Indonesian social medicine of the 1950s. This vision reflected the newly- 
decolonised archipelagic nation’s aspirations for a brighter future based on the notion that the 
Indonesian nation possessed immense physical and psychological strength engendered by the 
independence struggle.
46
 Pembangunan’s basic pillar was the Pantjasila doctrine, i.e., the 
philosophical underpinnings of the Indonesian state which specified belief in one God, just and 
civilised humanity, democracy, and social justice for all Indonesians. The principle of social 
justice for all Indonesians was reflected in Soekarno’s concern for ensuring Indonesia’s self-
sufficiency in rice that would lead to the fulfilment of one of the most basic needs (food) of all 
Indonesians.
47
 Soekarno’s version of pembangunan embraced the notion of kemerdekaan 
(freedom) that stood for multiple possibilities such as prosperity, human dignity, and the physical 
and spiritual welfare for every Indonesian. Pembangunan was associated with achieving the 
highest standard of living for every citizen, investment in human skills, and achieving an 
equitable distribution of wealth.
48
 Soekarno’s pembangunan was internationalist in the truest 
sense: he first evaluated successful socio-economic models functioning elsewhere in the world 
and then adapted them to suit Indonesian conditions. In the following paragraphs I explore the 
ideas of Sastroamidjojo, Mochtar, Leimena and Poorwo Soedarmo in order to ascertain how the 
Indonesian physicians eschewed the narrow biomedical model of public health that focused on 
disease control and instead, embraced a holistic program that included nutrition and other social 
factors that affected health outcomes.  
 Seno Sastroamidjojo was a leading social medicine expert during the Soekarno era in 
Indonesia. His vision of social medicine serves as a vantage point from which to examine how 
social medicine ideas were appropriated in an Indonesian context. Sastroamidjojo had enjoyed an 
eclectic educational experience initially at a pesantren (madrasah) in Grabak (Java) and was a 
STOVIA alumnus, 1916. He later pursued specialist training in gynaecology and social medicine 
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at the University of Amsterdam, trained in midwifery at Berlin University, venereology at 
Budapest (Hungary) and social medicine at Stockholm. He served as a doctor for the Dutch East 
Indies Public Health Service for a brief period after which he worked as a private practitioner in 
Jakarta for six years and then as a surgeon for the Biliton mining company. His international 
training influenced his social medicine outlook. 
 According to Sastroamidjojo, social medicine was a synthesis of sociology and public 
health.
49
  His definition of health as a state of material and spiritual well-being resonated with the 
WHO definition. His thinking on health was comprehensive as it embraced all phases of a 
person’s life including prenatal, postnatal, childhood, adolescence, adulthood and old age. A 
major public health problem discussed in Sastroamidjojo’s writings was the prevalence of 
venereal diseases in Indonesia.
50
  Recognising that venereal diseases embodied the degeneration 
of the nation’s population both physically and morally, he advocated the medical examination 
and sex education of couples before marriage. Another health problem frequently discussed by 
Sastroamidjojo was malnutrition. The high rate of oedema among Indonesian infants in the 
1950s, according to Sastroamidjojo, was due to a shortage of food; according to his logic, a 
malnourished child mirrored the poor health of the economy.
51
  By linking malnutrition to the 
poor state of the Indonesian economy, Sastroamidjojo reflected the idea of pembangunan or 
developmentalism.  
 A second influential physician who reflected the WHO’s definition of health was Raden 
Mochtar. Mochtar, who served as Head of the Department of Health Education of newly- 
independent Indonesia, and was instrumental in instituting community health programs both 
academically and practically. His chief concern in the 1950s was how to achieve the best 
possible standard of health for the average Indonesian through cost-effective preventive health 
measures such as the construction of latrines and stimulating community health initiatives 
through pilot health demonstration projects such as those initiated in Rawasari and Magelang.  
Mochtar was born on 23 July 1900 in Cilacap. After graduating from the STOVIA in 
1924, he was employed by the Rockefeller Foundation as an assistant doctor in Central Java to 
promote intensive hygiene work in the area, using hygiene films and lantern slides to educate the 
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public about hookworm disease.
52
 The Rockefeller Foundation bequeathed to the nationalist 
physicians, the model of a regency health service, initially established in Purwokerto. In 1937-
38, the Dutch East Indies Health Service underwent decentralisation through the establishment of 
Regency Health Units in Kebumen and Demak in Central Java.
53
  From 1939 onwards, the health 
demonstration units of the Rockefeller Foundation were taken over by Indonesians. Mochtar 
envisioned the establishment of village hygiene units made available to village households.   
Around 1946, the idea of establishing a village health service was realised in the regency 
of Banyumas.
54
  Mochtar had observed that the Dutch Military Action (1947) had forced the 
village health service to relocate to the Yogyakarta Sultanate at Magelang. Village hygiene work 
based on the Magelang model was also replicated with some success in Madiun; but, owing to 
the Military Action, the rural hygiene organisation was disrupted.
55
 However, following 
Indonesian independence in 1949, the rural hygiene work re-commenced in Magelang through 
the efforts of the Demonstration Centre which mobilised villagers to construct water supplies by 
appealing to the Javanese notion of gotong rojong (mutual cooperation). Mochtar was convinced 
that health education would help stimulate demand for hitherto unmet health needs. This meant 
mobilising the community around rural development projects.  
 Mochtar became the Head of the Department of Community Education within the 
Ministry of Health soon after Indonesia’s independence in 1949.  He served as Professor of 
Public Health within the Faculty of Medicine at the newly-established Universitas Indonesia. He 
also served as a visiting faculty member for the Universities of Gadjah Mada, Airlangga and 
Hasanuddin. Mochtar reiterated the WHO thinking of the 1950s, i.e., that health was not merely 
an absence of disease but a state of physical, psychological and social well-being.
56
 At the time, 
environmental factors affecting population wellbeing included inadequate housing and diseases 
caused due to nutritional deficiencies such as kwashiorkor. Public health was a means of 
alleviating human suffering:
57
 it was not an isolated pillar standing on its own but was anchored 
in public welfare, the rights of labour, and the humane care of the mentally ill. As well, 
according to Mochtar, it was a means of achieving human dignity.
58
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As Professor of Public Health at Universitas Indonesia (UI), Mochtar saw public health 
education as a means of improving health by inculcating hygienic habits.
59
 Mochtar viewed 
health education as an active process. In other words, the health educator had to convince the 
public that health, like food, was one of the basic necessities of life. Health education 
necessitated a coordinated approach to various levels of government: central, provincial and 
district.
60
 It consisted of imparting communication of the health message through films, lectures, 
newspapers, and/or radio.
61
 The ‘two-way Socratic method,’ an important pedagogic technique 
for public health education, consisted of discussions of public health issues initiated by public 
health officials with schoolchildren.
62
 Mochtar thus envisioned the public as an active partner in 
the health education process. In the interests of sensitising future medical practitioners to social 
conditions in the rural areas, Universitas Indonesia introduced a course on preventive medicine.  
Mochtar’s ideal of achieving the highest possible standard of health through cost- 
effective preventative measures – one that emphasised community participation – crystallised in 
the form of Puskesmas (Primary Health Centres) in the late 1960s. The full realisation of 
Mochtar’s ideals may have been inhibited by the waxing and waning of Indonesia’s 
parliamentary institutions, the lack of coordination between the centre and provinces regarding 
financing health projects, and the Dar Ul Islam insurrection in West Java in 1956. Although 
these initiatives were both rooted in local circumstance and constrained by its politics, similar 
challenges faced Johannes Leimena as he sought to adapt international exemplars to the unstable 
environment of the new republic. 
 Johannes Leimena, who was probably the most influential thinker on social medicine 
during the Soekarno era, officiated as Minister of Health between 1947 and 1956 (except in the 
first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo from 1953-1955). In addition, he sought to achieve 
congruence between Soekarno’s vision of relating health to nation-building and the WHO 
definition of health. An eclectic thinker, he sought to evaluate public health models of various 
countries and adapt these models to suit Indonesian conditions.  
 According to Leimena, the symbolic capital of public health was evident in 
reconstructing the Indonesian nation. He contended that public health and socio-economic 
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development mutually reinforced each other.
63
 In other words, an optimal level of social and 
economic development could only be achieved in the presence of good health.  Leimena’s logic 
was that disease and poverty constituted a vicious circle. A sick person became poor and his/her 
impoverishment precipitated further disease. Improving the people’s socio-economic conditions 
would in itself ensure the development of a basic standard of health.
64
 A healthy nation was 
reflected in the physical and mental wellbeing of its inhabitants.
65
  
As curative care was expensive and did not cover more than a miniscule section of the 
population living in the urban areas, Leimena laid great emphasis on prophylactic-hygiene work, 
particularly in rural areas of Indonesia where nearly 90% of the country’s population lived.66 He 
conceptualised the village (desa) as a self-supporting administrative unit, capable of funding its 
own health activities. The inhabitants of the desa would be approached not only for prophylactic 
hygiene work, but also for curative health measures such as the treatment of yaws-affected 
villagers where the concrete results of Western medicine were visible. The kernel of Leimena’s 
thinking on health was the Bandung Plan (1951), an  ambitious program that attempted to 
integrate preventive and curative health activities through the establishment of desa polyclinics 
and sub-district health centres under the direction of the regency physician (dokter kabupaten).
67
 
But, execution of the Bandung Plan throughout Indonesia in 1954 was impeded by financial and 
administrative bottlenecks.
68
  Not all regencies and desas were sufficiently self-supporting to 
finance the public health programs devolved to the local governments under the Plan.  
In 1953, a year prior to the extension of the Bandung Plan throughout Indonesia, the 
WHO offered a fellowship to Leimena to study the organisation of public health in Norway, 
Britain, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India and erstwhile Malaya (Singapore).
69
  During his stay in 
Norway, Leimena noted that the Norwegian government had recognised tuberculosis as a social 
disease. In order to reduce the prevalence of the disease, the government had undertaken efforts 
to raise the standard of living of the people by raising their nutritional standards and improving 
their conditions of work.
70
  In Britain, Leimena observed that the National Health Service, a 
publicly funded healthcare system, was available to every citizen. However, he was not 
impressed with the bureaucratic functioning of the organisation and the lack of emphasis given to 
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preventive health measures.  During his visit to Yugoslavia, Štampar impressed upon Leimena 
the necessity of instituting health education and integrating preventative and curative health 
services under the direction of the health centre.
71
 The Central Institute of Hygiene constituted 
the apex of the Yugoslav health services and advised the hygiene institutes at the district level 
which had considerable autonomy in advising the health centres that came under their 
jurisdiction.  
After observing the organisation of the health services in Europe, Leimena visited Egypt 
to evaluate the functioning of the Health and Demonstration Centre at Calioub, established with 
US and WHO assistance to ameliorate rural poverty among the fellahins (peasants).
72
 The last 
two countries visited by Leimena before the conclusion of his WHO fellowship were India and 
Singapore.
73
  In India, he explored along with India’s Minister of Health, Raj Kumari Amrit 
Kaur the possibility of using rural reconstruction as a means of socio-economic uplift of the 
population. In Singapore, the last country on Leimena’s official tour, Lloyd Davies (Head of 
Department of Social Medicine at the University of Malaya) discussed the postgraduate teaching 
of public health in that country which involved the integration of the study of the social aspects 
of disease into clinical training.   
Leimena’s thinking on health was undoubtedly influenced by the Norwegian health 
system that envisioned raising the people’s living standards through nutrition and improving 
their conditions at work. In his Public Health in Indonesia: Problems and Planning, published in 
1956, Leimena argued that health activities carried out without improving the social and 
economic conditions could create an unbalanced situation in the community.
74
  
Later, as Minister of Public Distribution in 1958, Leimena perceived that an adequate 
quantity and quality of nutritious food was critical to the health of expectant mothers, and 
children and to ensuring the productivity of workers. Leimena viewed the question of nutrition 
through the lens of scarcity. He held that in order to overcome nutritional and calorific 
deficiencies, Indonesia would need to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production.  Indonesia’s 
per capita consumption of rice was 84 kg prior to World War II and was 93 kg in the late 
1950s.
75
 However, the country experienced a population growth at 1.7 to 2 per cent per annum in 
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the late 1950s which outstripped its food production.
76
  Indonesia compensated its shortfall of 
rice production through imports. Leimena thought that Indonesia could become self-sufficient in 
rice by maximising its production and distribution to feed its ever growing population. He 
envisioned building Indonesia’s capacity in rice production through intensification of paddy 
cultivation on the island of Java and extensive dry land farming of paddy on the Outer Islands, 
e.g., Kalimantan and Sumatra, as a means to achieve berdiri di atas kaki sendiri (economic self-
sufficiency).  
Leimena viewed Indonesia’s nutritional problems through the lens of the Pantjasila 
doctrine which had social justice for all Indonesians as one of its tenets.
77
  He trained his focus 
on the state machinery in a bid to ensure an equitable distribution of food by maximising the 
production of rice; but his plan to achieve this proved overambitious. The Ministry of Public 
Distribution was unable to coordinate the Ministries of Agriculture, Transmigration, and Labour.   
During the 1950s, initiatives in community health education that intended to educate the 
population about the nutritive value of food were regarded as a significant public health 
intervention to address Indonesia’s nutrition problem. Poorwo Soedarmo is widely regarded as 
the father of Indonesian nutrition (bapak gizi) for his contribution to nutrition research. He 
creatively redesigned health promotion messages from the US to reflect Indonesian conditions. 
He perceived the role of nutrition in not only preventing disease but also in terms of promoting 
good health. He argued that absence of disease did not by itself imply that the person was 
healthy.
78
 
Poorwo Soedarmo, who was an alumnus of the London Post Graduate School of Public 
Health, later became a faculty member of the University of Indonesia’s Medical School, 
Department of Nutrition. His publications on nutrition largely dwelt on the issue of kwashiorkor 
in Indonesia. He had observed that during the colonial period, children who were afflicted by 
kwashiorkor or marasmus were labelled indolent. Since then, the word indolent has been used as 
an epithet to describe the diseased native body.
79
 Poorwo Soedarmo noted in his autobiography 
that nutrition is an important indicator of the quality of the nation.
80
 He advocated that any food 
policy for Indonesia had to take into account the rate of population growth, percentage of 
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dependent population, and a food balance sheet for the Indonesian population which would take 
into account the nutritional requirements of the ‘Average Indonesian.’ He observed that in 
several islands of the archipelago, particularly in Java, Madura, and Bali, self-denial of food was 
regarded as a virtue. As a result, people were reluctant to talk about food scarcity.
81
   
 In 1951, as Director of the newly-established Lembaga Makanan Rakjat (the Nutrition 
Institute at Jakarta) that explored solutions to Indonesia’s nutritional deficiencies, Poorwo 
Soedarmo initiated three-week courses designed to train nutrition assistants in public health 
propaganda to educate Indonesian villagers about the nutritive value of food.  His aim was to see 
population became nutrition-minded.
82
  He thought that as the Indonesian diet was 
homogeneous, i.e., largely rice-based, it was deficient in vitamins, minerals and protein and as a 
consequence people became prone to nutritional disorders. Educating the Indonesian population 
to become nutrition-minded was an important step towards realising the growth of the future 
nation.
83
 
 In 1952, Poorwo Soedarmo creatively appropriated the US nutrition slogan, ‘eat the basic 
seven every day,’ coined during World War II. The slogan referred to the basic seven food 
groups designed to provide food security to the American population under wartime conditions. 
He refashioned it as empat sehat, lima sempurna (four basic foods such as rice, protein, 
vegetables, with fruit and milk added for the maintenance of good health).  The slogan, which 
was intended to diversify the otherwise predominantly rice-based diet of Indonesian children was 
structured around the Sundanese staple diet that consisted of a bowl of rice with an 
accompanying vegetable, a piece of meat, tempe and papaya, foodstuffs that people could easily 
relate to.
84
 Given that meat, a major source of animal protein, was not affordable for many 
Indonesians, Poorwo Soedarmo designed a new but related  slogan murah, tetapi baik (cheap but 
nutritious) according to which tempe, a cheap but rich source of protein would substitute meat in 
the daily diet.
85
  
 Poorwo Soedarmo, who had a holistic understanding of the aetiology of malnutrition, 
attributed the high prevalence of nutritional disorders in Indonesia to faulty nutrition.  He 
observed that in the public schools of Jakarta, nearly all of the students passed the public 
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examinations whereas in the regency of Gunung Kidul in mid-Java, only 5% of students 
managed to pass.
86
 Learning could not be sustained by students from Gunung Kidul whose diets 
were exclusively based on a staple of cassava, a protein-deficient nutrition source. Like Leimena, 
he emphasised that Indonesia’s food shortage could be ameliorated by increasing the production 
of food grains and cereals through close coordination of the Ministry of Health with the 
Ministries of Agriculture, Communications, Industry, Social Affairs and Finance.  
Unlike Sastroamidjojo, Mochtar, Leimena and Poorwo Soedarmo, Soetopo’s contribution 
to Indonesian thinking on social medicine was marginal: he did not articulate a comprehensive 
agenda for social medicine in Indonesia. Nevertheless, he was influential because he framed 
venereal diseases as social diseases. Although venereal diseases were treatable using arsenicals 
and penicillin, identifying the potential carriers of venereal diseases and treating them was 
difficult due to social stigma. He argued that venereal diseases were indicators of larger socio-
economic problems such as economic insecurity, lack of adequate housing, unwholesome 
recreation, inadequate medical care, broken families and inadequate social support.
87
 Therefore, 
he advocated addressing the social causes that were conducive to the spread of venereal diseases.  
An alumnus of the NIAS medical school (1924), Soetopo worked as an assistant teacher 
in Central Burgerlijk Ziekenhuis (CBZ), Surabaya, in the Department of Venereal Diseases. In 
1950 he officiated as the Minister of Health between January and September in Abdul Halim’s 
cabinet. Soon after, he established the Venereal Disease Institute in Surabaya (1951) for 
undertaking research on venereal diseases, particularly syphilis.   
The Venereal Disease Institute initiated the following measures against syphilis: (a) 
diagnosing and treating syphilis cases; (b) screening investigations for syphilis amongst the 
Indonesian armed forces, industrial workers, slum population, students and expectant mothers 
visiting the maternal and child health centres; (c) treatment of prostitutes with penicillin; and, (d) 
medical examination of unmarried couples for venereal diseases.
88
 
In his lecture delivered at the Venereal Disease Institute commemorating World Health 
Day on 7 April 1953, Soetopo stated that prostitution contributed to the spread of venereal 
diseases. He lamented that after the Indonesian Revolution, there was a breakdown of social 
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norms. The youth of the day demanded unrestricted freedom, particularly with respect to the 
loosening of sexual mores.
89
  He termed the prevalence of venereal diseases in independent 
Indonesia a ‘moral crisis’ and observed that eradication efforts would involve joint efforts of the 
Ministries of Health, Education and Labour.
90
 Unlike the WHO, which advocated a purely public 
health approach to the control of venereal diseases such as the treatment of syphilis patients with 
penicillin, Soetopo attributed the prevalence of venereal diseases to prostitution and widespread 
moral decay. 
A common denominator inherent in Indonesian physicians’ approach to social medicine 
was a holistic interpretation of health as not merely the absence of disease but a state of physical 
and mental well-being. A number of leading Indonesian physicians were able to recognise the 
symbolic significance of the campaign against malnutrition and venereal diseases as an effort to 
cultivate a strong and healthy citizenry by attempting to address the underlying social causes of 
disease. Leimena was the most influential Indonesian thinker on social medicine due to his 
position as Minister of Health, and to his statesmanship in achieving congruence between the 
nationalist agenda of health, i.e., in producing a strong and healthy citizenry, with the agenda of 
the WHO. The others, particularly Poorwo Soedarmo, creatively appropriated public health 
slogans from abroad and refashioned them to suit Indonesian conditions. But, they overlooked 
the question of poverty. In contrast to Sastroamidjojo, Mochtar, Leimena and Poorwo Soedarmo, 
Soetopo did not articulate a definitive position on social medicine but remained influential for his 
framing of the prevalence of venereal diseases in Indonesia as a social problem.  
 
Social Medicine in Indonesian Politics 
 
During the 1950s, Indonesia was faced with the challenge of rebuilding its health system. The 
health infrastructure was destroyed during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) and the 
Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), leaving an acute shortage of health personnel. Of the 
approximately 1,200 doctors who served a population of 72 million, most were mainly 
concentrated in the urban areas. In the early 1950s, the Indonesian state was forced by the 
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Netherlands to repay the war debts incurred by the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 
(NICA) during the period 1945 to 1949 and the deficit of the Dutch East Indies from 1942 and 
before. The resultant scarcity of funds made it difficult meeting the cost of the preventive and 
curative health activities which made competing demands on the post-colonial state’s coffers. 
Nevertheless, the questions of equity, access, and availability of healthcare shaped the agenda of 
Indonesian social medicine of the post-independence period and were reflected in the Minutes of 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (The Indonesian House of Representatives).  The Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakjat provided a political space for Indonesian politicians to articulate their 
criticism of public health in a country where the health system was under-resourced, medical 
personnel were sparse, and the state weak.   
 During the early 1950s, Indonesia faced a budgetary deficit of 150-200 million rupiahs 
(equivalent to approximately 45 million US dollars) per year.  Between 1950 and 1951, the 
Masjumi government was torn between negotiating a favourable balance of trade and 
establishing a favourable exchange rate for the rupiah because the latter would increase the 
export of raw materials and meet the expense of the increased import of rice. Under such 
unfavourable financial circumstances, addressing competing health priorities ranging from 
initiating campaigns against malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy and yaws to increasing the supply of 
doctors in rural areas, orientation of health personnel to socio-economic conditions and the 
establishment of hospitals, proved contentious within the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat. For 
example, the campaigns against endemic diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis were 
inhibited by lack of community awareness regarding hygiene.
91
  The government could not 
afford to employ additional doctors or health educators due to financial constraints. Thus, 
physicians and paramedical personnel did not receive adequate salaries. Yet due to their sense of 
commitment towards the medical profession, they would discharge additional duties such as 
administering hospitals without the expectation of any additional remuneration.  
For President Soekarno, ensuring the adequate supply of rice to the people was related to 
the question of ensuring the survival of the future Indonesian nation (mengenai soal mati-
hidupnja bangsa kita di kemudian hari).
92
 Indonesia’s rice production, which was estimated at 
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6.45 million tonnes, was insufficient for the country’s ever-growing population (estimated at 75 
million in 1952).
93
 There was a shortfall of 5.5 million tonnes of rice that had to be imported 
from abroad. Indonesia could solve its food scarcity through two means: (a) opening up new 
lands for cultivation in the Outer Islands; and (b) undertaking research in high yielding varieties 
of rice. For Soekarno, without addressing Indonesia’s food problem, the realisation of a just and 
prosperous society (masjarakat adil dan makmur) was meaningless.
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During Wilopo’s tenure as Prime Minister between April 1952 and June 1953, the 
Ministry of Health under Leimena’s direction had formulated a number of symbolic public 
health initiatives including eradicating social evils particularly alcoholism and prostitution, 
wiping out indolence through improvement of the quality and quantity of food, eradication of 
endemic diseases, ensuring the availability of essential medicines to all Indonesians, and 
promoting research into Indonesian traditional medicine (djamu) with a view to reducing the 
country’s dependence on foreign drugs.95 These initiatives were guided by the notion of fostering 
a strong and healthy nation (rakjat sehat, negara kuat) that was capable of standing on its own 
feet (berdiri di atas kaki sendiri).  
  During Wilopo’s tenure, the promotion of public health in Indonesia was associated 
with the utopian notions of cultivating a strong and healthy citizenry, promoting self-sufficiency 
in economic affairs and realising social justice for the country’s citizens. The commitment to 
health was present but unfortunately, the successful implementation of the health initiatives 
could not materialise due to unfavourable economic circumstances, bureaucratic bottlenecks and 
corruption.  
 In November 1951, the preceding Sukiman cabinet had instituted BAMA (Jajasan Bahan 
Makanan, or the Food Grain Foundation), that was intended to centralise the procurement of rice 
and ensure its affordability to all Indonesians. In addition, middlemen (private organisations) 
were licensed to distribute rice procured by BAMA to the community. The Indonesian 
government not only fixed the price of rice but also imported it from abroad to stabilise the 
prices. Two Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat delegates R. Slamet Tirtosubroto and Sujudi were critical 
of the corruption that marred BAMA’s procurement of rice and the speculation by middlemen 
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that resulted in high prices.
96
  In the regency of Banyuwangi in East Java, widespread prevalence 
of hunger oedema (malnutrition) was conspicuous during the harvest season in 1952, despite an 
abundant supply of rice due to the poor purchasing power of the people.
97
  Ensuring an adequate 
supply of rice for every Indonesian epitomised the realisation of the revolutionary ideal of social 
justice for every Indonesian. But institutional mechanisms such as the BAMA reveal that the 
central government was highly focused upon ensuring a steady supply of rice that did not take 
into account the people’s purchasing capacity.98  
 Apart from its symbolic public health initiatives that were intended to reinforce the 
notion of a strong and healthy nation, the Wilopo cabinet also proposed legislation in 1952 that 
aimed to extend free curative care to the poor in private hospitals. This legislation came into 
effect in 1953.  Indonesian Law 18, 1953 stated that the State would be responsible for the 
attainment of the highest possible standard of health for the Indonesian people by granting 
subsidies for the construction of private hospitals that catered for the needs of the poor and for 
those who could not afford curative care.
99
 But, Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat members were 
sceptical as to whether the poor were really cared for in every private hospital subsidised under 
the legislation. In Makele, on the island of Sulawesi, two Christian Missionary polyclinics which 
served only twelve patients were subsidised under Law 18, 1953, despite the fact that Makele 
lacked a qualified doctor.
100
 The missionary hospitals were not utilised by local residents in 
South Sulawesi owing to religious differences. The majority of the population was Muslim. One 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat delegate, Abul Hajat, expressed reservations, saying that the program 
of granting government subsidies towards the construction of private hospitals was a form of 
‘state intervention’ and steered the nation towards communism.101  Leimena, who was then 
Minister of Health, stated that the main motive of the government in subsidising the construction 
of private hospitals was to stimulate public initiatives in curative health at the village level such 
as building hospitals and to improve the ratio of hospital beds to the total population which stood 
at 8 per 10,000 people, ranking it among the lowest in the world in the 1950s.
102
  High capital 
investment was needed for the establishment of hospitals and the government lacked the 
necessary funding as preventive public health measures, for e.g., elimination of malaria, yaws, 
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leprosy and trachoma, reducing maternal and infant mortality received the top priority within 
public health circles.   
Law 18 of 1953 was the first step for the Ministry of Health to address deficiencies in 
curative care.  However, in this law, ‘poverty’ was very narrowly defined as those who were 
unable to afford the minimum hospitalisation fee of 3.50 rupiahs (approximately 33 cents). 
Poor individuals had to be certified by the Bupati (regency head) before they could be treated 
free of cost in private hospitals subsidised by the government.  Identification of the poor among 
the general population according to the narrow classification by income was unrealistic due to 
the depreciation of the rupiah and high inflation.  
By 1958, the utopian vision of creating a strong and healthy Indonesian citizenry had by 
now turned to despair. Azis Saleh, who was the Minister of Health in the Djuanda cabinet 
between April 1957 and July 1959, acknowledged that the execution of pilot health projects in 
Indonesia, particularly in Bandung, Bekasi, Magelang and Purwokerto between 1951 and 1958, 
had proven unsatisfactory due to an acute shortage of doctors and other health personnel.
103
 The 
Ministry of Health had initiated a training program for nutritionists, health inspectors, 
sanitarians, assistant nutritionists and hygiene educators to address the shortage of medical and 
paramedical personnel working in preventive health. The Ministry of Health delegated the 
funding of preventive health programs and the disbursement of the salaries of health personnel 
to local governments, which were completely unprepared to assume financial responsibilities.  
When Indonesian politicians perceived the political capital of social medicine to reinforce 
the notion of a strong and self-sufficient nation that was capable of standing on its own feet, 
they prioritised symbolic initiatives such as increasing the per-capita availability of rice to the 
country’s citizens by regulating the price. Other initiatives intended to realise the revolutionary 
utopia of a just and prosperous society included the enactment of a law that would facilitate 
free treatment of the poor in private hospitals. Despite the comprehensive agenda of Indonesian 
social medicine that interpreted health not solely in terms of absence of disease, but also in 
terms of ensuring a minimum standard of living for the population, the concrete realisation of 
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objectives such as ensuring adequate availability of rice to the country’s population could not 
materialise due to weak regulatory mechanisms and a shortage of funds.  
 
Population Controversy 
 
By 1953-54, the world population was 20% larger than it was in 1930, partly attributed to 
improvements in public health such as smallpox vaccinations that had contributed to lowering 
the overall death rate. 
104
 Also, population was already growing even before the public health 
breakthroughs. In the post-World War II period, birth rates continued to rise, particularly in 
developing countries of Africa and Asia, contributing to a population problem which diminished 
the per capita availability of food.  Winslow argued that the application of modern agricultural 
methods could increase the world’s food production by a third.105  The premise of the WHO and 
FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) that the world’s population was a source of potential 
human capital found support within sections of Indonesian policy circles. The compilers of 
Indonesia’s First Five Year Plan were unanimous in accepting that Indonesia’s population was 
growing at an alarming rate; but, planners were divided on the question of using birth control to 
lower the rate of population growth on economic and religious grounds.   
 The discussions pertaining to family planning in Indonesia during the early 1950s in 
effect boiled down to two propositions: first, poverty and high fertility continued to kill mothers; 
and second, poverty could be overcome through economic planning.
106
 These propositions had 
very different implications for the question of how the government could address the question of 
poverty.  Julie Sulianti Saroso, a prominent Indonesian physician who advocated the use of 
family planning to prevent maternal mortality was the Technical Director of Maternal and Child 
Health in the early 1950s.  She was awarded a WHO Fellowship to study the functioning of 
maternal and child health policies in Sweden.  Dr. Saroso had observed the outcomes of family 
planning programs incorporating birth control that had been successfully implemented 
throughout Sweden’s district health centres. In a radio program broadcast by Radio Republik 
Indonesia, Saroso was very outspoken about using birth control as a means of preventing 
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maternal mortality. Vice President Mohammad Hatta was outraged by Saroso’s open advocacy 
of family planning, claiming that it offended the cultural and religious sensibilities of the 
Indonesian population.
107
 
 In the early 1950s, President Soekarno faced several pressing challenges such as forging 
national unity in the wake of regional uprisings, conflict between elements of the army, religious 
groups and the communists, and solving economic problems such as poverty and food scarcity.  
However, the question of addressing the problems created by Indonesia’s burgeoning population 
did not capture the President’s attention in the early 1950s. Soekarno stated that Indonesia could 
easily support a population of 250 million and that the pressing problem for the country was to 
provide housing and jobs for its people.
108
 Foreign journalists suggested that Soekarno advocated 
a stance in favour of the linkage between population growth and economic development. After 
labelling the president ‘pro-natalist,’ they conceded that he was able to accept the logic of birth 
spacing in order to protect the health of mothers.
109
 As the president, however, Soekarno did not 
want to be seen as accepting advice from foreigners on population control and advocating family 
planning programs that were (perceived to be) associated with immorality.
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The Indonesian First Five Year Plan (1956-61) stated that Indonesia had an unusually 
high rate of population growth, with nearly two-thirds of the population concentrated on the 
island of Java.
111
 The Plan was, however, characterised by contradictions because it argued that: 
(a) Indonesia’s surplus population would serve to harness the country’s natural resources; and, 
(b) every increase in the national income would be neutralised by a rising population.
112
   
 During the 1950s, Soekarno observed that Indonesia’s population was growing at the rate 
of one million per annum, increasing the pressure of population on land, particularly in Java. 
Subsistence agriculture alone was unable to fulfil the food requirements of an ever expanding 
population.  On the tenth anniversary of the Proclamation of Indonesian independence (17 
August 1955), Soekarno stated: Ia adalah satu bangsa jang biologis-dinamis (The Indonesians 
are a biologically dynamic nation).
113
  His statement referred to the fact that the Indonesian 
population had grown from 50 million (around 1900) to approximately 80 million around 
1955.
114
  Soekarno saw Indonesia’s growing population as the key to augmenting agricultural 
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productivity, particularly in the Outer Islands. In order to achieve the Javanese aphorism of loh 
djinawi, subur kang sarwa tinandur (so fertile that everything one sows, grows), Soekarno 
proposed the resettlement of Java’s ever expanding population on the Outer Islands, e.g., on 
Kalimantan and Sumatra, through a program of transmigrasi (transmigration), and the 
harnessing of the productive capacity of the land via modernisation of agriculture.
115
  He 
approached the population problem through a vision of transformation of Indonesia’s economy 
from a plantation-based colonial economy based on subsistence agriculture to a self-supporting 
socialist economy capable of standing on its own feet (berdiri di atas kaki sendiri) based on 
industrialisation.   
 In 1958, two Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat delegates, prominent Minangkabau leader 
Mohammed Isa and Soejoso Abdul Wahid, observed that Indonesia was adding between 1.3 and 
1.7 million to its population annually.
116
 The nation’s population registered an annual population 
growth of 1.7% during the 1950s. The delegates were critical of the Kasimo Plan (1947-1954) 
launched by the Minister of Food Affairs I.J. Kasimo, in an attempt to ensure self-sufficiency in 
food. The Plan did not take into account the country’s rising population.117 Isa and Wahid 
attributed food scarcity and consequent malnutrition to Indonesia’s rising population. While the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat planners related the issue of Indonesia’s high rate of population 
growth in terms of reduced availability of food, they remained silent on questions related to the 
correlation between high fertility and maternal mortality.  
 In 1959, Dr. Hadji Ali Akbar published an article in Madjalah Kedokteran Indonesia on 
birth control in an attempt to address any medical, political, economic and religious reservations 
regarding adopting birth control as a means of family planning through a Malthusian lens.
118
 In 
Akbar’s view, the world’s population expanded at the rate of 25 per cent per decade in the 1950s, 
leading to a fear of ‘population explosion’.119 By the late 1950s, nearly two-thirds of the world’s 
900 million children suffered from inadequate nutrition.  One of the commandments of the 
Quran proclaims that every person shall have a right to food and shelter.  However, in Indonesia, 
the population growth outstripped the country’s food supplies. Thus birth control was a 
prescriptive measure for improving the quality of life of the country’s children.  As most 
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Indonesians were convinced that life is sacred from conception, they found it hard to accept the 
economic rationale of birth control.  Akbar, citing the Hadis (sayings of Prophet Mohammed), 
advocated that coitus interruptus as a means of family planning was permissible in the greater 
common interest of preventing maternal mortality.  
 Indonesian newspapers such as Pos Indonesia and English newspapers such as the Times 
of Indonesia reflected the internationalism of the Soekarno era by critically evaluating the 
success of the family planning programs which functioned successfully in India and Malaya 
(Singapore) in 1959. But, this approach was at odds with the Indonesian government’s 
preoccupation with domestic concerns such as the waning of parliamentary institutions and the 
government’s perception of the family planning program as an international aid intervention that 
impinged upon Indonesia’s sovereignty. A Pos Indonesia article dated 5 July 1959 was headed 
Bahaja Besar jang Mengantjam Asia: Kenaikan Penduduk Sangat Tinggi, Sudah Perlukan 
Diadakan Sistim Pemandulan (Asia Needs Drastic Steps to Curb Population Growth). At the 
time, the rate of population growth in Indonesia was seven times the corresponding figure in 
Europe.
120
  Thus, it comes as no surprise that the rate of population growth outstripped the 
nation’s capacity to produce food, thereby raising fears of starvation.121  In India, for example, 
25% of the population was undernourished.
122
 In the state of Madras, the then Congress 
government had introduced a cash-based incentive for couples to engage in family planning. 
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, The People’s Action Party in Singapore had introduced family 
planning in the late 1950s, accompanied by a comprehensive program that improved the quality 
of life of children through enhanced nutrition, and education. Throughout the 1950s, family 
planning was a controversial issue that divided Indonesian physicians. Although advocated by 
Indonesian newspapers such as Pos Indonesia, which was based in urban centres such as 
Surabaya, the articles that appeared in it had limited readership in the 1950s.  
 Apropos of the nationalist leadership, Indonesia’s ever-increasing population epitomised 
future national greatness as a source of potential human capital.  Soekarno was privately 
sympathetic towards the use of birth control to prevent maternal mortality.
123
 But, as a politician, 
he recognised that an official endorsement of birth control as a means to reduce family size 
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would antagonise Indonesian religious leaders who associated birth control with moral laxity. 
Additionally, open advocacy of family planning that was propagated by international aid 
agencies in developing countries would imply a compromise of Indonesia’s hard-won political 
sovereignty. For the same reasons, although the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat delegates attributed 
Indonesia’s food insecurity to the country’s ever-growing population, they remained silent on the 
issue of using birth control as a means of population control.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 During the nineteenth century, social medicine emerged in the context of the industrial 
revolution to examine the influence of specific factors such as age, sex, economic circumstances, 
domestic environment, occupation and nutrition on the incidence and prevalence of disease. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, two approaches to social medicine developed, namely: (a) the 
narrowly biomedical approach that focused on disease control; and, (b) a broader social version 
that explored the socio-economic causes of illness. The Indonesians adopted the second 
approach, i.e., relating social medicine to nation-building. Indonesian physicians appropriated 
social medicine in an eclectic way. That is, they not only made public health a part of nation-
building but also accepted the comprehensive vertical WHO programs such as malaria 
eradication. Indonesian physicians imbibed by the Bandung spirit, seeking to creatively 
incorporate elements of public health from other countries without compromising the country’s 
political sovereignty in health. 
 In this chapter, I have critically examined how Indonesian physicians during World War 
II and beyond appropriated social medicine (the branch of medicine that examines the influence 
of social factors on the prevalence of disease and is focused on preventive over curative 
measures) to articulate their notion of public health in a country where the health system was 
under-resourced and characterised by a weak state which was itself in the process of formation. 
The common thread uniting the Indonesian physicians’ approach to social medicine was a 
holistic approach that contextualised health in the light of socio-economic factors such as 
68 
 
availability of food, diversification of diet, and affordability of food and health services. Leimena 
was undoubtedly the most influential Indonesian thinker on social medicine due to his astuteness 
in relating the nationalist vision of producing a strong and healthy citizenry to the agenda of the 
WHO and nation-building. Other physicians, notably Poorwo Soedarmo, Mochtar and 
Sastroamidjojo, articulated a definitive position on health as a state of physical and mental well-
being and not merely an absence of disease that closely corresponded to the WHO definition of 
health. But, unlike Leimena, they overlooked the relationship between poverty and disease. 
Although Soetopo’s contribution to Indonesian social medicine was not substantial, he was 
influential in terms of framing venereal disease as a social problem.   
This chapter contends that Indonesian social medicine from its genesis in the 1930s to 
1967 was imbued with a utopian vision of building a strong and healthy nation. Both Indonesian 
physicians and politicians alike recognised the symbolic significance of particular economic 
initiatives such as ensuring the country’s self-sufficiency in rice, health initiatives such as the 
promotion of Indonesian traditional medicine and combating malnutrition as efforts towards the 
realisation of a self-sufficient nation that was capable of fulfilling the basic needs of its citizens. 
The ambitious agenda of Indonesian medicine conceptualised social medicine not only in terms 
of preventing disease, but also as promoting health through a comprehensive program that 
involved addressing issues such as ensuring equitable distribution of food, availability of health 
services, health education and broader economic development. Nevertheless, social medicine 
could not redress Indonesia’s public health problems due to the bureaucratic labyrinths of the 
newly-emerging state that impeded any meaningful coordination between the Ministry of Health, 
the provincial health departments’ and local governments’ implementation of health policies.  
 
 
  
69 
 
Below: Hunger oedema is widespread in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta (1953).  The Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sri Paku 
Alam VIII (front) visits hunger oedema patients. 
   
 
Source: Republik Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Jogjakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953). 
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Above: A Hunger Oedema Patient in Gunung Kidul (1953). 
Source: Republik Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Jogjakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953). 
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Above: Rice distribution by the Yogyakarta regional government to a hunger oedema patient (Gunung Kidul, 1953).  
Source: Republik Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Jogjakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953). 
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Poorwo Soedarmo: Father of Indonesian Nutrition (1995). 
 
 
Source: Poorwo Soedarmo, ‘Biographic Sketches of Nutritionists in the Asia-Pacific Region,’ Asia Pacific Journal 
of Clinical Nutrition 4 (1995): 394.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE BANDUNG PLAN FOR HEALTH 
 
In 1949, Indonesia inherited a health infrastructure that had been devastated by eight years of 
warfare—the Japanese occupation from 1942-45 and the Revolutionary period, 1945-49.  During 
the Japanese occupation, the Central Office of Public Health that was established during the era 
of Dutch colonialism closed and for this reason public health activities lacked any form of 
coordination.
1
  Warfare had disrupted the food supply, resulting in widespread malnutrition. 
With the return of the Dutch and two subsequent military actions against the revolutionaries 
(1947-48) the Indonesian Ministry of Health, which had been established in 1945, was faced 
with the dual challenges of rehabilitating war casualties and coping with the re-emergence of 
communicable diseases, such as smallpox. By 1950, the approximately 300-400 Dutch doctors 
who had been working in Indonesia, departed for the Netherlands.
2
  As a result, only 1,200 
doctors were left in Indonesia to serve a population of over 72 million people, roughly translating 
to one doctor per 60,000 people, mostly concentrated in urban areas such as Jakarta, Surabaya 
and Bandung.
3
 This was indeed a dire situation. In 1950, the Ministry of Health was faced with 
the challenge of controlling infectious diseases: this required employing preventive and curative 
measures, emphasis on health education, increasing the supply of hospital beds, education of 
health personnel, distribution of pharmaceuticals throughout Indonesia, laboratory research to 
test the efficacy of vaccines, industrial hygiene, health planning for Indonesia through legislation 
that would ensure equitable distribution of  physicians throughout the archipelago, and  
improving the nutritional status of the population. During the early 1950s, the Ministry of Health 
worked in cooperation with the WHO, FAO (The Food and Agricultural Organisation), 
UNICEF, and ICA (International Cooperation Administration of the US government) to achieve 
the realisation of its immediate working program.  
 The health policy of the Soekarno era bore the imprint of Johannes Leimena, who was 
successively Minister of Health in the cabinets of Amir Sjarifudin (3 July 1947 to 11 November 
1947), Mohammad Hatta (29 January 1948 to 4 August 1949),  Natsir (6 September 1950 to 20 
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March 1951), Soekiman (27 April 1951 to 3 April 1952) , Wilopo (3 April 1952 to 30 July 
1953), and Burnahudin Harahap (12 August 1955 to 24 March 1956) during the era of 
parliamentary democracy in Indonesia (1947 to 1956), except during a brief interlude from 1953 
to 1955 when Lie Kiat Teng served in this position.
4
  Leimena was the architect of the ‘Bandung 
Plan for Health’ which incorporated the integration of preventive and curative public health 
measures, medical ethics,  rehabilitation of the disabled, maternal and child health, raising the 
nutritional levels of the population, rural health development, and education of paramedical 
personnel.
5
 His aim was to implement this plan across Indonesia.  
Leimena’s political philosophy, which eschewed narrow regionalism based on ethnic 
loyalties, sought to reconcile Indonesia’s diverse religious beliefs with nation-building. His 
internationalist approach aimed to carve out a prominent niche for Indonesia in international 
health through membership of the WHO and accession to the Southeast Asia Regional Office of 
the WHO (headquartered in New Delhi). He sought to cement closer cooperation with India as 
both countries shared an antipathy towards imperialism.
6
  Leimena’s health policy, which was 
closely aligned to the policy recommendations on public health of the WHO, sought to secure 
international funding for pilot health projects while cautiously balancing Indonesia’s hard-won 
political sovereignty and nationalist rhetoric that espoused the notion of berdiri di atas kaki 
sendiri (standing on one’s own feet) and viewed foreign aid as an encroachment on Indonesian 
sovereignty.  
Leimena’s Political Philosophy  
 
Leimena’s political philosophy was influenced by a fusion of his international outlook, 
Christianity, and nationalist ideology: it decisively shaped his thinking on health.  As an 
Ambonese Christian, he embodied the ideals of unity in diversity of the Indonesian archipelago 
and inclusive citizenship.
7
 He argued that in nations like Indonesia—where the majority of the 
population was non-Christian—the Church should associate itself with the Indonesian people 
and familiarise itself with their primary needs i.e., health, agriculture, education and labour.
8
 An 
idealist in international relations, Leimena noted that, during the second half of the twentieth 
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century, the world had shrunk in size due to advancements in science and technology.
9
  He used 
biblical metaphors to illustrate the common challenges faced by the international community 
during the Cold War: 
The aftermath of two world wars, the tensions incident to the present cold war and the 
atomic disaster have produced a profound popular yearning for peace. This desire is not 
limited to the great powers. It is especially characteristic of the newly independent 
nations. Starting late in the technological race, the young nations recognise that only if 
there is an extended period of world peace can they develop their internal economies so 
as to supply their peoples with an abundant living. They must raise the national standards 
of living by improving social and economic conditions. They must provide relief from 
hunger, poverty and preventable disease. Thus these young national Davids are pitting 
themselves against four Goliaths: Ignorance, poverty, disease, and unemployment. This 
sling-shot is effective thought and planning, the stone with which they must slay the 
enemy is hard work.
10
 
 
Leimena viewed the role of the national leadership as battling social challenges such as 
ignorance, disease, poverty and unemployment, as a David facing Goliath in order to illustrate 
the magnitude of the social questions that remained unaddressed during the Cold War of the 
1950s. As well, he expressed certain optimism that these challenges were surmountable with 
human ingenuity.  
Leimena was a firm believer in the Pantjasila ideology, the dasar negara (philosophical 
foundation) of the Indonesian nation, which was promulgated in 1945 by Soekarno, Hatta and 
Raden Soepomo. The word Pantjasila is derived from the Sanskrit words pantja (five) and sila 
(principles). The five principles were:  kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian national unity), 
internationalisme (internationalism, or humanitarianism), demokrasi (democracy) guided by 
consensus, kesedjahteraan social (social justice), and ketuhanan jang Maha Esa (the belief in 
one supreme God).  But because Soekarno’s description of the Pantjasila was not fully explicit, 
these principles were interpreted differently across Indonesia.
11
  Within the Pantjasila, the 
principle of national unity was incompatible with internationalism, particularly in the context of 
anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesian society in the 1950s. Indonesians tended to define 
nationalism in an exclusionary manner that alienated certain ethnic groups.
12
  Leimena provided 
a holistic interpretation of the Pantjasila that sought to balance conflicting principles such as 
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nationalism and internationalism by subordinating provincial and religious interests to the greater 
common good.  He was convinced that Indonesian nationalism should be alive in all of 
Indonesia’s religious denominations, including the Christian.13  As a doctor and Minister of 
Health, he opined that corruption and ignorance were the social diseases that retarded 
development.  In the 1950s, Leimena observed that widespread poverty and illiteracy had the 
potential to serve as a breeding ground of communism.
14
  He had foreseen that communism 
would lead to the erosion of social values.  As a means of preventing the growth of the 
communist ideology, Leimena advocated rural development projects that ensured social security 
for vulnerable groups, particularly wage earners.
15
  He was a firm believer in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and believed that human rights incorporated religious 
freedom.
16
  As regards fulfilling the socio-economic rights of all Indonesians, Leimena stressed 
that it was important to satisfy the basic needs of the population, e.g., food, education, clothing, 
and health.   
In Leimena’s thought, the development of public health in the Republic of Indonesia 
during the period from 1945 to 1955 was imbued with the spirit of struggle born during the 
revolutionary period (1945-1949) when the nation was faced with the challenge of overcoming 
its shortage of doctors, particularly when they were facing the Dutch armies.
17
 During this time, 
control of malaria and yaws was hampered due to a shortage of drugs.  Despite setbacks suffered 
by the republican government during the Dutch military action, the Ministry of Health instituted 
maternal and child health activities in Yogyakarta. With the transfer of sovereignty to the 
Indonesian Republic in December 1949, the government implemented an emergency program 
aiming to tackle the acute shortage of physicians and other medical personnel needed for 
implementing control measures for infectious diseases, i.e. smallpox, and endemic diseases 
including malaria, yaws, tuberculosis and leprosy. In addition, it strongly advocated public health 
education, orienting health personnel to deal with problems in the rural areas, facilitating the 
development of medical research in Indonesia, the expansion of maternal and child health 
activities throughout Indonesia, the introduction of rural health services in Bandung, Magelang, 
and Yogya, and improving the nutritional status of the population.
18
  Leimena thus viewed the 
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public health activities of the Soekarno era through a teleological narrative of progress which 
signified that the Indonesians showed resilience and a capability to overcome hardship under the 
banner of the Red-White flag.  
  As a statesman, Leimena had a strong awareness of the necessity to compensate for 
Indonesia’s inability to fulfil the needs of its ever-growing population by enlisting the technical 
assistance of the United Nations’ specialised agencies in the forms of medical supplies and 
equipment, overseas study fellowships for Indonesian physicians, and health surveys. Such 
assistance was, however, miniscule in contrast to the ever growing size of the Indonesian 
population. Leimena was also aware that international developmental aid administered by 
developed countries, with its underlying terms and conditions, would compromise the hard-won 
independence of newly-decolonised nations of Asia including Indonesia.
19
 He accordingly 
recommended that the developed countries allocate overseas aid to newly-independent nations 
on an unconditional basis. His appeal was to the strong sense of social responsibility between 
nations that characterised the post-World War II international order: 
In this ever shrinking world, one diseased spot can contaminate the whole body. Unrest in 
a single locality may be exploited to disturb the peace of the world. In the field of health, 
we as nations cannot stand alone. Mosquitos and bacteria are not respecters of national 
boundaries. National legislation and international reactions affect each other. We in 
South-east Asia thus welcome international collaboration and cooperation through United 
Nations specialised agencies.
20
 
 
Foreign aid was a sensitive issue in Indonesian politics. This may be why Soekarno advocated 
the ideal of self-sufficiency in Indonesian economic matters with the proclamation of berdiri di 
atas kaki sendiri (standing on one’s own feet in economic affairs).  International developmental 
aid projects were used by the Indonesians to meet their own political and technological agendas, 
although they were sometimes at odds with those of the US.
21
 
 In his welcoming address to the delegates of the Eighth Annual Session of the SEARO 
convened in Bandung in 1955, Leimena expressed his optimism that international peace was 
achievable through joint collaboration between the various national governments and UN 
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agencies. He suggested that the technological developments of the twentieth century had 
provided a favourable opportunity to humankind to better human conditions: 
 We live in a world full of paradoxes. One seeks to unify the world; the other seeks to 
divide them. Science has, on one hand, provided him with instruments conducive to 
prosperity and the improvement of life. On one hand, mankind lives amidst fear and fury, 
facing possibilities of progress and prosperity on the other. These paradoxes may carry a 
higher dialectic, that is any difficulty being faced or to be faced constitutes a “challenge” 
to man to achieve their goal as God’s creatures.22 
 
Leimena compared solving public health problems to scaling the summit of Mount Everest.
23
 
The Eighth Annual Session of the SEARO coincided with the Asia-Africa Conference in 
Bandung. Realising that the socio-economic and political freedom of the citizens of the newly- 
decolonised nations of Africa and Asia was a major theme of this conference, Leimena alluded to 
it in his welcoming speech. 
Leimena stated that the ecological concept of disease influenced public health ideas.
24
 
Disease resulted from the interaction of a triad consisting of man as a primary concern, an agent 
of the disease, and the interaction between environmental, physical, social, and environmental 
factors. According to his analysis, the main problems associated with rural health in Southeast 
Asia included environmental sanitation, public health education, and the adequate training of 
public health personnel.
25
 Leimena perceived a correlation between health, happiness, and 
prosperity with health forming the base of the triangle.
26
  
 Leimena creatively appropriated international ideas of public health into his health 
philosophy which were crystallised in his Bandung Plan in 1951. This plan was extended 
throughout Indonesia in 1954 and renamed the ‘Leimena Plan,’ although it continued to be 
referred to in WHO publications by its original name. He thought that disease and poverty 
constituted a vicious circle.
27
 A sick person became poor; then, poverty contributed to the 
worsening of disease which in turn entailed further poverty. Health activities were a means to 
improve the population’s socio-economic conditions. Leimena was influenced by C.E.A. 
Winslow (a WHO consultant and one of the leading figures in international public health) who 
83 
 
argued that public health programs could not be planned in a vacuum but should form a vital part 
of a broader program of social and economic development.
28
 
Leimena’s personal political philosophy reconciled his Ambonese Christian identity with 
Indonesian nationalism. His focus was upon carving out a significant niche for Indonesia in 
international health. As a pragmatist, Leimena observed the shortcomings of the Indonesian 
state’s attempts to meet the health needs of the population. In response, he sought to enlist the 
cooperation of several UN agencies and the ICA to compensate for these shortcomings.  The 
influx of foreign aid to fund Indonesian health projects was viewed with scepticism within 
Indonesian policy circles, in particular by Soekarno, as compromising Indonesia’s hard won 
political sovereignty and reinforcing the international aid agencies’ agendas.  
 
The Leimena Plan  
 
 
In 1951, Leimena envisioned a health system that would increase the supply of skilled medical 
personnel and correct the inequitable distribution of physicians which favoured the country’s 
urban centres such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung. His aim was for future health services to 
integrate preventive and curative health efforts. But, such a strategy required addressing the non-
medical determinants of health including public health education and sanitation. Leimena 
inferred that successes in public health were contingent to raising the standard of living. His 
Bandung Plan, a pilot project initiated by the Ministry of Health in 1951 in the regency of 
Bandung which already had a well-functioning health system prior to World War II.
29
 A central 
principle of the Plan was community participation in preventive health measures centred on the 
desa (village). The Plan was based on two further principles: the integration of preventive and 
curative public health, and establishing a balance between rural and urban health facilities.  
 The Bandung Plan, which established a referral system for the provision of curative care 
beginning at the sub-district level, envisioned the establishment of auxiliary hospitals at the 
kewedanaan (under the jurisdiction of regency)
30
 level and dispensaries at the kecamatan (sub-
district) level. The regency hospital would serve as the apex of the referral system and complex 
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cases from the dispensaries and auxiliary hospitals would be referred to the regency hospitals 
located in the headquarters of the regency. The Bandung Plan devolved the administration of 
preventive health measures to the village. The djuru hygiene (the hygiene assistant) would work 
in close cooperation with the village officials during the implementation of health education, and 
the sanitation of houses and markets.
31
 As the lowest self-governing unit of administration in 
Indonesia is the desa, Leimena envisioned mobilising the population on the basis of gotong 
rojong (mutual cooperation) to facilitate the operation of a desa hygiene service. The staff would 
be chosen by the villagers themselves. The desa hygiene nurse was the head and would 
undertake intensive hygiene education of the villagers. The curative care in a desa would be 
administered by a desa polyclinic. The dokter kabupaten (regency doctor) was in charge of 
curative and preventive health measures undertaken within the various desas and kecamatans of 
the regency.  
 Leimena incorporated the ‘health protection to local areas’ methodology discussed at the 
Fifth World Health Assembly (1952) into the Bandung Plan.
32
 The WHO viewed ‘health 
protection’ as the wellspring of all activities for the promotion of health, happiness, and the well- 
being of the people.
33
  The World Health Assembly noted that several member states of the 
WHO saw the need to integrate both the preventive and the curative elements of a health 
program, but that such emphasis would vary according to the level of development of the local 
area. In defining the scope of rural health services, the WHO recommended that such services 
should  incorporate the needs of the individual at different stages of development, beginning with 
pre-natal care, maternal and child health, school health, industrial health, sanitation, and health 
education. Leimena’s publication Some Aspects of Health Protection to Local Areas in Indonesia 
(1953) recommended that the implementation of ‘health protection’ in an Indonesian context 
would have to consider the large variations in the socio-economic conditions of the population 
across the various islands constituting the archipelago.
34
 Therefore designing a one-fits-all plan 
of health for the rural and urban areas of Indonesia was neither feasible nor practicable.  
 During the period of extending the scope of the original Bandung Plan (Leimena Plan) 
throughout Indonesia in 1954, the Ministry of Health established health demonstration projects 
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in each of the ten provinces: namely, South Sumatra, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, East Java, Central Java and Jakarta.
35
  The criteria for the 
selection of the model regencies where the health demonstration projects were to be initiated 
were based both on the financial stability of the regency and the degree of participation of the 
community in public health activities. In each of these demonstration projects, preventive and 
curative healthcare were integrated in the interests of minimising operational costs.  
  The Leimena Plan proved somewhat overambitious in its vision of extending the scope 
of the original Bandung Plan throughout Indonesia as it accorded greater autonomy to the 
regencies in executing health plans for the villages and sub-districts under its jurisdiction. 
Financing the Plan proved a thorny issue between the central, provincial, district, and village 
administrations as not all regencies were financially able to support the integration of preventive 
and curative health activities.  
 
Implementation of Leimena’s Plans 
 
Leimena’s ideas regarding health were implemented at a time when Indonesia was faced with the 
challenge of rehabilitating its fledgling economy after the Japanese occupation and its armed 
struggle against the Dutch. In 1950, the government recorded a budgetary deficit of 
approximately 1.7 billion rupiahs (approximately US$400 million: the official exchange rate was 
fixed at 3.8 rupiahs to one dollar in the early 1950s).
36
  In 1950, the Natsir cabinet, after 
consultation with Leimena, conceptualised an Eleven Point Program, a precursor to the Bandung 
Plan and a stopgap measure that intended to increase the supply of skilled medical personnel, 
construction of rural health units and public health education. As Minister of Health, Leimena 
was attentive to: first, ensure an equitable distribution of physicians—throughout the various 
islands that constituted the Indonesian archipelago—as most of them were concentrated in the 
urban areas of the country; and second,  regulate private medical practice.    
After being successfully implemented in the headquarters of the Bandung regency, viz. 
the city of Bandung, the Bandung Plan halved the prevalence of the city’s infant mortality rate 
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during the period from 1951 to 1956. This came as no surprise as the city had an excellent health 
infrastructure dating back to the late colonial era, that is, to the 1930s. In sharp contrast, infant 
mortality figures for the Bandung regency did not show any decline due to the lack of doctors, 
most of whom were concentrated in the urban areas and were unavailable to attend medical 
emergencies in the countryside. Leimena sought to correct the disequilibrium in the Indonesian 
health system by introducing laws regulating the rational distribution of doctors, and licensing 
private practice.  But, legislative measures did not address the poor graduation rate from 
Indonesia’s medical schools, estimated at twenty-eight or thirty out of a few thousand from the 
faculties of medicine at Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta, and none from the recently 
established medical faculties on the Outer Islands, e.g., Bukittinggi or Medan. These low 
graduation rates did not even succeed in keeping pace with the nation’s growing population, 
estimated at 1.7 per cent per annum in the 1950s.  
 Faith in a brighter future, together with a nationalist zeal to ameliorate the poor health 
conditions of the masses, inspired some among the country’s youth to pursue a medical 
profession in the early 1950s.
37
  To quote one nursing student from Central Java who was 
interviewed by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Committee on Health (1951): ‘Sir, I am indeed 
greatly privileged that I will become a nurse soon so that I may use my abilities in the service of 
the Indonesian nation’.38  However, the nationalist aspirations of several young nursing graduates 
after four years of medical training  amounted to little more than an incomplete dream as 
monthly  remunerations  were not commensurate with professional responsibilities. This 
discrepancy ultimately dampened their enthusiasm to work in public health in the rural areas. 
Smallpox vaccinators, for example, received a monthly salary of 15 rupiahs, which barely 
covered meals for three days.
39
 In Central and Western Java, several regencies were bereft of 
regency physicians. Many auxiliary hospitals at the regency level, which lacked the support of a 
regency physician, were occasionally led by the mantri who often went beyond the call of duty.  
Midwives who had a private practice earned approximately 75 rupiahs per delivery whereas 
those employed by the BKIA (Balai Kesedjahteraan Ibu dan Anak) earned approximately 90 
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rupiahs per month.
40
  Thus, private medical practice in the cities was in fact far more lucrative 
for medical professionals in Indonesia during the 1950s.  
Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat delegates from various Indonesian provinces were 
instrumental in sensitising the Ministry of Health vis-a-vis the disequilibrium of public health 
resulting from the acute shortage of skilled medical personnel and the need to formulate a law 
related to regulating private medical practice. The inequitable distribution of medical personnel 
across the archipelago had occurred within disparate socio-political and historical contexts. The 
province of Kalimantan recorded the highest maternal and infant mortality rate in the Indonesian 
archipelago in 1950. Out of ten or fifteen children born to a couple, only two or three would 
survive.
41
  At the time, Kalimantan’s health centres were poorly utilised, with fewer than twenty 
patient visits recorded per day.
42
  The distances between villages, the sub-district and the 
regency/provincial headquarters were huge. In 1951, the Indonesian government formulated laws 
stipulating that newly-graduated doctors had to serve outside the large urban centres in order to 
achieve an equitable distribution of physicians throughout the archipelago. In practice, people in 
the rural areas had never seen a doctor since the Japanese occupation (1942), especially in 
Sumatra as many of the Dutch plantation physicians left for the Netherlands during the Dutch 
military action. In the residency of Bengkulu, which had a population of 300,000, two doctors 
served an area of approximately 500 square kilometres.
43
  Likewise, people living in the rural 
areas of South Sulawesi were rarely seen by a doctor. Under Indonesian Law 22 of 1948, which 
granted provincial autonomy, the organisation of public health and the payment of staff salaries 
were devolved to the provinces. In South Sulawesi, smallpox vaccinators were paid a pittance of  
0.50 rupiahs per month.
44
  It was ultimately due to the low salaries paid to public health 
personnel that Leimena’s vision of integrating preventive with curative health could not be 
realised in South Sulawesi.  The rugged topography of the area, along with inadequate 
transportation, prevented doctors from delivering healthcare to remote communities. Emergency 
hospitals in the regencies of Jeneponto, Pangkajene and Pare Pare, which were managed by the 
local government, lacked financial backing from the Ministry of Health.
45
 The sick were 
regularly pushed out of overcrowded hospitals. Apart from an acute shortage of doctors during 
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the 1950s, Indonesia lacked a strong supply system that would ensure timely and adequate 
supply of drugs needed for the control of endemic diseases. In Java, bottlenecks existed in the 
timely supply of medicines to dispensaries. In Kalimantan, health centres received expired drugs. 
The streptomycin required for the treatment of tuberculosis was not available in many health 
centres, particularly in Java and Kalimantan, and out of pocket payments for treatment were 
reported.
46
   
 In 1951, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, supported by initiative from the Sukiman cabinet, 
enacted three laws related to health that would be hotly contested:
47
 
a) Undang Undang Nomor 8, Tahun  1951,  Tentang Penangguhan Pemberian Surat Idzin 
Kepada Dokter dan Dokter Gigi (Law No 8, 1951, Relating to Licensing of Doctors and 
Dentists) 
b) Undang Undang Nomor 9, Tahun 1951, Tentang Pembagian Tenaga Dokter, Dokter Gigi 
dan Bidan  Secara Rasionil (Law No 9, 1951, Relating to Rational Distribution of  Doctors, 
Dentists, and Midwives) 
c) Undang Undang Nomor 10, Tahun 1951, Tentang Mengatur Tenaga Dokter Partekulir 
dalam Keadaan Genting (Law 10, 1951, Relating to the Establishment of Private Practice). 
These laws stipulated that after graduation, both Indonesian and foreign doctors and dentists 
intending to establish private practice in Indonesia had to work in public service for at least three 
years before they would be granted a surat idzin (licence to practice).
48
 The newly-graduated 
doctors, dentists and midwives could not practice in areas which had a surplus of doctors; such 
areas were declared by the Ministry of Health to be closed for medical practice.
49
  However, the 
government was empowered to enlist private practitioners in the public service during an 
epidemic. 
The proposals to enact these laws were met with stiff resistance from medical students at 
Universitas Indonesia as the legislation regulating the rational distribution of doctors, dentists, 
and midwives fell squarely on the shoulders of doctors, dentists, and midwives.
50
  It failed to 
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address the question of maximising the output of the nation’s three medical schools at Jakarta, 
Surabaya, and Yogyakarta.
51
 Within the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat,  delegates who were also 
members of the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (Indonesian Medical Association, henceforth IDI), in 
particular Dr. Ateng Kartanahardja,  were opposed to drastic measures such as regulating the 
rational distribution of health personnel through legislation and sensitising the Ministry of Health 
towards the poor remuneration of government doctors.
52
  Leimena defended the three laws 
mentioned above by stressing the difference between bekwaamheid (ability) and bevoegheid 
(authority).
53
  Qualified medical practitioners, who were administered the professional oath, had 
demonstrated the ability to fulfil their responsibility as a doctor. But the authority—a legal 
recognition for discharging responsibilities of a doctor—came in the form of a licence granted by 
the Ministry of Law. Leimena had observed that in the zaman pembangunan (the period of 
national development, coinciding with the early 1950s), the laws regulating private practice and 
rational distribution of physicians were in accordance with the Pantjasila principle of keadilan 
(social justice) for all Indonesians. He reminded the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat delegates that the 
doctor had a duty to alleviate suffering.
54
  These laws reflected Leimena’s nationalist aspirations 
to develop a professional cadre of doctors imbued with a mentality that was strong, healthy and 
creative, and adhered to ethical principles. However, the government was unable to enforce the 
laws related to regulating private practice and achieving an equitable distribution of doctors 
throughout the archipelago due to the low output of graduates from Indonesia’s medical schools 
and the poorly remunerated doctors serving in the rural areas. 
In similar vein, the Leimena Plan failed to achieve fruition in the 1950s as it devolved 
financial responsibility to the regencies for the implementation of preventive and curative health. 
Not all of the regencies of Indonesia were financially self-sufficient. The Leimena Plan thus 
yielded variable results largely contingent to the district administration and to individual factors 
such as leadership of the dokter kabupaten. In the pilot area of Bandung, the Plan registered 
conspicuous success by almost halving the maternal mortality rate from 6,500 per 100,000 in 
1951 to 3,740 per 100,000 in 1956.
55
 However, the public health successes of the pilot area of 
Bandung glossed over disparities in health indicators between various ketjamatans of Bandung 
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and Bandung city. Most of the noticeable public health improvements recorded in the official 
statistics occurred in Bandung city (the regency headquarters), not in the regency of Bandung.
56
  
Infant mortality in the poorer sub-districts of Bandung regency, e.g., Majalengka, had not 
declined owing to the lack of paediatricians qualified to deal with postpartum complications and 
the failure of the regency administration to integrate child health within the framework of the 
rural health services. The doctors working in the pilot area, who were largely based in Bandung 
city, opted not to work among the rural communities as they were reluctant to abandon their 
lucrative practices and not attuned to addressing the everyday health problems peculiar to people 
of rural areas. They lacked training in preventive medicine which, in the mid-1950s, was yet to 
be introduced as an academic discipline in the faculties of medicine at Jakarta, Surabaya, 
Yogyakarta, Medan, and Bukittinggi in the mid-1950s.
57
   
 The Leimena Plan was implemented in the province of Central Java albeit limited 
success. In 1959, of the annual provincial health budget (approximately 44 million rupiahs) 
awarded by the central government for the Bandung Plan, nearly two-thirds was spent on staff 
salaries and the transportation of medical personnel.
58
  Less than a third of the provincial budget 
was allocated to public health. From 1956-59, the provincial government built hospitals at 
Brebes, Boyolali and Cilacap; but, the development of curative health was inhibited by the lack 
of pharmaceuticals in hospitals. Medical students from Gadjah Mada University were involved 
in teaching maternal and child health in the urban and rural areas of Central Java. In Central 
Java, the implementation of the Leimena Plan was constrained by overhead costs and shortages 
of essential drugs.  
 In North Sumatra, attempts by the provincial government to integrate preventive and 
curative public health were frustrated by a shortage of dokter kabupatens, who provided public 
health initiatives.
59
 The Ministry of Health provided a subsidy of 177,000 rupiahs to the North 
Sumatra provincial health department under Law 18, 1953, which stated that the government 
would grant subsidies to private organisations to construct hospitals that would treat poor 
patients for free.
60
  Under the provisions of this law, the provincial government disbursed the 
health ministry funds to charitable organisations.  However, it is doubtful if the charitable 
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hospitals were widely used in North Sumatra owing to the acute shortage of doctors. 
Tuberculosis control was one major preventive health measure in North Sumatra that reflected 
Leimena’s vision of integrating preventive and curative health. However, the implementation of 
the tuberculosis control program in the regencies of North Sumatra failed to materialise due to 
administrative and technical bottlenecks.
61
 As a precautionary public health measure, the 
provincial health department of North Sumatra attempted to educate the public on hygienic 
habits to prevent the spread of the highly infectious diseases. Treatment at the time consisted of 
rendering the tuberculosis patient non-infectious through the administration of streptomycin. 
Tuberculosis treatment was severely constrained in North Sumatra due to a general lack of 
finances at the provincial and regency levels.
62
  The anti-yaws campaign introduced in North 
Sumatra was not as effective as the campaign in Central Java.
63
 The dispersed nature of the 
population and inadequate transportation proved to be major hurdles in yaws prevention and 
treatment.
64
   
 During the 1950s, the Indonesian government, particularly the cabinets of Natsir, 
Sukiman and Wilopo, were faced with the challenge of addressing pressing financial issues such 
as repayment of debts owed to the former Netherlands colonial administration and war reparation 
owed to the Dutch.  Indonesia was, therefore, compelled to increase the volume of its commodity 
exports and to negotiate a favourable export price. The outbreak of the Korean War in the early 
1950s provided a much needed stimulus to Indonesia’s exports; but, Indonesia’s gains in foreign 
exchange were nullified by repayment of debts carried over from the colonial legacy, a 
consequence that ultimately led to an unfavourable balance of trade. The integration of 
preventive and curative public health under the umbrella of the Bandung Plan was a cost-
effective public health measure adopted by Leimena from the WHO to address pressing public 
health problems amidst widespread economic difficulty.  While the Bandung Plan reflected 
Leimena’s pragmatic thinking on health, it failed to materialise in the 1950s as it had to 
overcome the administrative and financial bottlenecks created by the central, provincial and 
regency governments in executing practical aspects of the Plan, such as funding the 
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establishment of health centres and executing specific aspects of the mass campaign against 
tuberculosis.
65
   
 
Public Health Education 
 
Leimena had intended to use public health education to awaken the sanitary conscience of the 
people and to mobilise them into identifying their own health needs. During the implementation 
of the Bandung Plan from 1951 to 1956, health education was implemented by various 
departments within the Ministry of Health such as maternal and child health, nutrition, 
tuberculosis, and the yaws eradication program in a piecemeal manner. Leimena recommended 
the establishment of a separate department that would oversee the activities of health education 
within the Ministry of Health.  However, his recommendations were only vaguely defined and 
did not specify how health education would be implemented at the regency and sub-district 
levels. The implementation of health education in Indonesia suffered major shortcomings, most 
notably the confusion of health education with the training of public health personnel, and the 
inability of health education policy-makers to perceive the interrelationship between poverty and 
ill health.  
   Raden Mochtar, a leading Indonesian advocate of social medicine who envisioned 
hygiene work as the means to awaken a sanitary conscience in individuals and groups, observed 
that public health was interwoven with Indonesian politics.
66
 According to Mochtar, during the 
revolutionary period (1945-49), freedom had infused the Indonesian peoples with a new vitality 
to work for the wellbeing of their communities.
67
  The revolutionary government’s Division of 
Hygiene established village health services in the village of Patik Raja, Banyumas and a health 
demonstration centre at Magelang.  Beginning in 1950, the demonstration centre at Magelang, 
under the leadership of the Ministry of Health, endeavoured to mobilise the villagers around the 
principle of gotong rojong to construct village water supplies. This was simply the revitalisation 
of the training and demonstration centre established in the 1930s and documented in Hydrick’s 
booklet ‘Intensive Hygiene Work in the Netherlands Indies.’ Achmad Dipodilogo—Director of 
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Maternal and Child Health in 1969—was from Banyumas and in his old age talked of having 
been a child in school when Hydrick’s program was implemented.  
Hygiene work in the village was compartmentalised into personal hygiene, the domain of 
the maternal and child health home visitor, and rural sanitation, which was undertaken by the 
pengamat hygiene. Raden Mochtar’s vision of health education, which accorded a dominant role 
to the elementary hygiene educator, met with opposition from the maternal and child health 
leadership, particularly from Julie Sulianti Saroso, who stated that the elementary hygiene 
educator had only received elementary education and therefore had a limited view of sanitation. 
She advocated that public health education programs should involve the contributions of doctors, 
nurses, midwives, and the school health worker.
68
 Within the Ministry of Health, the Division of 
Environmental Sanitation, that was concerned mainly with sanitary engineering emphasised 
community sanitation in all of its programs: home improvements, latrine construction, and a 
campaign against fleas.
69
 The Ministry’s maternal and child health program introduced the 
training of dukuns in scientific birthing practices and encouraged home visits by dieticians to 
educate mothers about the nutritive value of foods. But, the programs were not implemented 
beyond pilot health demonstration areas such as Bandung and did not represent an overall 
community approach to health education.  
Elementary hygiene educators (pengamat hygiene), i.e., male graduates with two years of 
training at the Bandung Health Educator’s School, were pivotal to the health education programs 
in the rural areas. During their second year of instruction, they were trained to communicate with 
the villagers regarding the construction of latrines, cleaning houses, and the disinfection of wells. 
Due to people’s resistance to using latrines, the program designed to educate villagers was 
abandoned.  Sardjito, the President of Universitas Gadjah Mada, was pessimistic: he felt that 
scientific knowledge alone was insufficient to overcome people’s resistance i.e., giving up their 
unhygienic habit of defecating in the river, for example.
70
  Sardjito claimed that:  
 The people in many villages had latrines, but they do not use them. Instead they use the 
stream, the river, the canal. Perhaps it is too difficult a thing to change these habits of the 
people, particularly of older people. I wonder if scientists can find other ways of 
combating the diseases caused by contamination of the water and soil?
71
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Sardjito’s critique highlighted the shortcomings of using health education as a means to bring 
about improvement in health conditions, especially in rural areas.   
Health education in Indonesia during the Soekarno era glossed over the socio-economic 
questions associated with disease. The assumption was that individual self-awareness and 
diligence could overcome disease, regardless of socioeconomic conditions.
72
 Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer’s short story ‘My Kampung’ which paints a stark picture of the Jakarta poor in the 1950s, 
brings home to the reader how the health education implemented in Indonesia was limited by 
lack of focus upon socio-economic problems. To quote Pramoedya Toer’s narrative:  
Friend, you’ve heard of my kampung, haven’t you? Kebun Djahe Kober, five hundred 
metres in a straight line from the palace. And you also know, don’t you? Its gutters are 
covered in shit of the kampung residents. To be sure, yesterday, the headman issued an 
order: ‘No more shitting in the gutters.’ And what was the first reaction? A neighbor of 
mine helped his child to shit in someone else’s gutter, not his own. And at night, the same 
was true of the adults. 
This is not a story that ought to be admired or condemned. I’ve lived in this kampung for 
two years. Much have I seen of events in this kampung.  And it seems to me that I too 
have become a small part of this kampung. Friend, this kampung is not that large. More or 
less two hundred metres in width and the same in length. So, an area of more or less 
40,000 square metres, crisscrossed by seven alleys. The population of this kampung 
cannot be less than nine hundred people.  
Friend, I want to tell you about the condition of my alley—one among the seven. Do you 
know when I first came to the kampung? One gleaming bright morning. But I did not see 
signs of morning, so many trees had consumed the breathing-space of the residents. 
However, the residents of my kampung were used to using all of these trees, which were 
of no guaranteed use for their stoves. And since I’ve lived there, I’ve felt a longing for 
morning sunshine. What’s more, houses are so close together that fresh air is unable to 
flush out the stale air heavy with shit and gutter gases. This gutter water, friend, can’t 
flow unless municipal laborers push it along, since every resident throws his trash into it.  
This has become common practice, since they know no one is likely to prohibit their 
actions.
73
 
 
Public health education in the kampungs of Jakarta was greeted with scepticism. Orders banning 
open defecation in gutters issued by the kampung heads were greeted with defiance by the 
residents as such orders lacked the force of law and did not address problems such as poverty. 
The residents of the kampungs of Jakarta had a high prevalence of venereal diseases and 
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tuberculosis. Infected individuals preferred death to living in urban squalor. Toer’s Kampung 
sheds light on how the urban poor were either resistant or indifferent to any form of health 
education that inculcated hygienic practices due to poverty.  
In the 1950s, health education in Indonesia was inextricably linked with sanitation.
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Those in charge of sanitation, for example pengamat hygiene, pendidik hygiene (hygiene 
educator), and djuru hygiene (hygiene nurse) were responsible for implementing health 
education at the village and sub-district level. At the provincial level, the kontrolir kesehatan 
(sanitary inspector), who had three years of training in disease control with the Ministry of 
Health, was assigned the additional responsibility of health education.  But, sanitary inspectors 
could not devote adequate time to health education. While Indonesia was a major recipient of 
international developmental aid during the 1950s, funding agencies such as the ICA restricted 
their assistance to agriculture and home economics, conditions related to family welfare. As a 
consequence, health education developed in piecemeal manner. The Ford Foundation, on the 
other hand, emphasised teacher training, which included health education.  And, because each 
funding agency operating in Indonesia had a very specific idea of what constituted health 
education and restricted funding to priority areas,
75
 health education failed to develop in a 
coordinated manner during the Soekarno era. The Ministry of Health, under the leadership of 
Leimena, astutely related Indonesia’s health problems to the priority areas of the WHO in order 
to secure international funding for public health in Indonesia.  
The SEARO program of assistance to member countries in the first session (1948) were 
identical to the priorities accorded by the WHO headquarters, Geneva, to the so called ‘Big Six’ 
issues, viz. malaria, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, maternal and child health, nutrition and 
environment health.
76
  By including maternal and child health on its agenda for technical 
assistance, the SEARO policy closely synchronised with the Indonesian nationalist aspirations 
for securing respectability for Indonesia in the sphere of international health. Indonesia fared 
poorly in maternal health.
77
 As a consequence of the country’s high rate of maternal mortality, 
which was considered as a national shame, the political leadership began to perceive the health 
of the Indonesian mother and child as the nasib (hope) of the nation’s future. The Indonesian 
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leadership appealed to the spirit of humanitarianism and urged joint efforts of the Indonesian 
citizens and the international community in reducing the high prevalence of maternal mortality.  
The SEARO was instrumental in designing short-term demonstration projects in member 
states that aimed to develop problem solving strategies amongst national health personnel 
working in the field. Maternal and child health absorbed much of the attention of the Indonesian 
leaders and the WHO consultants alike, owing to the high rates of maternal mortality which 
Indonesian physicians and leaders attributed to the dukun bayi’s ‘primitive’ birthing practices 
that constituted a national embarrassment.
78
 Beginning the early 1950s, the Indonesian health 
policy managed—albeit with limited success—to train dukun bayis in scientific birthing 
practices to overcome the shortage of skilled midwives.  By 1960, of the 13,541 dukuns trained 
by qualified midwives, less than 25% managed to graduate.
79
  
 In the early 1950s, the Ministry of Health initiated a hygiene demonstration project in the 
urban areas of Jakarta (Pasar Senen and Salemba Raya) to foster community participation in 
improving health indicators. The Ministry of Health, which attributed the high infant mortality 
rate in Jakarta (30 per 1000 in 1952) to faulty feeding practices, initiated special programs to 
educate mothers about the nutritive value of food, hygiene and care of infants, and to train 
dukuns in scientific birthing practices.
80
  J.H. de Haas (WHO Consultant to Indonesia from 1954-
March 1955) had observed in his report that health education in maternal and child health was 
intended to educate mothers about the nutritive value of certain foods. But de Haas, expressing 
measured pessimism, also observed that bringing about a change in the feeding habits of infants 
would take at least a decade or longer as ushering in such a change was contingent to the 
improvement of socio-economic conditions.
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 Maternal and child health was a major component of the Bandung Plan. It involved not 
only the prevention of malnutrition, maternal and infant mortality, but also raising the health 
standards of mothers and children. Leimena contended that the high prevalence of maternal and 
infant mortality in the country was not only an economic loss but a social loss as well. 
82
 He 
equated the campaign to reduce maternal and infant mortality with the nationalist rhetoric that 
emphasised the emancipation of Indonesia against the three social evils, i.e. disease, ignorance 
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and poverty. With a view to achieving a drastic reduction of maternal and infant mortality at the 
lowest possible cost, Leimena advocated (a) the improvement of the people’s economic 
conditions; and, (b) educating mothers about nutrition and the prevention of disease. In 1952, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Health established Maternal and Child Health Bureaus to synchronise the 
following activities of maternal and child health: (a) prenatal examination of infants, maternity 
assistance outside of hospitals, examination of the health of lactating mothers; (b) examination of 
new-born babies, immunisation of children against diseases such as smallpox and tuberculosis 
and promoting the consumption of milk; (c) educating mothers about the care of infants through 
home visits, training courses; and, (d) training paramedical personnel in maternal and child 
health.  In order to maximise the delivery of results in maternal and child health— and 
considering difficult economic circumstances of the 1950s, a point which I stressed earlier—
Leimena envisioned the synchronisation of activities of the Maternal and Child Health Bureaus 
with the functioning of the Bandung Plan. Synchronisation was attempted by devolving the 
financial and administrative responsibilities of the Maternal and Child Health Bureaus to the 
regency governments.  
Julie Sulianti Saroso, who at the time was Technical Director of Maternal and Child 
Health, was not directly involved in the implementation of the Bandung Plan. Nevertheless, her 
work is of particular note as she was active in advocating coordination of the various 
departments within the Department of Health to initiate preventive measures against maternal 
mortality. Awarded a UNICEF fellowship for studying the public health systems of 
Scandinavian countries, England, US and Malaya in 1951, she conceptualised a comprehensive 
‘team approach’ to the improvement of rural health throughout Indonesia. Saroso advocated the 
prevention of disease through the eradication of epidemic and endemic diseases. This would 
involve coordination of the Departments of Health at the provincial and district levels in 
reducing the high prevalence of maternal and infant mortality, educating the public regarding 
healthy living, and educating mothers about childcare and nutrition through house visits. As well, 
it would require improvement of community nutrition through health education and encouraging 
schools to develop kebun sekolah (school gardens) that would give students better access to 
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locally available fruits and reduce vitamin deficiencies.
83
  Saroso’s school health program thus 
consisted of integrating preventive and curative health, i.e., educating children about hygiene and 
nutrition, vaccinating them against tuberculosis, and smallpox, and administration of first aid to 
sick children. She conceptualised integrating maternal and child health within the broader 
framework of rural health (Kesehatan Masjarakat Desa) through house visits. But, her efforts to 
achieve coordination failed due to the persistent shortage of health personnel.
84
 As the technical 
director of  maternal and child health, Saroso was instrumental in initiating dental health 
education of expectant mothers by educating them about the nutritive value of mineral rich 
foods, systematic examination of dental caries among primary schoolchildren, and spreading 
awareness of dental hygiene amongst the general public through the use of posters, and visual 
aids.
85
  However, the practical implementation of the dental hygiene program was constrained by 
the lack of coordination between the Division of Dental Health within the Ministry of Health, 
and Maternal and Child Health. Doctors, nurses, and other health personnel were unable to 
recognise the correlation between preventive dental hygiene and maternal and child health.  
 In 1956, Saroso was instrumental in establishing a rural health unit in Bekasi, West Java 
province, in accordance with the WHO prescription that it would serve as a demonstration centre 
for public health education.
86
 The Bekasi project was primarily intended to evolve a practical 
strategy of health education at the village, sub-district, and regency levels and to determine 
practical ways of coordinating the responsibilities of health personnel in implementing a 
meaningful program of health education. But, from the outset, the Bekasi project was beset with 
technical and financial problems.
87
  Funding for establishing the rural health centre competed 
with the local malaria eradication program.
88
 The staff training centre at Lemah Abang, Bekasi 
regency, did not consider training in rural health as a part of extant public health problems of 
Indonesia. For example, sanitarians were taught about chagas disease, which did not have any 
practical relevance to Indonesia.
89
 Owing to financial constraints, the practical training of 
sanitarians in health education was discontinued in 1963.  Trainees were transferred to Jakarta to 
assist the Ministry of Health in smallpox vaccination programs.
90
 The sanitarians in the 
demonstration area were successful in conducting a survey of water sources following an 
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outbreak of food poisoning which revealed that the villagers used contaminated sources for 
domestic purposes and defecation. UNICEF and USAID (United States Agency for International 
Development) had provided funding for the construction of latrines and hand pumps. 
Unfortunately, the sanitarians failed to prevent the villagers from defecating in the local Citarum 
River and to convince them from using hand pumps to source clean drinking water. The overall 
problem was that the inhabitants of those areas lacked orientation to health conditions.
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Beginning in 1962 in the Outer Islands (esp. Kalimantan), the Indonesian government, in 
conjunction with UNICEF and the WHO, initiated programs to strengthen the rural health 
services and orient health personnel to existing health problems.
92
 The main aim of the WHO 
and the Indonesian government was to use existing health services as a strong base for 
introducing malaria eradication. The Indonesian Ministry of Health planned to integrate 
preventive and curative health services with the malaria eradication program, and operate them 
through the health centre and sub-centres. At each sub-centre, junior health workers were trained 
in basic epidemiology of communicable diseases, reporting outbreaks of disease, basic first aid, 
personal hygiene, nutrition, and the principles of vaccination. The WHO would assist provincial 
health inspectors of Kalimantan to develop training modules for health workers. Soon after the 
WHO and the Indonesian government signed the agreement for strengthening Indonesia’s health 
services in late 1962, the Ministry of Health developed rural health services in Kalimantan to 
provide favourable conditions for the execution of the malaria eradication program.
93
 The 
program for strengthening basic health services was, however, contingent to international aid. 
The WHO and the Indonesian government had proposed using unused UNICEF funding from 
the maternal and child health program for the malaria eradication program in Kalimantan. But, 
the proposal was rejected by the UNICEF headquarters in New York. The Indonesian 
government’s proposal to commence malaria eradication in the Outer Islands within the 
framework of basic health services was not clearly defined with respect to how malaria 
eradication would strengthen basic health services. Public health education in Outer Islands such 
as Kalimantan did not draw firm lines of distinction between the training of health personnel and 
educating the population about preventative health measures, e.g., vaccination. Consequently, the 
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health personnel were unable to communicate effectively with the rural dwellers regarding the 
rationale for specific public health measures.
94
  
Towards the end of the Soekarno era (1966-67), planners within the Indonesian Ministry 
and Department of Health (including Dr. Achmad Dipodilogo, the Director of Maternal and 
Child Health in 1969 during the New Order) advocated that for effective execution of public 
health in Indonesia, the nation needed to employ a synthesis of Leimena’s ‘social approach’—
that addressed the socio-economic causes of ill health—and Saroso’s ‘team approach’ that would 
involve coordination between various government departments such as agriculture, veterinary 
science, and education with public health.
95
 Dipodilogo’s ad-hoc plan envisioned the fusion of 
maternal and child health of the BKIA and curative care administered at the polyclinics within 
the overarching framework of the ‘health centre.’  The community within the jurisdiction of the 
health centre would be collectively responsible for its functioning. Dipodilogo’s ad-hoc plan 
intended to integrate public health within the broader framework of social welfare.
96
 The health 
centre would integrate the health-related activities of the Rural Health Department, the 
Department of Community Education, the Department of Religion, and the Department of 
Agriculture.  
Public health education during the Soekarno era was intended not only to convey 
information to the rural public about how to maintain health but also to instil healthy habits. 
Despite the significant inflow of overseas developmental aid for facilitating implementation of 
rural hygiene and health education, particularly the construction of latrines, these projects 
remained unutilised. Health education was implemented piecemeal by various departments and 
agencies within the Ministry of Health such as the Directorate for Communicable Disease 
Control, Jakarta, the Maternal and Child Health Department and the Department for 
Communicable Disease Control. Consequently, the implementation of an integrated program of 
health education of the public that would incorporate maternal and child health, nutrition, 
prevention of epidemic and endemic diseases, sanitation, and personal hygiene did not 
materialise during the Soekarno era. The doctors and paramedical personnel undergoing training 
in health education could not clearly comprehend the interdisciplinary nature of public health 
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problems including poor personal hygiene and a high prevalence of dental caries. Throughout the 
Soekarno era, disease eradication programs such as the anti-yaws campaign and the malaria 
eradication program competed for scarce medical personnel who would otherwise have been 
deputed to undertake health education of the public.  
 
Conclusions 
 
As a physician, Leimena understood the implications of the Cold War for Indonesia correctly. He 
used medical metaphors such as ‘the sharp needles of the cold war have penetrated into the body 
of the United Nations at present’97 to highlight the looming danger of the Cold War to world 
peace and the danger of the newly-independent nations compromising their hard-won 
sovereignty by aligning themselves either with the US or the USSR. His advocacy for 
international peace was shaped by his Christian convictions. An astute statesman, he sought to 
reconcile his Christian Ambonese ethnic identity with an Indonesian nationalism that sought to 
build Indonesia’s credibility within the UN as a leader of the developing world by voicing its 
aspirations to freedom, democracy, food security (rice), and education.
98
  
Leimena was the architect of the Indonesian health policy of the Soekarno era. Ever the 
pragmatist, he had critically appropriated public health thinking prominent in WHO circles and 
applied them to Indonesian conditions. The nucleus of his health philosophy, i.e., the Bandung 
Plan—a pioneering effort in post-World War II Indonesia designed to integrate preventive and 
curative public health activities centred on the notion of community participation—was 
implemented through pilot health demonstration projects, e.g. in the Bandung regency. The 
implementation of the Bandung Plan throughout Indonesia (now renamed as the Leimena Plan) 
in 1954 was somewhat untimely as the Ministry of Health lacked financial resources to support 
such a gigantic endeavour. Financing the pilot health projects proved a thorny issue between the 
central, provincial, and local governments in Indonesia.  
During his tenure as Minister of Health in the Sukiman cabinet in 1951, Leimena fully 
appreciated the fact that Indonesia’s health problems were exacerbated by an acute shortage of 
doctors, who at the time numbered approximately 1,200 and mostly gravitated towards the urban 
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areas. In an attempt to correct this disequilibrium in the health system, Leimena supported three 
hotly contested pieces of legislation that sought to regulate private practice, achieve an equitable 
distribution of physicians throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and enlist the assistance of the 
country’s private practitioners for undertaking emergency measures during epidemics. 
Legislative measures relating to the practice of medicine in the Soekarno era had strong 
nationalist underpinnings based on the Pantjasila ideal of social justice. Unfortunately, they 
failed to address the question of a low graduation rate of doctors from the country’s medical 
schools and the poor remuneration received by government doctors.  
During the 1950s, Indonesia was a significant recipient of international aid for health from 
international agencies including USAID, UNICEF, and the WHO. Foreign aid was a politically 
delicate issue for Indonesia. As Health Minister, Leimena was fully cognisant of the need to 
balance Indonesia’s hard won political sovereignty in the political sphere with international 
assistance in health to compensate for the shortfall in the government spending on health. 
Foreign assistance to public health was evident in the pilot health education and demonstration 
projects initiated in Indonesia such as Bekasi. Some international aid agencies (USAID, for 
example) restricted health funding for malaria eradication. UNICEF emphasised support for 
maternal and child health care. The post-colonial Indonesian state of the 1950s and 1960s closely 
aligned its health objectives with the prescriptions of international agencies.  Indonesia’s high 
prevalence of maternal and infant mortality, which attracted the attention of health planners and 
international agencies alike, was termed a disgrace by external aid agencies.  
The various aid agencies funding health programs in Indonesia had very concrete ideas of 
what was considered appropriate as health policy for Indonesia. Malaria eradication, for 
example, received top priority in USAID circles owing to its conspicuous association with 
maximising the economic productivity of the workforce. With the expansion of the malaria 
eradication program to the entire archipelago in 1959, paramedical workers who would 
otherwise have been involved in health education were diverted to the malaria eradication 
program. Health education in Indonesia during the Soekarno era lacked synchronisation with the 
Bandung Plan in terms of integrating preventive and curative health. The various departments 
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within the Ministry of Health independently implemented their own staff training programs, 
which were so loosely related to the theme of public health education that doctors and other 
medical personnel were unable to comprehend the interrelatedness of the various components of 
public health such as nutrition, sanitation, and infectious disease prevention. Julie Sulianti 
Saroso, Director of Maternal and Child Health, initiated a program of caries prevention among 
schoolchildren and enlisted the support of the School Health Service and the maternal and child 
health and stressed the combination of teamwork among health personnel—which was found 
lacking during the implementation of the Leimena Plan—and a socio-behavioural approach to 
public health. However, her initiatives failed to materialise owing to the acute shortage of 
paramedical personnel and doctors.   
The Leimena Plan for Health, which advocated a social approach to public health, and 
Saroso’s notion of team approach, which envisioned the coordination of health and health-related 
educational activities of the various departments functioning under the umbrella of, or related to, 
the Ministry of Health, neatly complemented each other. But, they could not be executed in 
conjunction with each other during the early 1960s owing to financial difficulties and the 
political uncertainty that destabilised the period. Both approaches were forerunners to the 
concept of the health centre which was born during the New Order era. Finally, in the late 1960s, 
the country’s health centres integrated the activities of maternal and child health, immunisation, 
treatment for common health problems, and health education under the leadership of the dokabu 
(dokter kabupaten, regency physician) and administered by the community.  
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Johannes Leimena: Indonesia’s Minister of Health (1950). Source: KITLV Digital Image Library Image Code 
41408. 
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School Health (above, c.a. 1965) and the training of doekoens (below) in scientific birthing practices.  
 
Source: Fakultas Kedokteran Universitas Indonesia, Buku Tahunan 1964-1965 (Jakarta: Fakultas Kedokteran 
Universitas Indonesia, 1965).  
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Indonesia, Sanitation (1950-1959): Women wash clothes in a Jakarta canal. Further on, people will draw their 
drinking water from the same source.  
 
Source:  Image WHO_A_000459 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BIG FOUR ENDEMIC DISEASES 
 
Since the 1950s, Indonesia has been actively interested in receiving international health and 
developmental assistance—particularly in the field of disease eradication—through agencies of 
the United Nations such as the WHO (World Health Organisation), UNICEF (United Nations 
Children’s Emergency Fund), and the WHO Regional Office for Southeast Asia (SEARO). 
Disease eradication programs in the post-World War II period in newly-decolonised nations of 
Africa and Asia were seen as demonstrating the ability of Western science to modernise the 
underdeveloped world. Within US policy circles, disease eradication (particularly malaria 
eradication) was viewed as a weapon to contain the spread of communism in Africa and Asia and 
as a means to foster political allegiance of the leaders of those countries. While there is a 
burgeoning scholarship documenting post-World War II disease eradication programs in Latin 
America, Africa, and India, the Indonesian chapter of disease eradication seems to have escaped 
the attention of the history of medicine.
1
 Sunil Amrith’s influential monograph Decolonising 
International Health argues that India played a pivotal role in shaping the WHO activities in 
Southeast Asia because of its uniquely complex disease environment. Indians played a greater 
role in shaping approaches to Asia’s health than either the Indonesians or the Burmese.2  
However, this argument does not do full justice to the Indonesian imprint on the disease 
eradication campaigns of the 1950s in Southeast Asia. The unique epidemiological strategy 
developed by Dr. Raden Kodijat and Soetopo, for example, aimed to eradicate yaws in a 
resource-poor environment was emulated by other decolonising nations such as Malaya. The 
multidirectional flow of epidemiological ideas between the SEARO member states and Geneva 
was instrumental in shaping the practice of international health in the 1950s.   
Indonesian leaders were convinced of the necessity to promote the health of the country’s 
population and address the many diseases that were plaguing the citizenry. In 1950, Abdul 
Halim’s cabinet identified malaria, tuberculosis, yaws, and leprosy as Penjakit Rakjat (the big 
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four endemic diseases), which adversely affected the overall vitality of the Indonesians. 
Mobilisation of the nation around  the eradication of these big four diseases involved raising the 
standard of living of average Indonesians and presenting an image of the New Indonesian as free 
of disease in accordance with the pembangunan (nation-building) ideology. Indonesian 
physicians presented issues related to health and disease as essential elements of nation-building. 
The 1950s witnessed interplay of national and international ideas and initiatives in Indonesian 
public health. There were several sets of ideas on how to combat diseases internationally. In this 
chapter, I will focus on the way in which Indonesians received these ideas and fashioned them to 
suit their own purposes.  
The ways in which Indonesia received and refashioned international ideas on health and 
international aid projects were determined by the desire for self-sufficiency and the country’s 
ideology. Indonesia was not a passive recipient of international aid: it contributed to international 
campaigns as well. During the Cold War, disease eradication campaigns and international aid 
provided by the superpowers were a way to buy political allegiance, which made participation in 
these projects an essentially political act. Indonesia favoured the Bandung approach; that is: 
economic self-sufficiency, non-alignment and emphasis on solidarity with the newly-
independent nations in a similar position to itself rather than reliance upon superpowers. The 
disease eradication campaigns formulated during the 1950s reveal the tension between 
Indonesia’s ambitions to retain control over its health policy versus its increased openness to 
international aid.  
 For Indonesians, health was a part of nation-building. The discourse adopted by Soekarno 
and other nationalists around the struggle for Indonesian independence was appropriated by 
Indonesia’s physicians who metaphorically referred to disease eradication campaigns as battles 
that would lead to further victories of the nation against poverty, illiteracy and disease and 
cultivate a strong and healthy population. Critical to the securing of international financial 
support for Indonesia’s disease eradication program was the continued alignment of the 
Indonesian framing of disease eradication—that envisioned the creation of a strong and healthy 
population—with the agenda of international agencies that narrowly equated disease eradication 
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with maximising economic productivity was critical. Unlike the international agencies that 
correlated the prevalence of disease with poverty, Indonesian physicians adopted a holistic 
approach. They argued that diseases were not caused by poverty alone but were rooted in socio-
economic conditions, political structures and the environment. 
 
Disease Eradication and International Politics 
 
During the Cold War, the US became alarmed about the rapid spread of communism to 
developing countries. In an attempt to contain the spread of communist ideology among the 
developing countries, the US followed a policy of alleviating poverty in the underdeveloped 
nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The US contended that (a) disease caused poverty; 
and, (b) poverty was a breeding ground of communism. Therefore, the eradication of disease 
would arrest the growth of communist ideology. For the US, campaigns against disease also 
signified the enhancement of economic productivity in developing countries. It saw the political 
significance of funding disease eradication campaigns in developing countries as a means of 
gaining their political loyalties. The government of Indonesia, instead, sought to pursue its own 
path to health policy— the Bandung approach, independent of superpower intervention—and 
sought to cautiously balance Indonesia’s sovereignty with increased openness to international 
cooperation in health. Unlike the US, which narrowly correlated the promotion of public health 
programs (especially disease eradication campaigns) with the maximisation of economic 
productivity and the containment of communism, Indonesia adopted a holistic approach that 
sought to use public health to achieve social and economic development, particularly in the rural 
areas. Indonesia did not aim to diffuse Cold War tensions.  
World War II not only marked a major watershed in the campaign against infectious 
diseases but also brought to fruition the idea that eradication of disease vectors was possible with 
the application of suitable technological interventions. For example, DDT trials against malarial 
mosquitoes conducted by the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia in 1944 
could be universally applied to control malaria.  The apparent success of DDT against malaria 
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inspired faith in the ability of medical technology to achieve human victory over nature.
3
 The 
governments of India, Thailand and the Philippines had undertaken malaria eradication 
campaigns in the 1950s to generate a sense of social progress.
4
  The eradication of malaria 
reinforced the belief that narrowly-directed technocratic solutions such as using DDT would 
solve the health problems of the underdeveloped countries.
5
  
From 1945 onwards, the WHO and UN agencies such as the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) and UNICEF shaped the thinking on public health of the newly- 
decolonising nations of Africa and Asia. The above agencies emphasised the effect of disease on 
labour productivity by quantifying the economic losses caused by disease. They argued that 
disease created lethargy, robbed people of their vitality, and resulted in underdevelopment. In 
this view, medical advances such as penicillin injections against yaws were catalysts of social 
change by curing the infections and increasing economic productivity.
6
 These ideas were based 
on the notion that international development could be redefined in terms of disease eradication.  
This proposition quantified the social benefit that accrued from disease eradication in purely 
economic terms, such as maximising the productivity of labour of the newly-decolonised nations. 
This would then increase the extraction of raw materials and open markets, which in turn would 
benefit the industrialised nations, who often were the erstwhile colonial powers.
7
 The economic 
rationale of disease eradication was criticised by Boentaran Martoatmodjo (Indonesia’s first 
Minister of Health from 19 August 1945 to 14 November 1945), who argued that poverty was 
not caused by disease alone but by prevailing political structures, socio-economic conditions and 
the environment.
8
 According to a number of Indonesian physicians, equating health with 
economic development was too simple because many other factors had their roles to play. 
In the post-World War II world order—which was characterised by the Cold War rivalry 
between the US and the USSR—the US could not maintain its security after the emergence of 
communism in the developing countries.  In a bid to contain communism, the US adopted a 
policy of economic development of the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, often in the form of humanitarian intervention. Integrated planning addressed the 
question of the health of their populations with a view to raising economic productivity.
9
  The 
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rationale for this was straightforward: poverty was the breeding ground of communism, and 
since disease caused poverty, eradicating disease would prevent the spread of communism 
among the developing countries. The post-World War II definition of development coincided 
with US national interests that sought to increase the flow of raw materials from the developing 
nations to the industrial centres and provide overseas markets for US manufactured goods.
10
  
From 1945 to the late 1960s, the US played a pivotal role (through the UN and its 
specialised agencies such as the UNICEF and the WHO) in implementing international 
assistance to underdeveloped countries. The US took part in international development in order 
to enhance its standing in international affairs as a champion of humanitarian causes. It sought to 
use UN agencies and technical experts as a conduit for executing international developmental 
projects aligned with US foreign policy such as the modernisation of agriculture and malaria 
eradication in developing countries. But, the developing nations did not always react positively 
to these initiatives. In the 1950s, the developing countries jealously guarded their hard-earned 
independence. They did not want to get entangled in the Cold War rivalry between the USSR 
and the US. As a result, they viewed aid from either USSR or the US with a certain degree of 
scepticism, preferring to receive aid from multilateral agencies such as the UN.
11
  But, the UN 
was close to the US. US financial support to the developing countries administered through UN 
agencies in the 1950s envisioned a process of modernisation that involved efficient use of the 
world’s financial resources to achieve overall improvements in health, education, and nutrition 
without accompanying social change.
12
  Accelerating the development of the newly-decolonised 
countries of Asia and Africa through the diffusion of modern science and technology was 
considered the key to reducing the disparities between these countries and the more developed 
nations of Europe and North America.   
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the WHO was faced with the challenge of establishing 
its identity within the UN as a specialised agency in the context of the Cold War. To this end, it 
deliberately ironed over controversies such as socialized medicine, instead diverting its attention 
to narrowly directed public health interventions such as disease eradication.
13
  In the 1950s, the 
WHO approach to public health in Southeast Asia was to develop short term demonstration 
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projects such as malaria, tuberculosis, yaws , venereal diseases, and maternal and child health.
14
  
During this period, throughout postcolonial Southeast Asia, the campaign against disease 
reflected the rising expectations of the population for a healthier future.  These campaigns were 
approached through two competing public health strategies—i.e., the horizontal approach which 
addressed health problems through the establishment of health services, and the vertical 
approach that resolved particular diseases.
15
 On occasion, these approaches coordinated with 
each other, the prime example of horizontal approach being the integration of BCG (Bacillus 
Calmette–Guérin) vaccination with maternal and child health in Indonesia. On other occasions, 
disease control initiatives, namely smallpox eradication and malaria eradication, competed 
against each other for scarce financial resources.  
The WHO, which established its first regional office in South East Asia (SEARO) in 
New Delhi in 1948, believed that Southeast Asia, comprising India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Nepal, had a certain unity shaped by tropical environment, shared 
poverty and pathogenic conditions.
16
  However, the geopolitics of the Cold War and 
decolonisation dictated membership of the SEARO. Owing to the partition of British India and 
the subsequent conflict over Kashmir, Pakistan joined the East Mediterranean Regional 
Organisation which had its headquarters in Alexandria whereas Malaysia, then engaged in 
conflict with Indonesia, joined the West Pacific Regional Organisation (WPRO), with its 
headquarters in Manila.  
The SEARO assisted member states through the assignment of short-term project 
consultants for malaria, tuberculosis, and maternal and child health, as well as financial support 
for disease eradication campaigns. The SEARO identified malaria as the ‘number one’ public 
health problem in Southeast Asia in 1953 which impeded the socio-economic development of the 
region.
17
 To this end, it recommended malaria control on an inter-country basis with financial 
support from UNICEF and the Point-Four Program of the US under President Harry S.Truman 
(implemented in 1950 as a Cold War strategy to contain communism). The Point-Four Program 
stipulated that US technical assistance to developing countries could be provided in the fields of 
health, education, and agriculture. The application of such assistance could contribute to raising 
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the standards of living of the peoples and create new sources of wealth, thereby containing 
subversion of the population to communist ideology.
18
  Recipient nations also had a strong 
interest in health, albeit for different reasons. The 1950s were characterised by a sense of 
optimism in the newly-independent states of Southeast Asia, which persuaded the people to 
believe that science offered opportunities for economic betterment and social change.  For 
example, public health found mention in the First Five Year plans of India, Indonesia and Burma 
as a means of promoting socio-economic development.  
The most significant political event influencing the course of disease eradication 
campaigns in the Southeast Asian region in the 1950s was the Bandung Conference of African 
and Asian nations, held in 1955. Apart from discussing socio-political issues, health was an 
important part of the program. Delegates, including Raden Mochtar, expressed a belief in the 
international circulation of technologies that bolstered the legitimacy of the post-colonial state’s 
developmental programs and identification of the shared struggles of different groups against 
colonialism in the newly-decolonised nations of Asia and Africa.
19
 The Eighth SEARO session 
at Bandung coincided with the Bandung Conference. At this session, Indonesians expressed 
optimism that rural development through the development of public health could serve as a 
medium to diffuse Cold War tensions worldwide.  In his opening address, Raden Mochtar, 
Acting Chairman of the Eighth SEARO session, stated: 
 The WHO has become a symbol of hope for the peoples on the earth, although the work 
is still at the beginning of a very long endeavour. Whether its promise can be fulfilled 
depends upon many factors essential to the success of the Organization, among which are 
the participation of the nations in the work of the WHO. Health can be won only through 
the concerted efforts of all in fighting against illness. In this respect it is the same with 
peace and security, which are inconceivable without such efforts.  
 There is one thing to regret, namely that WHO as a non-political body cannot be 
entirely free from the frustrating effects of a politically and psychologically divided world 
community. Every nation should realise that the birth of this Organization emanated from 
the principle of universal solidarity and that the sole purpose of the WHO is to render the 
peoples of all countries physically and mentally healthier and stronger. Hence there is no 
excuse for any nation to stand aside from this international effort.
20
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In his address, Mochtar stressed that any attempt to raise the standard of health of the world 
population required the establishing of closer political cooperation between WHO member states 
and subordinating narrowly-defined national interests, e.g., the quarantining of communicable 
diseases across international borders to ensure the greater international good.  
Soekarno’s internationalism was reflected in Indonesia’s membership of the SEARO and 
commitment to disease eradication.  In 1960, Indonesia hosted the Thirteenth Regional 
Conference of the SEARO in Bandung. In his speech to the SEARO delegates at Bogor Palace, 
Soekarno emphasised that the Indonesian republic was a people’s republic.21  Indonesia’s health 
program was implemented on behalf of the people and with the people. Soekarno stated that 
Indonesia was collaborating with other nations in the spirit of internationalism to eradicate 
disease. And, while it welcomed foreign aid, he emphasised that Indonesia was capable of 
implementing its targets of eradicating malaria, yaws and tuberculosis independently.
22
  By 
1960, after ‘fifteen years of freedom,’ Indonesia had indeed achieved modest accomplishments 
in health concomitant with people becoming ‘health minded.’23  In Soekarno’s address to the 
SEARO delegates, he used the word ‘free’ four times, indicating a sense of Indonesia’s 
commitment to international cooperation in health and a sense of possibility that Indonesia could 
eradicate tuberculosis and malaria with the cooperation of the people.
24
  
During the Cold War, the US viewed the campaign against disease as an instrument to 
gain the political allegiance of the developing nations.  Unlike the WHO and the other UN 
agencies which narrowly equated disease with underdevelopment, Indonesian physicians adopted 
a holistic perspective that contextualised disease in the light of socio-political factors, the 
prevailing political conditions and the environment.  
 
Framing Disease Eradication in the Soekarno Era 
 
This section investigates the presentation of disease and health issues in Indonesia’s nationalistic 
rhetoric of the 1950s. More specifically, it investigates how the discourse adopted by Soekarno 
around the revolutionary struggle was appropriated by Indonesian physicians who 
119 
 
metaphorically depicted disease eradication initiatives as battles which would lead to further 
victories of the nation against poverty, thus cultivating a strong and healthy population.  The 
continued congruence of the nationalist imageries of disease—that depicted disease as 
debilitating the nation’s demographic and economic potential—with the agenda of international 
organisations that narrowly quantified economic losses sustained as a result of disease, was a 
crucial factor determining international support for Indonesia’s public health projects.  
Between 1949 and 1967, disease eradication in Indonesia was presented within President 
Soekarno’s pembangunan ideology, which used military metaphors such as musuh (enemy) to 
associate malaria with the weakening of the masses because it drained them of their vitality. 
Such a metaphorical depiction of disease served to articulate a very specific reading of the 
nation’s health in which international health ideas were reinterpreted in an Indonesian context.  
According to Indonesian physicians, pembangunan contained multiple initiatives such as 
eradicating illiteracy, increasing the food supply, and achieving a higher standard of living. For 
example, eradicating malaria could be presented as central to progress and development because 
it was seen as the key to increasing labour efficiency and developing areas wherein the disease 
was endemic, such as Kalimantan.   
President Soekarno conceptualised pembangunan to articulate Indonesia’s vision of 
development and its aspirations for a brighter future after three-and-a-half centuries of Dutch 
colonialism. It embodied national reconstruction with a view to transforming Indonesia into a 
just and prosperous society and recreating an international society (masjarakat dunia) based on 
security for every person.
25
 For Soekarno, the meaning of merdeka (freedom) reflected the 
aspiration of Indonesians to have their basic needs such as food, clothing and education fulfilled, 
as reflected in the Javanese expression subur kang sarwa tinandur, murah kang sarwa tinuku 
(prosperity in which everyone was ensured satisfaction of basic needs). Thus, Soekarno’s view 
of pembangunan embraced advancements in public health, communications, the construction of 
monuments, and the development of a strong military that expressed Indonesia’s newly-won 
self-confidence 
26
 In the context of nations, Soekarno envisioned the percolation of the fruits of 
scientific knowledge to Indonesian society in which the rumbling of the tractor was symbolic of 
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addressing the problem of increasing food supply to feed the country’s ever growing 
population.
27
 
The discourse developed by Soekarno and other nationalists around the struggle for 
Indonesian independence and the identity of the Indonesian nation was adopted by Indonesian 
physicians to frame health initiatives as battles which would lead to further victories of the 
nation. At the time of Indonesian independence (1949) Indonesian nationalists argued that 
infectious diseases such as malaria, fever, and diseases of the gastrointestinal tract were 
responsible for diminishing the working capacity of the nation’s workforce resulting in lowered 
agricultural productivity and starvation.
28
 In other words, a strong and healthy population was a 
vital ingredient in ensuring the prosperity of the Indonesian nation.
29
 Disease aetiologies 
constructed by Indonesian nationalists sought to rationalise the relationship between poverty, 
disease and national priorities of the archipelagic state at the time of independence.  Within the 
framework of mass disease, malaria was cast as a hantu (ghost) which haunted the coastal areas 
and the hinterland causing malnutrition among children and infant mortality. It was considered 
the musuh nomor pertama (enemy number one) of the newly-independent nation.
30
  On the tenth 
anniversary of the WHO in 1958, the Minister of Health, Dr Azis Saleh reflected on the state of 
Indonesia’s health since independence, by using the word kemadjuan to indicate the progress 
made by the Indonesian nation in public health during the 1950s, despite the challenges posed by 
an acute shortage of physicians, and health centres.
31
  In his speech, Dr Saleh indicated that the 
Indonesian government would work jointly with the people (kita bersama usaha) to address the 
problem of ill health in the homeland (tanah air kita) through mass mobilisation of 
schoolchildren and teachers to spread awareness of preventive health.
32
  
In 1959, President Soekarno inaugurated the Indonesian chapter of the malaria 
eradication program in collaboration with the ICA and the WHO. In his speech, he used military 
metaphors to associate malaria with the loss of the nation’s economic potential.33   He substituted 
the word malaria with mal-mosquito to demonstrate that malaria was not caused by climate but 
by mosquito bites that paralysed the nation’s economic potential. Eradicating malaria, in 
Soekarno’s vision, would result in the creation of a physically and mentally healthy Indonesian 
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population.
34
  The Indonesian malaria eradication program was the second largest in the world 
after India; but, the sheer size of the archipelago had forced the Indonesian government to adopt 
a militarised approach to eradication, noted by the Times of Indonesia, dated 13 August 1959:  
Indonesia with her 3,000 islands, 85 million population and approximately 18 million 
houses is divided in 58 battle zones, each consisting of some 300,000 houses. Each battle 
zone requires: 620 tonnes of DDT, 30 motorized vehicles, 60 spraying instruments, 60 
overseers, 10 mobile teams, 23 microscopist [sic], 50 malaria officers, 60 workers, and 
buildings, storehouses and staff-quarters in the regions. In ten years every inch of walls of 
houses in villages, mountains, hills, fields, swamps and rivers should be entirely sprayed 
with DDT.  The walls of houses have become the main object because malaria 
mosquitoes after sucking blood used to take rest on walls of houses.
35
 
 
The Indonesian government’s official launch of the malaria eradication campaign in 1959 was an 
attempt to align the nationalist imagery of a strong and healthy citizenry free of disease with the 
agenda of international agencies such as the ICA and the SEARO. These agencies emphasized 
the economic aspects of the disease and quantified the economic losses sustained internationally 
due to malaria. As a consequence of balancing the nationalist imagery of disease eradication with 
the agenda of international agencies, the Ministry of Health sought to secure moral and financial 
support for malaria eradication.  
Indonesian physicians appropriated the revolutionary discourse conceptualised by 
Soekarno and other nationalists to represent disease eradication initiatives as victorious battles 
that would augment the nation’s economic productivity. During the 1950s, the continued 
alignment of the nationalist imagination of disease (that perceived the symbolic value of disease 
eradication campaigns in constructing a strong and healthy population) with the international 
agencies’ agenda that equated disease eradication with development, was critical to ensure 
sustained international support for Indonesia’s public health programs.  
 
Malaria: From Control to Eradication 
 
 The common denominator uniting the ideas surrounding malaria control of the WHO, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Health, and the US was the belief that malaria eradication would lead to 
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increased economic productivity. The continued alignment of nationalist rhetoric and health 
initiatives that envisioned disease eradication as an important step in the creation of a strong and 
healthy citizenry with the agenda of international agencies that equated the campaign against 
disease with enhanced economic productivity, was crucial for continued international support for 
Indonesia’s malaria eradication program. Between 1951 and 1956, the Indonesian government 
implemented pilot malaria control projects with international support that sought to minimise the 
incidence of malaria using DDT. Unfortunately, these malaria control operations were impeded 
due to mosquitoes developing resistance to DDT. By 1958, the Indonesian Ministry of Health 
had launched a malaria eradication program on a nationwide basis which faced shortcomings not 
because of insecticidal resistance of mosquitoes but due to bureaucratic delays that affected the 
effective implementation of the anti-malarial campaign. Unfortunately, the Indonesian Ministry 
of Health had learnt no lessons from the resistance of mosquitoes to DDT.  
The term ‘magic bullet’ refers to specific treatments targeting and destroying 
microorganisms causing the disease.
36
 For example, DDT could eliminate malaria from tropical 
areas by killing all mosquito vectors, in the process avoiding the enormous expenditure incurred 
by draining marshes and swamps that would have prevented the breeding of the anopheles. The 
Indonesian government initially introduced malaria control with DDT as pilot demonstration 
projects in Java in the villages of Cilacap and Semarang in Central Java between 1951 and 1956. 
Prior to formally commencing the eradication program in 1959, assistance was provided by the 
WHO. These projects revealed the shortcomings of the magic bullet approach as the anopheles 
sundaicus developed resistance to DDT.  Subsequent demonstration projects used DDT in 
malaria control in conjunction with endrin, aldrin and dieldrin (pesticides used in paddy fields) 
beginning in 1956.    
Malaria control is the reduction of the prevalence and morbidity of the disease to 
acceptable levels.
37
 During the early 1950s, Indonesia implemented malaria control measures 
through a combination of insecticide spraying (DDT), quininisation of the affected population 
and the draining of swamps.
38
 Although the initiatives seemed promising, malaria control 
measures proved unworkable due to the enormous capital expenditure. Thus, by the mid-1950s, 
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the Indonesian Ministry of Health opted for the large-scale spraying of DDT as a cost-effective 
measure of malaria control. Apart from the ineffectiveness of DDT under hot and humid weather 
conditions and the development of anopheline resistance to the insecticide, malaria control was 
further impeded by unscientific spraying attributed to the selective spraying of malarious 
locations based on political criteria.   
In 1950, the Malaria Section of the Ministry of Health designed field experiments to 
study the impact of DDT house spraying of anopheles punctulatus and anopheles sundaicus in 
Marunda village near Tanjung Priok harbour of Jakarta.
39
  The spraying activities resulted in a 
decrease in the incidence of malaria among schoolchildren.
40
  However, this experiment was 
only an isolated example of the success of the magic bullet approach.  In the early 1950s, 
Indonesia’s malaria control programs relied on a combination of household spraying of DDT, 
quininisation of the affected population, and sanitary works such as the draining of swamps. But, 
mass quininisation and the draining of swamps proved unworkable due to the huge capital 
expenditure required. Eradication campaigns ultimately came to rely exclusively on DDT.  
  The malaria control plan for the province of Central Java was implemented by the 
doctors of each residency of that province. C.A. Ferullo, WHO sanitary engineer at Cilacap, 
described the mechanics of the spraying operations as follows: 
The recommended dose was two grams of technical DDT per square meter. The 
spraymen were trained to cover a standard wall of twelve m
2
 in one minute to obtain the 
required deposit. It was satisfactory to note that within three days all trainees, with few 
exceptions, were in a position to spray at the recommended speed. With a view to 
obtaining a constant rate of discharge from the Hudson sprayers, a particular technique 
was elaborated, based on uniform intervals among the charges and a fixed number of 
strokes.
41
 
 
In line with enhanced spraying, the average sprayed area per house in Cilacap increased. 
Spraying operations were not carried out in a timely manner. This was often associated with 
political reasons such as the containment of banditry in the western part of Cilacap regency 
where the military had recommended malaria control.
42
 Spraying DDT was done in association 
with military action in order to curb banditry.  
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The malaria control projects in Cilacap and Semarang used malariometric methods that 
involved blood and spleen surveys and entomologic surveys that included testing anopheles 
species for susceptibility to insecticides.
43
 The surveys revealed that the parasite levels in blood 
were fairly high in individuals living in the coastal belt, and high in individuals living in fertile 
agricultural areas.
44
 Experiments with household spraying of DDT to control the anopheles 
sundaicus vector in the coastal areas of Banyumas revealed that the vector had developed DDT 
resistance due to the progressive deterioration of DDT coating on the walls of houses, rendering 
the insecticidal properties of DDT ineffective.
45
  Moreover, anopheles sundaicus avoided the 
walls of the houses once they were sprayed with DDT. Anopheline resistance to DDT was also 
recorded in parts of eastern Java in the early 1960s where DDT and dieldrin were used in 
combination with other insecticides such as endrin and aldrin to control pests in rice paddies and 
were added to fishing bait in the lagoons.
46
 The anopheles sundaicus species had thus 
demonstrated cross-insecticidal resistance to DDT as it had developed an earlier immunity to 
endrin and aldrin. Concomitant with increased insecticidal immunity, the density of anopheles 
sundaicus in East Java increased. The pilot project was, therefore, entirely unsuccessful as 
mosquitoes developed resistance to DDT due to its deterioration in a hot and humid climate.  
In the period that followed, due to a shortage of spraying personnel and a lack of spraying 
directions, DDT spraying was carried out haphazardly. Prior to commencing the National 
Malaria Eradication Program in 1959, spraying with insecticides in provinces such as East Java 
was carried out in selected areas only, leaving the surrounding zones highly susceptible to 
malaria. The toxic effects of dieldrin became evident when eight to ten spraymen at one time 
succumbed to headaches and convulsions, which were caused by the short term effects of 
dieldrin exposure.
47
  There were reports of chickens, goats and ducks dying in villages of East 
Java due to house spraying with dieldrin.
48
 Eventually, people refused to cooperate with the 
spraying squads owing to economic losses incurred as a result of the spraying operations. 
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During its initial stages from 1951 to 1956, the malaria control program was highly 
centralised. The control program for the province of Central Java was prepared by the Malaria 
Institute at Jakarta for the whole province without consideration for geographic or climatic 
factors.  The Indonesian government’s malaria control manual, published in 1956, described the 
complex chain of command style of functioning of the malaria control program as follows:  
Reports and records are essential to an efficient malaria control program. The Malaria 
control program for the Republic of Indonesia is a nation-wide one and complete, 
accurate and regular reports are necessary to those who do the overall planning and 
directing. Although the individual Provincial Control Operations are under the direction 
of the Inspectors of Health, the insecticides, vehicles, sprayers and a large part of the 
finances are furnished by the Central Government. Much of the training of personnel is 
carried on by the Malaria Institute. The Budget of the Ministry of Health must be made 
up for a year in advance. The Government must request insecticides, vehicles, sprayers 
and laboratory equipment from the International Co-operation Administration of the 
United States of America one year in advance. Much of this planning is based on records, 
which are in turn based on reports sent in from personnel actually engaged in spraying 
operations and other phases of malaria control. 
Standardization of Reports cannot be overemphasized. Reports coming in from 
Supervisors to the offices of the Inspectors of Health must be consolidated. Just as the 
Mandur [Associated with supervision of spraying DDT] makes his report from the 
individual reports of his spraymen, the Sub-supervisor makes his from those of his 
Mandurs, and so on up, the Ministry of Health must make a report for the nation.
49
 
 
Lines of responsibility in organizing the malaria control program remained undefined from the 
very beginning. The provincial health inspectors had enormous control over implementing 
malaria control activities in territories under their jurisdiction. But for all practical purposes, they 
were dependent upon the Ministry of Health at Jakarta for the disbursement of funds which were 
often delayed.  
Malaria eradication is the permanent elimination of the disease even in the absence of 
control measures. Between 1958 and 1965, Indonesia implemented malaria eradication that 
consisted of the following strategies: (a) mapping out the prevalence of the disease through 
surveys; (b) determining the resistance of the anopheline species to DDT; (c) treating all 
suspected malaria cases discovered during surveys with chloroquine; and, (d) spraying the 
infected household with DDT to contain the transmission of malaria. The course of the malaria 
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eradication program in Indonesia started to look promising with the sharp decline of the parasitic 
index in children with the commencement of spraying operations and the temporary elimination 
of malaria from the major urban areas such as Jakarta and Surabaya. But, the sustained 
implementation of the eradication activities was contingent upon international funding. 
Indonesia’s leaders astutely related the nationalist vision of malaria eradication of cultivating a 
strong and healthy citizenry to the agenda of the WHO that equated malaria eradication with the 
improvement of economic productivity with a view to securing international support for the 
program. However, political uncertainties within Indonesia such as Soekarno’s suspension of 
parliamentary institutions and the establishment of closer ties with the USSR resulted in 
decreased American support for the malaria eradication program. Additionally, there was a 
cessation of spraying operations between 1965 and 1967 due to political disturbances and the 
movement of peoples between the Outer Islands (which were still malaria endemic) and Java’s 
urban centres that had temporarily eliminated malaria by the mid-1960s, importation of malaria 
into Java’s urban centres recurred in 1967.  
On 29 October 1954 and 27 February 1958, the Indonesian government entered into 
separate agreements with the ICA and the WHO for eradicating malaria using the following 
methods: (a) use of residual insecticides such as DDT (that had a long-lasting effect in malaria 
control except under tropical conditions); (b) detection of individual malaria cases through blood 
tests; (c) case finding operations; (d) the administration of anti-malarial drugs to the population; 
(e) depletion of the plasmodium (malarial parasite in the human blood) reservoir; and, (f) 
integrating malaria eradication into public health services.
50
 The Ministry of Health sought to 
secure international support for the malaria eradication program by framing it in terms of 
maximising national productivity and extending the eradication campaign to Indonesia’s 
international borders. Malaria eradication served as a platform for Indonesia to express its 
commitment to the international community, particularly by interrupting transmission of the 
disease in Kalimantan (then malaria endemic), which shared a land border with Malaya. The 
WHO proposed sponsoring the visit of the then Minister of Health Azis Saleh to Mexico in 1958, 
so that the Indonesians could learn from the Mexican campaign about scientific spraying and 
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administrative organisation of the malaria eradication program. But, the proposal could not 
materialise due to political uncertainties within Indonesia soon after Soekarno’s suspension of 
parliamentary institutions in 1957.
51
    
In 1958, Azis Saleh quantified the economic losses resulting from malaria, labelled as the 
single most important cause of economic drain for Indonesia. Approximately 30 million 
Indonesians were affected, of whom 40% were wage earners and 60% were children resulting in 
a productivity loss of 360 million rupiahs per annum.
52
 In Saleh’s discussions with Prime 
Minister Djuanda in 1958, the narrow quantification of economic losses caused by malaria 
justified the execution of the malaria eradication program throughout the Indonesian archipelago 
and synchronised well with the pembangunan ideology. In addition, the ready availability of 
DDT as a cost-effective technological intervention in post-World II Indonesia meant that it could 
be extended to remote communities of the archipelago. In other words, Saleh’s program was 
feasible.  
The 1959 Indonesian malaria eradication campaign coincided with Soekarno’s 
proclamation of his Manifesto Politik, which envisioned the need to retool the Indonesian people 
towards a just and prosperous society based on ‘developing the power potential of the Indonesian 
masses,’ expressed through mass mobilization of the population against illiteracy and disease.53  
Within the Manifesto Politik framework, malaria was constructed as a musuh (enemy) which 
affected the physical and mental wellbeing of the Indonesians. In 1959, the Malaria Eradication 
Service within the Ministry of Health was invested with quasi-independent authority to 
implement DDT spraying, surveillance of malaria cases and treatment, and entomological 
investigation of anopheles. In 1963, the Ministry of Health created KOPEM (Komando Operasi 
Penjakit Malaria) as a special taskforce to eradicate malaria in Java and Bali, a continuation of 
the nationalist rhetoric on health.
54
 The DDT spraying operations had reduced the incidence of 
parasitic index in children from 22.5% prior to 1963 to 0.2% soon after the spraying operations 
had commenced.
55
 The beginning looked good.  
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From its inception, the malaria eradication program faced organisational setbacks such as 
poor remuneration for the spraying squads and confusion between health education and training 
of public health personnel. Indonesian medical professionals did not view the malaria eradication 
program as promising as they were recruited against their will. Malaria eradication officers were 
forcibly drafted from the Chinese community based on an obsolete law, which caused 
resentment.
56
 The malaria eradication program was impeded not so much by the deterioration of 
DDT but by bureaucratic hurdles within Indonesia resulting from the centralised nature of the 
campaign which overlooked the geographic, epidemiological and demographic diversity across 
the archipelagic nation. While health education in Indonesia inculcated healthy habits among the 
population, it did not educate them on the significance of indoor spraying. Therefore, the 
population did not cooperate with the spraying squads. The malaria eradication personnel were 
unable to interpret spraying instructions from the KOPEM headquarters as the instructions were 
highly centralised. The spraying operations were not supervised, the sprayers failed to achieve 
expected targets and bottlenecks existed in the complex chain of command. For example, each 
head of the malaria eradication zone at the residency level received instructions based on the 
lunar month but was expected to present results according to the calendar month.
57
 
The malaria eradication staff had to negotiate the bureaucratic maze of rules and 
regulations at the local, provincial and central government levels when while requesting 
accessories such as sprayer parts, and spare parts for transport such as tyres and batteries.  This 
impeded the complete coverage of the malaria endemic zones. For example, worn tyres of 
vehicles used in the malaria eradication program in the Yogyakarta area had to be brought in 
from Semarang, the provincial capital of Central Java, and issued a certificate of unworthiness by 
the police before the malaria service could file an application to the Malaria Eradication 
Program, Jakarta, for new tyres.
58
  The administrative procedure for replacement of spare 
equipment used in the program took two months.
59
 As a result of procedural delays, the 
eradication program made slow progress during its first year, from 1959 to 1960. Instead of 
supervising eradication operations, the WHO officers in Indonesia were burdened with the 
administrative responsibility of clearing customs duties on imported spare parts for WHO 
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vehicles used in the eradication campaign, imposed by the Indonesian government. In the 
residency of Cilacap, there was an abnormal increase in the numbers of malaria cases in 
February 1960.
60
  In the provinces of Sumatra, except for malarial surveys that determined 
parasite levels in the blood, the eradication program demonstrated slow progress in 1960 owing 
to difficulties surrounding the procuring of spare parts for vehicles from Jakarta.
61
  
Owing to the slow progress of malaria eradication in the first year, the ICA proposed to 
halve the funding for the program from $10 million to $5 million.
62
  The ICA was disappointed 
that the Indonesian government failed to accord autonomous status to the National Malaria 
Eradication Service. Vehicles used by the malaria eradication campaign were purchased using 
ICA funds; but, they were misallocated to doctors who did not participate in the eradication 
program.
63
 The ICA made a direct appeal to Djuanda to slow down the malaria eradication 
program in Indonesia. But, the Minister of Health, Satrio, was fighting to expand it.
64
  The 
SEARO Director General, C. Mani (1948-1968) had the unenviable task of performing a delicate 
balancing act, ensuring the compliance of the Indonesian Ministry of Health with ICA directives 
granting greater autonomy to the National Malaria Eradication Program in line with Satrio’s 
vision of expanding the coverage of malaria eradication.   
The year 1959 was politically difficult for the malaria eradication program, owing to 
Soekarno’s reversion to the 1945 Constitution, suspension of parliamentary institutions, and the 
strengthening of military ties with the Soviet Union, all of which led to a reduction of US aid. 
Indonesian discontent with international aid was evident in Minister of Health Satrio’s address to 
the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the SEARO, Bandung (1960). Satrio stressed that the modern 
public health needs of Indonesia could not be met solely by funding from the WHO or ICA but 
required greater spending by the Indonesian government. If the government was unable to 
allocate a greater share of the national income to public health, people would be discontented 
about the program of overseas assistance.
65
 Satrio further perceived that unconditional 
acceptance of international aid in health would compromise Indonesia’s political sovereignty.   
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Despite a series of organisational and political setbacks, Indonesia introduced the malaria 
eradication program starting with pre-eradication strategies such as mapping out the exact 
geographical distribution of malaria and determining the anopheline species’ resistance to DDT. 
Once the exact prevalence of malaria in a given area was determined, all adjacent areas with 
suspected malaria transmission were selected for spraying. After treating the endemic areas with 
DDT, part-time malaria assistants commenced detecting fevers.  When malaria was suspected in 
families or villages, the suspected malaria patient and all detected fever cases were treated with 
anti-malarial drugs; and, village houses were sprayed with DDT as a precautionary measure.  
Eradication initiatives were also undertaken in the Outer Islands. The WHO 
recommended that KOPEM use mass chemotherapy (using chloroquine) for treating suspected 
malaria cases there as surveillance operations could only be accomplished with great difficulty 
owing to transportation problems. However, the recommendation was not carried out due to a 
shortage of chloroquine; instead, surveillance operations were carried out. Surveillance 
operations consisted of epidemiological investigation of malaria cases through surveys and 
voluntary examination of spleen rates among vulnerable groups such as schoolchildren and 
women.  
South Kalimantan was given first priority for eradication in 1961 as the Ministry of 
Health conceptualised malaria eradication in the province as the nucleus around which basic 
health services would develop. Through the KOPEM, the Ministry of Health was able to obtain 
not only epidemiological data pertaining to malaria but also valuable information regarding 
location of health centres.
66
 The general polyclinics at the sub-district level detected symptoms 
of malaria using printed cards issued by the KOPEM.
67
  Pre-eradication strategies in the province 
consisted of detecting the spleen rates of primary schoolchildren and voluntary examination of 
the spleen rates of villagers. But the village women in South Kalimantan were unwilling to be 
subjected to spleen examination. In Bali, the malaria eradication program commenced spraying 
operations in 1962 with the application of DDT and dieldrin in six and eight monthly cycles 
respectively.
68
 Spraying operations were temporarily suspended in February 1963 following the 
eruption of Gunung Agung volcano. Surveillance operations consisted of epidemiological 
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investigation of suspected malaria cases:  house cards were used to detect malaria at the 
household level.
69
  Upon the discovery of fever, the suspected case would be treated with 
chloroquine and the entire house would be sprayed with DDT to break the link of transmission.  
However, malaria eradication operations could not be implemented uniformly across 
Indonesia.  Progress in Indonesia from 1960 to 1965 was influenced by uncertain economic 
conditions and international politics. The fall in the value of the Indonesian rupiah in 1964 meant 
that malaria eradication staff had to take part-time jobs to support their meagre income.
70
  And, 
due to the deteriorating relations between the US government and Indonesia, the former 
withdrew its aid to the malaria eradication program. According to Soebandrio, Minister for 
Foreign Economic Relations, Indonesia was already intending to sever USAID to malaria 
eradication and replace it with some other form of assistance.
71
 In 1964, malaria eradication in 
Java was discontinued due to lack of funds. In 1965, the government allocated approximately 5.2 
billion rupiahs from its regular budget for malaria eradication. But, as a consequence of rampant 
inflation, estimated at 600% in 1965, and the depreciation of the international exchange value of 
the rupiah by almost 66% from 1959 to1965, the Indonesian budgetary allocations for malaria 
eradication and the remuneration of field personnel proved grossly inadequate.
72
 Spraying 
operations were delayed in most residencies of East Java in 1965 owing to inadequate 
transportation and supervision. In Bali, surveillance activities continued on a fortnightly basis up 
to the second quarter of 1965.  Despite active detection and follow-up of malarial cases, 
treatment remained ineffective owing to a shortage of medicines.
73
 Despite financial difficulties 
and the drying up of international assistance, the malaria eradication program in Indonesia 
continued until September 1965, when eradication operations were suspended indefinitely 
following the September 30 coup by Indonesian armed forces that were in the process of 
liquidating the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). 
The failure of the campaign was predictable considering its slow start and lack of definite 
accomplishments from its inception until 1965. Administrative bottlenecks such as clearing 
customs duties for imported WHO vehicles used in the campaign, or replacing worn spare parts 
of vehicles meant that on occasion, WHO field staff in Indonesia had to circumvent the rules to 
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get the job done. For example, some had to carry out purchases of gasoline out of their own 
pocket while on their official duties.  The campaign commenced its operations in Java, South 
Sumatra, and Bali by 1959 and had extended its activities to the entire archipelago by 1963. 
Consequently, cities on the island of Java, for e.g., Jakarta and Surabaya had temporarily 
eliminated malaria by early 1965. However, owing to the termination of US assistance to the 
program in 1964, the lack of availability of DDT, the deterioration of the existing DDT stock, the 
acute shortage of malaria surveillance staff, and the political unrest in the country from 1965 to 
1967, the eradication program was suspended for an indefinite period in the second half of 1965.  
The 1950s onwards saw the continuation of the transmigrasi (transmigration) program—which 
had been initiated by the Dutch colonial government to facilitate the transfer of population from 
areas of high density such as Java to the  Outer Islands.  However, this continued movement of 
the population to the Outer Islands—that were malaria endemic—and to parts of Java that had 
temporarily been malaria-free, ensured the spread of the disease. In line with the above, the 
number of malaria outbreaks increased between 1967 and 1968.
74
  
By 1969-70, nationalist physicians particularly Martoatmodjo had observed that the 
campaigns against endemic diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, yaws, and leprosy, which had 
been initiated in the early 1950s, had favoured narrow technocratic solutions (such as the use of 
DDT to control malaria, or penicillin shots to cure yaws).
75
 But, such measures did not address 
the perceived cause of disease, namely poverty and indentured labour. Martoatmodjo observed 
that from 1950 until about 1970, high prevalence of malnutrition continued as during the era of 
Dutch colonialism.
76
  Deaths from malnutrition were either treated in hospitals, or misreported as 
malaria deaths due to identical symptoms manifested by patients such as enlarged spleens. 
Martoatmodjo claimed that the malaria eradication campaign in Indonesia addressed the clinical 
symptoms but not the causes (for example, rural indebtedness, and poverty) of the disease.
77
 He 
further recommended that for the successful conclusion of the campaign against endemic 
diseases, Indonesia needed to address the socio-economic factors leading to poverty and disease 
such as rural indebtedness, or inequitable distribution of food.  Martoatmodjo’s comments 
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highlighted the limitations of narrowly equating malaria eradication with development; the 
relationship between disease and economic development was far more complex.  
Indonesia’s malaria eradication program was the second largest in the world after India.78  
The WHO had allocated more staff to the former’s malaria eradication program than to any other 
country in Southeast Asia. But, unfortunately, the performance of the program was below that 
anticipated by the WHO.
79
  While epidemiological studies in Indonesia were thorough, the 
implementation of specific aspects of the program was ineffective compared to other WHO 
member states such as Mexico.  
Both malaria control operations implemented between 1951 and 1956, and the 
eradication program, implemented between 1958 and 1965, failed as a result of three factors: (a) 
the Byzantine maze that was the Indonesian bureaucracy; (b) the toxicity of DDT resulting in 
popular resistance to spraying operations; and, (c) the resistance of the anopheline species to 
DDT. Of the three factors—negotiating the byzantine maze of the Indonesian bureaucracy was 
the most predictable factor accounting for the delay or suspension of the malaria eradication 
activities. The development of the anopheline species’ resistance to DDT was an unpredictable 
factor that frustrated the course of the eradication program.  
 
Tuberculosis Control 
 
Tuberculosis in post-World War II Indonesia was framed both as a socio-hygienic and a socio-
medical problem. Each of these frames had very specific implications for tuberculosis control. 
As a socio-medical problem, Indonesian physicians viewed tuberculosis was a problem peculiar 
to individual patients that could be cured with a single-drug treatment. In contrast, 
conceptualising tuberculosis as a socio-hygienic problem involved educating patients and 
families about the infectious nature of the disease (for example, by fostering hygienic habits such 
as the prevention of spitting) and the rational administration of prescribed medications, and of 
BCG vaccinations for infants. As hospital beds were in short supply and tuberculosis treatment 
was expensive, the SEARO recommended a combination of socio-hygienic and socio-medical 
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approaches for tuberculosis control. This involved home visits, educating patients and their 
families about the contagiousness of the disease, and ensuring the former’s compliance during 
the duration of their treatment. 
Prior to 1949, apart from a few clinical trials, very little was known about the efficacy of 
anti-tuberculosis drugs in a tropical environment. Equally little was known of the implications of 
combining preventative measures such as BCG vaccinations and health education when treating 
individual patients in a family. In the 1950s, the WHO launched pilot studies in Madras and 
Bangalore in South India to investigate the effects of drug treatment provided under domiciliary 
conditions in a sanatorium.
80
 Around the same time (1952), the WHO, in conjunction with 
UNICEF and the Ministry of Health (Indonesia), undertook a pilot ambulatory project in 
Bandung, within the scope of Johannes Leimena’s Bandung Plan. The aim was to investigate the 
effect of large scale drug treatment in patients and its effect in diminishing the burden of 
tuberculosis in the community. Such pilot studies undertaken by the WHO contributed to insights 
into tuberculosis and its treatment for third world countries. Tuberculosis control in the 1950s 
closely corresponded with the Indonesian nationalist contention that the Indonesian nation had 
been enfeebled by three and a half centuries of Dutch colonialism. Tuberculosis, a consequence 
of this enfeeblement, had impeded the progress of Indonesia by three-and-a-half centuries.
81
  
In post-World War II Indonesia, a person died from tuberculosis every two minutes.
82
  
Malnutrition-induced tuberculosis was a leading cause of death. During the Japanese occupation, 
tuberculosis began to assume epidemic proportions owing to the impoverished state of the 
people. Indonesians were ill-prepared to control tuberculosis at the dawn of independence: there 
were only fifteen sanatoriums with 1,537 beds in the entire country.
83
  The per capita expenditure 
incurred when curing a tuberculosis patient in the early 1950s was approximately 4,000 rupiah, 
which translated into a gross expenditure of 8,000 million rupiah per annum for treating the 
nearly one million Indonesian tuberculosis patients.
84
  In contrast, the per capita expenditure 
incurred when administering the BCG vaccine to prevent tuberculosis amounted to a mere 50 sen 
per person.
85
  Between September 1952 and mid-1957, the Ministry of Health operated a 
Tuberculosis Control and Demonstration project in Bandung, West Java, in collaboration with 
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the SEARO. The Ministry planned to investigate the prevalence of tuberculosis, and to suggest 
preventative measures. The SEARO report revealed that malaria, nutritional disorders, and 
pneumonia had a hidden influence on the prevalence of tuberculosis.
86
  Overcrowding and 
insanitary housing, spitting, lack of general hygiene, and a low intake of animal protein were 
some of the social factors leading to tuberculosis. Interestingly, a statistical investigation of 
tuberculosis distribution according to profession revealed that food handlers and manual 
labourers were most vulnerable to the disease.
87
   
In 1952, when the tuberculosis project was implemented, Bandung was facing an acute 
shortage of hospital beds.  The only viable measure was ambulatory chemoprophylaxis, i.e., 
visiting patients’ homes, educating families on tuberculosis, administering drugs such as 
isoniazid and streptomycin, isolating the infected patients, and ensuring that the patient followed 
up on medications.
88
 The SEARO advocated a long-term solution to tackling tuberculosis: 
It has been found that local doctors need very little, if any, instruction in the clinical aspects of 
tuberculosis; they are rather well informed. But the public health attitude—that the work is 
aimed at the healthy people to decrease the risk of contracting tuberculosis, more than to assist 
patients in getting rid of it has proved to be a subject on which the WHO can bring and has 
brought new knowledge to combat the expressed negative approach of some national doctors. 
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As well, SEARO advocated ambulatory chemoprophylaxis as a strategy for tuberculosis control 
(similar to the Bandung project) for other countries in Southeast Asia where hospital beds for 
treatment were also in short supply.  
  Mantris (male nurses) and home visitors formed an important link between the pilot 
project and the general population of Bandung. They visited the homes of infected patients, 
examined family members for tuberculosis, and taught them about the scientific disposal of 
sputum. The activities of the pilot tuberculosis control and demonstration project were 
coordinated by a tuberculosis centre in Bandung city, which examined nearly 40,000 patients 
annually. The staff treated the diagnosed tuberculosis patients on an ambulatory basis, using 
drugs such as streptomycin.
90
  
  The SEARO played an advisory role in the project, training home visitors and mantris. 
But, many of the home visitors recruited for the project were inexperienced and required 
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constant supervision by a WHO nurse.
91
 Although the Bandung tuberculosis centre was 
enthusiastic about training medical students in tuberculosis control, in practice, tuberculosis 
training was not very remunerative. Bandung lacked a medical faculty in 1952; and, the existing 
medical schools in Jakarta, Surabaya, Yogyakarta and Medan lacked contact with the 
tuberculosis project. Financing the project remained a thorny issue from the very beginning. The 
project was directly administered by the Tuberculosis Section of the Ministry of Health. But, 
control was transferred to the Inspectorate of Health, West Java in 1954. The Bandung municipal 
health service was not involved in the execution of the project as it lacked sufficient finances.
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The then Minister of Health, Johannes Leimena, sought to integrate tuberculosis control within 
the framework of basic health services. However, integration failed in the 1950s due to lack of 
finances and an acute shortage of skilled medical personnel. But, the project succeeded in 
spreading awareness regarding the prevention of tuberculosis through health education.
93
 Not 
unexpectedly, the actual implementation project suffered from several organisational bottlenecks 
that inhibited the effective treatment of tuberculosis cases and ensuring compliance with 
treatment. 
From 1952 onwards, Indonesia addressed tuberculosis vaccination through a pilot program 
of mass vaccination (BCG) involving new-born infants in the city of Bandung. This project was 
established in close connection with the WHO Tuberculosis Training and Training Centre. 
However, within a few months, complications arising from the low take rate of the vaccine 
caused fevers among new-born infants. This prompted Leimena to reassess the long-term benefit 
of using BCG vaccination as a prophylactic measure against tuberculosis.
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Administrative factors were no less instrumental in determining the progress of the BCG 
campaign. The headquarters of the BCG campaign, which was located in Bandung, was 
responsible to the Tuberculosis Division of the Ministry of Health located in Yogyakarta. The 
Ministry of Health, on the other hand, was located in Jakarta. This implied that the BCG 
personnel at Bandung had to refer problems related to the execution of the campaign to 
Yogyakarta, then to Jakarta, and back to Bandung.
95
  Therefore, it was not possible for the 
headquarters of the BCG campaign and the Ministry of Health to effectively supervise the 
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execution of the campaign at the provincial level. In principle, the WHO was planning to entrust 
the execution of the campaign at the regency level to the doctor in charge. But, as not more than 
thirty doctors were specialised in tuberculosis control, the overall planning and execution of the 
campaign was undertaken by the mantris.  The working hours in Indonesia were inflexible and 
interfered with the vaccination schedules. While the weekday work hours were from 7a.m. to 
2p.m. from Monday to Friday, in practice, health personnel were late to commence vaccinations. 
The mantris were paid paltry monthly salaries by the provincial governments and for this reason 
lacked the enthusiasm to undertake public health education, a pivotal pillar critical to the success 
of the tuberculosis control program in Indonesia.  In addition, the local population was not well 
informed about the need to register for the tuberculin test, which would ascertain the 
susceptibility of confirmed non-reactors (those who did not have a tubercular history) for 
tuberculosis and whether subsequent vaccinations were required.   
In addition, BCG campaign also encountered technical difficulties. The mantris were 
unable to determine the immunity levels against tuberculosis; thus they vaccinated only those, 
who in reality demonstrated a non-reactor reading, who rarely turned up for their BCG 
vaccinations.
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 The most frequently used excuse was that the Consultancy Bureau was located 
far from the homes of patients. In the Rancakek sub-district of Bandung, the original site of the 
BCG demonstration project, the organisation of the mass campaign was far from satisfactory. 
Children under the age of fourteen were not taken to the Consultancy Bureau for tuberculin 
testing as the vaccine was administered irrespective of whether the patient was undergoing 
medical treatment or was infected.  People who had turned up for the tuberculin test were 
administered the BCG, irrespective of whether or not they had a previous history of tuberculosis.  
At Bandung, the BCG team frequently encountered passive resistance from the Chinese 
population which opposed administration of the BCG vaccine.
97
 Episodes of resistance occurred 
between 1953 and 1956 owing to a multiplicity of factors, at times due to disagreements related 
to the framing of tuberculosis between the Western educated physicians, WHO consultants, and 
the diverse ethnic groups inhabiting the city. At other times, particular groups of people opted 
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not to get vaccinated certain times of the year such as the holy month of Ramadan, owing to the 
popular Islamic belief that vaccination in the holy month would annul their fasting.
98
  
The BCG campaign, which was extended to the entire archipelago in 1956, staffed by 32 
teams, 62 mantris, 143 lay vaccinators, and 19 doctors.
99
  The campaign’s performance in the 
Outer Islands was variable and contingent to three factors: (a) geographic, for example the 
impact of a tropical climate on the potency of the vaccine; (b) technical (the potency of the 
vaccine); and, (c) human factor, e.g., ensuring the willingness of the people to have the 
vaccinations. Human factors were most influential in the execution of the campaigns. In Medan, 
North Sumatra, tuberculin testing and the BCG campaign were among the best organised in 
Indonesia. Approximately, 90-95% of the population was tested for tuberculosis.
100
 The 
tuberculin surveys in North Sumatra revealed a slightly higher incidence of tuberculosis in males 
than in females in all age groups, possibly because women were less likely to notify health 
centres if they suspected tuberculosis due to stigma.
101
  Tuberculosis was a major problem in the 
rural areas, particularly in regencies such as Simalungun, which had a high proportion of the 
workforce employed in its plantations. In Makassar, South Sulawesi, secondary infections such 
as abscesses were reported in people soon after the tuberculin tests were undertaken.
102
Thus, 
these infections coincided with a smallpox outbreak.
103
 Thus, the local population were unwilling 
to get vaccinated, fearing that vaccination would cause abscesses. For this and other reasons, the 
locals campaigned actively to stop the BCG campaign. Nevertheless, tuberculin testing and BCG 
vaccinations continued uninterrupted in Makassar. Unlike Sumatra and Sulawesi, human factors 
were less decisive in determining the progress of the BCG campaign in Maluku. The difficulties 
encountered there while executing tuberculosis surveys and mass vaccinations were largely 
related to accessibility. The population was scattered across islands and could only be reached by 
boat. The wet BCG vaccine used in Bandung was unsuitable for vaccinations in the Maluku 
group of islands as it lost its potency in the tropical heat and refrigeration facilities for storing the 
vaccine were not well developed there.  
The WHO and the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (IDI, The Indonesian Medical Association) 
attributed the high incidence of tuberculosis in Indonesia during the 1950s (10% among toddlers 
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for instance) to chronic malnutrition.
104
 In situations where tuberculosis was transmitted from 
mothers to children, the isolation of patients in sanatoriums and treatment with streptomycin was 
not a pragmatic option. Fewer than thirty doctors specialised in tuberculosis control in Indonesia 
during the 1950s. The implementation of the social-medical approach of tuberculosis control was 
thus constrained by an acute shortage of physicians. As a cost-effective prophylactic measure, 
IDI recommended sanitary improvement of the kampongs, improvement of community nutrition 
and inculcating hygienic habits among the general population as a means of preventing the 
spread of tuberculosis. 
One non-governmental organisation that viewed tuberculosis as a socio-hygienic issue 
emphasised the prevention of tuberculosis in the community through health education of the 
patient. Ngrukti Nirmala was an NGO, established in Blitar (East Java) in 1954 with financial 
assistance from the Indonesian Red Cross.
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 Those types of educational measures undertaken by 
non-governmental organisations were intended to supplement the curative care administered by 
the Consultancy Bureaus in the rural areas, where there was an acute shortage of physicians. 
Patients with positive sputum would be instructed by the staff of Ngrukti Nirmala regarding the 
rational use of medication, nutritious foods, and the infectiousness of spitting. Ngrukti Nirmala 
was operational in the regencies of Kediri and Blitar, where regency doctors demonstrated 
initiatives in coordinating the curative activities of the Consultancy Bureaus with hygiene 
education. The depiction of tuberculosis as a socio-hygienic question established a correlation 
between the social determinants of health such as nutrition, education and housing, and the 
prevalence of tuberculosis and pathologised unhealthy habits within the community such as 
spitting that would lead to contagion. However, the implementation of these non-governmental 
initiatives was contingent to the initiatives of the regency doctors and support from the local 
administration, which was lacking in other parts of Indonesia.  
Addressing tuberculosis defined as a socio-medical problem involved tracing the source of 
infection through surveillance, administering medications such as streptomycin, and 
rehabilitating patients. Such a strategy was visualized by J.C. Kapitan (who graduated from the 
GH in 1931), and Professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Airlangga University.
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  The socio-
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medical frame perceived tuberculosis as a problem of individual patients who could be rendered 
non-infectious through treatment.  In Surabaya, following a single drug treatment, approximately 
81% of patients showed signs of recovery whereas with rontgenologis (a particular form of x-ray 
treatment) only 40% of patients were cured.
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  In the final analysis, the socio-medical solution 
to tuberculosis control showed signs of weakness from the very beginning as the bacterium 
developed resistance to isoniazid and streptomycin. Part of the problem was that medications 
were dispensed irrationally.
108
  
The Indonesian experience of tuberculosis control informed the WHO that an ambulatory 
approach to treating patients, especially the administration of isoniazid and streptomycin at the 
patient’s home and education of patients and their families regarding hygienic disposal of 
sputum, was a cost-effective measure for other resource-poor countries where the per capita 
availability of hospital beds was minimal.  Socio-hygienic measures, especially prevention of 
spitting, educating families about nutrition, and the rational use of anti-tuberculosis drugs were a 
response to the acute shortage of specialists. Such measures registered conspicuous success in 
the regencies of East Java—regarded as a Soekarno stronghold prior to the mid-1960s—where 
support from local administration was forthcoming.  But, socio-hygienic measures could not be 
replicated throughout the archipelago as their implementation was contingent upon health 
education, which was far from remunerative for doctors and other health personnel such as 
mantris. The execution of the BCG vaccination campaign revealed technical failures with respect 
to the preservation of the vaccine in a tropical climate and the training of vaccinators. The anti-
tuberculosis campaign also failed both to address the popular misconceptions of the people 
regarding vaccination and to enlist their cooperation.   
The Ministry of Health accepted the SEARO recommendations on tuberculosis. Indonesia 
faced an acute shortage of hospital beds and prescribed medications; as well, there was 
expenditure involved in curing individual patients. With these factors in mind, the Ministry of 
Health adopted a combination of socio-medical and socio-hygienic approaches to address the 
problems.  The performance of tuberculosis control in Indonesia was determined by four factors: 
(a) human factors, securing the cooperation of the population in the implementation of BCG 
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vaccinations; (b) technical factors such as the potency of the vaccine and development of 
microbial resistance to anti-tuberculosis drugs; (c) environmental factors such as the 
deterioration of the BCG vaccine in a tropical climate; and, (d) administrative factors, 
particularly the differences between the Ministry of Health, the headquarters of the BCG 
Campaign, and the local governments regarding the financing of tuberculosis control activities. 
Tuberculosis control in Indonesia was impeded not so much by the inefficacy of the BCG 
vaccine or the resistance of the local population to BCG vaccinations but by bureaucratic 
labyrinths. There was a marked lack of synchronisation between the activities of the Ministry of 
Health, the Tuberculosis Institute, and the headquarters of the BCG campaign.  
 
Where the Road Ends, Yaws Begins 
 
Like syphilis, bijel and pinta, yaws originates from the treponemal family of bacteria and limits 
the employability of individuals due to disfigurement. It is metaphorically referred to as ‘a 
disease at the end of the road’—the road being the symbol of socio-economic development—and 
is deemed to be caused by inadequate hygiene. Yaws can be successfully suppressed using 
penicillin: the results of treatment are evident within a few days. Villagers uncritically accepted 
penicillin injections as a panacea against the disease; but in the process overlooked long-lasting 
preventive measures such as community hygiene. As a result, the anti-yaws campaigns in 
Indonesia encouraged a confidence in Western medicine that was unwarranted. Yaws 
eradication, an Indonesian initiative, emerged under the leadership of retired regency physician 
Raden Kodijat, who was successful in reducing the prevalence of yaws twentyfold between 1951 
and 1956. As a consequence, neighbouring Malaya—which was yaws endemic in 1956—
adopted the epidemiological strategies designed by him. Although the Indonesian anti-yaws 
campaign was the world’s largest and won international acclaim in drastically reducing the 
prevalence of the disease, it was far from perfect. Due to the demographic and geographic 
variations across the Indonesian archipelago, the prevalence of yaws across the islands was 
patchy. For these reasons, the anti-yaws campaign had to be modified into a two-pronged 
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strategy: (a) the Kodijat method of yaws control, which involved detection and treatment of 
patients with active yaws lesions and their contacts, implemented in densely populated Java; and 
(b) Total Mass Treatment which involved treatment of whole village populations with penicillin, 
irrespective of whether or not individuals were registered as yaws patients, on the Outer Islands 
where the population was sparse. 
Yaws is caused by a spirochete known as trepanoma pertenue, which is closely related to 
the bacterium that causes syphilis and is transmitted by direct contact with skin sores of the 
infected person.
109
 Within two to four weeks after infection, individuals develop mother-yaws or 
raspberry-like sores on the infected skin where the microbe entered the body. Soon, the sores 
disappear. Later, skin lesions appear all over the body.  Other symptoms include bone pain and 
scarring of the skin. If yaws is not treated within five years of the initial infection, the nose and 
bones become disfigured. In addition, the thickening of the soles of the feet makes it difficult for 
patients to walk. Yaws has long been endemic in Java. The character of Nolo Gareng of the 
Javanese wayang kulit, was a sufferer.
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From 1950 until the mid-1960s, Indonesia led the global treponematoses control project 
under the leadership of Raden Kodijat and Soetopo, who officiated as the Minister of Health 
from January 1950 to September 1950. The Indonesian chapter of the global treponematoses 
project (other countries that participated in the project sponsored by the WHO and the UNICEF 
between 1952 and 1964 included Malaya, Thailand, Haiti, Jamaica and Nigeria) was engineered 
by Raden Kodijat based on his experience as a regency medical officer at Kediri, East Java in the 
1930s.  
Raden Kodijat, a product of the Dutch educational system, graduated from the STOVIA 
medical school in 1914 and later earned a doctorate in Medicine from the Faculty of Medicine, 
Amsterdam in 1925. He returned to the Dutch East Indies to pursue a career as a regency doctor 
in Kediri, East Java, from 1930 to 1942.  The Kodijat Method, which was born in 1934 during 
his tenure as a regency doctor, aimed to prevent the recurrence of future infections. A program 
designed to detect yaws in the entire population by selecting individual patients based on 
symptoms and treating them with neosalvarsan or arsenicals until their symptoms disappeared. 
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Identified patients were administered neosalvarsan on a weekly basis. This was supplemented 
with the re-examination of the entire village population at intervals of six months.
111
 The Kodijat 
Method was successful in reducing the overall prevalence of yaws in the Kediri population from 
10.1% in 1934 to 1.7% in 1936.
112
  Interestingly, the villagers believed that neosalvarsan was a 
panacea for every disease and began to approach polyclinics in large numbers for treatment. As a 
result, the doctors/mantris were unable to devote adequate time to examine individual cases of 
yaws. With one salvarsan injection, yaws symptoms were brought down dramatically. For this 
reason, many patients did not follow up on treatment.  As a consequence, relapses occurred.  
During World War II, the Kodijat Method could not be implemented due to a shortage of 
salvarsan. 
In 1949, 15% of the Indonesian population was affected by yaws; with approximately 
three quarters of patients under the age of eighteen.
113
  Regency medical officers were entrusted 
to treat yaws patients with arsenicals in rural polyclinics. Patients submitted themselves for yaws 
examination voluntarily. In 1950, Indonesia implemented the Treponematoses Control Project 
(TCP), which was based on the Kodijat Method and focused on yaws control and the treatment 
of congenital syphilis. The campaign was conducted by teams of trained mantris under the 
supervision of trained medical officers. Civil administration officials took a census of each 
village and supplied the team leader (either the doctor or the mantri) with the names of the 
village inhabitants. The latter would then be voluntarily examined by regency doctors in the 
polyclinics.   
In April 1950, Leimena enlisted the financial support from UNICEF to implement the 
TCP.
114
  It was initially implemented in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Treponemal infections were 
treated with procaine penicillin G (particle size in oil) with 2% aluminium monostearite (PAM), 
a one shot treatment schedule.
115
  With the availability of a one shot treatment schedule, the per 
capita cost of yaws treatment declined.
116
  The Indonesian government, under Soetopo’s 
directive, followed a policy of administering penicillin injections to the entire population, 
irrespective of whether individuals were infected with yaws or not. The main objective was to 
prevent reinfections. Kodijat was opposed to the wasteful expenditure of UNICEF funds and 
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advocated that only patients with active yaws lesions be administered injections. He was also 
aware that the injections sometimes had side effects.
117
   
The Kodijat Method was a unique epidemiological strategy of yaws control based on the 
detection and registration of yaws patients, and the treatment of infectious cases and their 
contacts.  Initially, Soetopo questioned the feasibility of the Kodijat Method in achieving yaws 
control throughout the Indonesian archipelago as Indonesia suffered from an acute scarcity of 
doctors and nurses who were needed to execute the anti-yaws campaign.  Additionally, 
according to the method, only patients with active yaws lesions would be administered penicillin 
injections. Thus, latent cases would escape treatment. In response, Soetopo developed a modified 
version of the Kodijat Method (Treponematoses Control Program Simplified, or TCPS) which 
aimed to overcome the shortage of skilled medical personnel. He appointed djuru pateks (yaws 
scouts with basic elementary school training) to detect yaws cases and administer treatment, 
conduct periodic resurveys of the population, and to follow up on treated patients. The TCPS 
used a two pronged strategy of yaws control: (a) the Kodijat Method of yaws control for Java; 
and, (b) the total mass treatment of yaws patients using penicillin for the Outer Islands, where the 
population was scattered and distances covered by the TCPS teams were huge. Unfortunately, 
however, the Kodijat Method missed out on latent yaws cases that constituted a potential 
reservoir for the transmission of future infections.  
The TCPS aimed to examine entire village populations for treponemal infections and 
treatment would be administered only to active cases of yaws. The TCPS was designed to fit into 
the existing health services, the focal point being the polyclinics at the ketjamatan (sub-district) 
level. The regency medical officers’ task was to initiate the treponematoses control program at 
the sub-district level with overall control by the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah (the regency 
administration) which would finance the campaign from their annual budgets. The TCP 
headquarters at Yogyakarta would provide technical assistance.  Subsequent to the initiation of 
the TCPS program in the district, the regency medical officer would meet with the sub-district 
(tjamat) and village heads (lurah) to educate them on treponematoses control and enlist their 
cooperation. Mantris would supervise the programs in districts which were either populous or 
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had a wide geographical spread. The lurah would assist the TCPS by drawing up the census list 
of the village population. The polyclinic mantri and the djuru pateks would receive a copy of the 
census list before implementing the program. In a normal working week, the TCPS operations 
would begin on Monday morning. Villagers would assemble in the village headman’s house 
before the djuru patek arrived. Soon after the latter’s arrival, which was signalled by the striking 
of a wooden gong (kenthongan, in Javanese), the village secretary, drawing from the census list, 
would call out all the names of all families present and mark their attendance (present or absent). 
The djuru pateks would then examine the hands and legs of villagers for symptoms of 
treponemal infection.  He would record, on the patient’s card, the names of any individuals he 
suspected of having yaws. He would then prepare, in duplicate, the list of all patients who had 
yaws.  They would be called together when the mantri arrived to administer PAM injections. The 
mantri would confirm the diagnosis of suspected yaws cases before the injections were 
administered. The djuru patek and the mantri could cover the entire sub-district in approximately 
eight months, detecting yaws cases and administering penicillin. Soon after the yaws prevalence 
was determined, resurveys would be undertaken to check the prevalence of the disease in the 
given sub-district in question and to determine the effectiveness of treatment.  
The TCPS was tailored to reflect the Indonesian archipelago’s demographic and 
geographic diversity. The Kodijat method, which consisted of a systematic examination of the 
entire village population for yaws and treatment of yaws patients with active lesions only, was 
personnel-intensive. It depended upon the recruitment of a cadre of djuru pateks to undertake 
surveys, and of mantris for administering penicillin injections. Unlike the densely populated 
Javanese villages, where it was easy to assemble villagers for medical examination, the Outer 
Islands were sparsely populated and distances between settlements were huge. Thus, Total Mass 
Treatment, which consisted of administering full-penicillin doses to villagers with active lesions 
and half-doses to uninfected villagers, latent yaws cases and contacts, was implemented in the 
Outer Islands. As the Outer Islands experienced a severe shortage of mantris and paramedical 
personnel, the djuru pateks were trained not only to diagnose yaws lesions, but also to administer 
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penicillin injections. Contact Treatment was implemented on an experimental basis to contain 
the transmission of yaws among family members.  
In East Java, Contact Treatment was used in the TCPS on an experimental basis to treat 
family contacts of yaws patients. Contacts were administered half doses of PAM. However, the 
Contact Treatment failed to contain yaws as most of the children contacted the disease outside of 
the family.
118
  In cases where the prevalence of infectious yaws in a sub-district was less than 
0.5%, and non-infectious yaws below 1.5%, the sub-district would move to the Consolidation 
Phase of the TCPS. The djuru patek would undertake six-monthly examinations of 
schoolchildren, and report on yaws treatment at polyclinics on a monthly basis before 
undertaking a resurvey of the sub-district population.  
Educating the villagers, the village headmen, and the civil officials about the importance 
of yaws detection and treatment of diagnosed cases was pivotal to the smooth execution of the 
TCPS campaign.  Just as the terms ‘contagion’ or ‘dirt’ were sufficient to evoke fear of the 
importation of infectious diseases and the imposition of cordon sanitaires in nineteenth and 
twentieth century international health, the TCPS program used the language of crisis. The 
message was that every single case of patek (yaws) not yet discovered or treated would make the 
village suffer further.
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  Yaws-infected villagers were persuaded to register themselves for 
treatment in the spirit of gotong rojong (mutual cooperation). The djuru patek, who spearheaded 
the TCPS campaign, would communicate with the villagers in language they could understand 
about the importance of yaws detection and the appropriate treatment.  
The mobility of health personnel to remote areas of the Indonesian archipelago and the 
timeliness of undertaking treponematoses surveys and treatments was at the heart of the TCPS. 
The TCPS program stated: 
At the crux of the campaign will be mobility and speed for getting to and from location to 
location, and as areas covered are wide, with a dispersed population who have little 
transport facilities themselves, it is imperative that for the success of the campaign that 
adequate transport facilities will be provided. In addition to motor vehicles the use of 
cycles will also be required. The rural roads are far from satisfactory and once off the 
main roads, public health personnel may require the aid of cycles to get from village to 
village collecting points to others.
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The Indonesian government pledged 4.2 billion rupiahs to the TCPS and one-third of the 
expected penicillin requirements.
121
  But UNICEF faced operational difficulties in procuring 
penicillin supplies. As well, it faced difficulty giving Kodijat the authority to authorise the 
appointment of personnel to work in the TCPS as it lacked the support of the Ministry of 
Finance. The Ministry of Health had to eliminate the administrative bottlenecks operating at 
various levels of the Indonesian government by directly authorising Kodijat to withdraw funds 
for expediting the TCPS.  
In October 1951, the TCPS was put into practice for the first time in the sub-district of 
Driyo (the villages of Banjaran and Karangandong), which was located 25 km from Surabaya. A 
total of 16,659 persons were examined during the initial survey,
122
 which, together with the re-
survey, was conducted within an interval of five months. The overall prevalence of yaws in the 
sub-district was approximately 10%. The diagnoses made by the djuru patek in the initial yaws 
survey were accurate and PAM injections were administered to active yaws patients who showed 
symptoms, e.g., lesions on their feet. However, latent yaws cases were not treated in the initial 
survey and new cases were evident during the resurveys. Soetopo’s pilot study in Driyo revealed 
that the highest percentage of infectious yaws occurred in the 3 to 10 year age group.
123
  Boys 
were more prone to treponemal infection than girls in this age group owing to injuries sustained 
during sporting activities and walking with exposed wounds. House-to-house examinations for 
yaws were not usually undertaken in East Java for the customary cultural reasons—when the 
male member of the household had left for work—but they were undertaken in the pilot project 
area as civil service officials from the two sub-districts oversaw the examinations. The yaws 
surveys and resurveys revealed a patchy distribution of yaws prevalence in the sub-district of 
Driyo, with a varying proportion of the population affected by yaws.
124
  In Driyo sub-district, for 
example, a village with a yaws prevalence of 15% was found adjacent to a village with a 
prevalence of 7%.
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The TCPS was implemented as an experimental project in Surabaya in the sub-district of 
Cerme in 1952. The Cerme TCPS experiment combined malaria eradication and yaws control 
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with the overall aim of raising the standard of living of the people through a rural development 
program that initiated horticulture and pisciculture. The overall prevalence of yaws declined in 
Cerme from 12.8% in 1952 to 0.57% in 1958 owing to improvement in general health 
conditions.
126
  In 1954, Soetopo initiated the Small Island Project, a pilot demonstration project, 
supported by the provincial government of East Java in the regency of Sumenep and Madura. 
The project aimed to reduce the prevalence of chronic diseases such as hookworm, trachoma and 
yaws.
127
  The overall prevalence of yaws in Sumenep declined sharply from 17.4 to 0.26%.
128
  
However, yaws control within the overall framework of basic health services was contingent to 
the individual agency of the regency doctors and financial support from the provincial 
governments. This saw the implementation of the TCPS decentralised to the regency 
governments in 1959.  
Between 1951 and 1956, the TCPS campaign covered approximately 85% of the 
Indonesian population.  The overall prevalence of yaws at the end of the five year period 
declined from 20% in 1951 to 1% in 1956 as a result of improved detection of cases, treatment of 
suspected yaws patients, and resurveys to determine relapsed cases.
129
  From 1959 onwards, the 
execution of the TCPS program at the sub-district and village levels was devolved to regency 
administration, the plan being that TCPS would cover the whole archipelago by 1961. TCPS was 
adapted to the unique geographical and epidemiological conditions of the Indonesian 
archipelago. In the Outer Islands, for example, where the prevalence of yaws was high and 
population was sparse, Total Mass Treatment—involving the administration of a full penicillin 
dose to yaws patients and half dose to the uninfected individuals in the village and latent yaws 
patients—was the epidemiological strategy.  The djuru pateks working in the Outer Islands were 
not only trained to diagnose yaws lesions, but also in administering penicillin injections as 
mantris were in short supply. In 1961, the WHO provided a motor vessel, the PAM (named after 
the penicillin used in the TCPS) to undertake inter-island yaws control and to prevent the 
transmission of treponemal infections across the islands.
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 The PAM took the form of a mobile 
yaws clinic; it operated between the islands of Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and the 
northern and central parts of Sumatra. But its role in stopping the chain of yaws transmission 
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across the Outer Islands was largely symbolic. In effect, it was unable to prevent the 
transmission of infection across the islands owing to unsettled political conditions and 
widespread coastal traffic and population movements that hindered effective detection of 
treponemal infections.  
In 1951, when the TCPS program was conceived, Indonesia was the world’s second 
largest reservoir of yaws after Nigeria. The Indonesian TCPS gained worldwide attention as it 
was not only the world’s largest campaign against treponemal infections, but it had succeeded in 
reducing the prevalence of yaws twentyfold between 1951 and 1956. The Kodijat Method was 
accordingly adapted into anti-yaws programs elsewhere in Asia. In the early 1950s, Malaya had a 
high prevalence of yaws, particularly in the province of Kelantan. Owing to the acute shortage of 
nurses, the Malayan anti-yaws program deployed field workers (akin to the djuru pateks used in 
the Indonesian TCPS) to detect yaws in remote villages.
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 The yaws control program in Malaya 
initially used punch cards to determine the prevalence of yaws at the household level; but the 
method had to be abandoned as it was too time consuming. The Kodijat Method was favoured 
for its use of census forms which listed the names of individuals and systematic classification of 
yaws lesions.
132
  However, nurses working in the Malayan yaws eradication campaign failed to 
educate villagers about the significance of treatment of infectious cases with penicillin. 
Therefore, any kind of propaganda that encouraged yaws-infected villagers to attend polyclinics 
and be treated with penicillin was greeted with scepticism. 
The Indonesian TCPS was critiqued internationally at the First International Conference 
on Yaws Control, held in Bangkok in 1952, and at the Second International Conference on Yaws 
Control, held at Enugu in Nigeria in 1955. The Indonesian delegation, which was led by 
Soetopo, Kodijat and Wasito, presented their research findings based on the operation of the 
TCPS at the field level. At the first conference, the WHO observed that regarding the Indonesian 
TCPS, only patients with identifiable yaws symptoms were treated. Latent yaws cases were left 
untreated.  In response, the WHO recommended that the anti-yaws campaign should treat all 
children below the age of eighteen and patients with identifiable symptoms. 
133
 The use of field 
workers (djuru pateks) proved problematic for accurate diagnosis owing to discrepancies 
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between the serological diagnosis made by doctors and diagnosis made on the basis of clinical 
observations.
134
 The Kodijat Method was also critiqued by Indonesian TCPS staff at the field 
level, e.g.,  by mantris, who claimed that only active cases of yaws and their contacts were 
treated with PAM.
135
  The definitions of contacts was vague: they could vary from immediate 
family members of the yaws patients to more distant contacts such as the village population. 
Latent cases of yaws and their contacts were overlooked during treatment. The Kodijat Method 
excluded the examination of non-contacts of yaws patients for ascertaining the presence of yaws. 
Therefore yaws field workers detected new infections during resurveys. Ultimately, the 
limitation of TCPS treatment to active yaws patients and their contacts did little to reduce the 
prevalence of yaws.
136
  During the TCPS surveys and resurveys, patients showing hyperkeratosis 
(non-infectious lesions) were over-diagnosed and were accordingly administered PAM 
treatments, resulting in a high treatment failure of approximately 20%.
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The First National Symposium on Yaws Control (1956) organised by the Ministry of 
Health at Lawang, East Java, concluded that the TCPS program had entered the consolidation 
phase.  The overall prevalence of yaws on the Indonesian archipelago had registered a 
twentyfold decline from corresponding levels in 1951. However, delegates, especially Soetopo, 
warned that the program needed to achieve 100% geographical coverage as the islands not within 
the reach of the TCPS constituted a potential reservoir of future infections.
138
  The symposium 
delegates unanimously resolved to expand the TCPS program throughout Indonesia with utmost 
urgency. In addition, they proposed that the campaign would be executed with funding from the 
local government, and would involve teachers, civil servants, and schoolchildren in the periodic 
follow-up of the treatment of yaws patients in the polyclinics. The Ministry of Finance at Jakarta 
agreed to financially support the implementation of the TCPS campaign in regencies that lacked 
adequate financial resources. The following paragraphs deal with the reception of the anti-yaws 
campaign in Indonesia in general.  
The anti-yaws campaign was generally well received in Indonesia. Because its effects 
were immediate, the villagers showed enthusiasm for the treatment.  Indonesian novelist 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, commenting on yaws, considered it a disabling childhood disease. 
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Salvarsan treatment, administered to schoolchildren during the late colonial and early post-
independence period, furthered the widespread acceptance of scientific medicine as a proven 
fact. Yaws-affected children were cured within a few days.
139
  Toer’s recollections illustrate that 
salvarsan treatment against yaws came to be widely accepted in Javanese villages during the late-
colonial period because the effects of the treatment were visible to the people.  
For the UNICEF Asia Regional Office Director S.M. Keeny, yaws was a disease 
associated with poverty. The increased use of footwear and soap had reduced its prevalence 
among the population.
140
  When Keeny asked the villagers of East Java in 1964 what they 
thought about the TCPS program, there was a general denial. Villagers proudly claimed that 
there were no yaws in their family. However, one elderly woman named Ruchati broke the 
silence and narrated her painful experience with yaws during the colonial period. The infection 
had delayed her marriage: she was administered five arsenical shots that had cured her. But, for 
Ruchati, conditions were not much better in the 1960s than when she was a girl. Yaws had 
almost disappeared by the mid-1960s; but, ‘what about prices.’141  The elderly villagers whom 
Keeny interviewed were glad—not so much for themselves, that yaws was curable and reduced 
to negligible proportions, as their days were numbered—but for their children who could look 
forward to a brighter future where they could work without pain. Although the Indonesian anti-
yaws campaign was successful in reducing the prevalence of the disease, its implementation was 
far from perfect inasmuch as it papered over long-term sustainable solutions to the disease such 
as addressing poverty. The success of the anti-yaws campaign was apparent. Whereas statistical 
figures revealed the absolute decline in yaws prevalence throughout Indonesia, latent cases were 
missed out.  
The TCPS was a public health achievement for Indonesia in terms of reducing yaws 
prevalence from 20% in 1951 to approximately 0.58% in 1960. Kodijat was of the opinion that 
the most significant factor of the fortyfold decline in Indonesia from 1951-1960 was the 
cooperation of the civil administration with the villagers that ensured a high coverage of 
approximately 85%. In recognition of his skilful direction of the anti-yaws campaign, Kodijat 
was nominated for the Ramon Magsaysay Award, 1961.  The Magsaysay Committee noted: 
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It is a measure of Dr. Kodijat’s grasp of the problem and determination that he developed 
a campaign which is overcoming Indonesia’s shortage of doctors and reaching patients 
living on some 3000 islands extending over a 3,000 mile area of the moist tropics where 
this disease is most prevalent.  
The foundation said that although Kodijat had reached a normal retirement age in 
1950, he accepted unhesitatingly the call to organize and direct a national yaws control 
program in Indonesia that since has become larger than  the total of all such efforts in the 
world.  
Now 71-years old, he continues quietly but firmly to steer the yaws programme in 
Indonesia. Holding concern for the health of his people above his own, even an attack of 
pneumonia in 1959 did not deter this devoted doctor from managing a campaign of far 
reaching humanitarian and economic consequences throughout its crucial years.
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By 1969, although the overall prevalence of yaws in Indonesia had declined to 0.44%, there were 
sharp variations across the country’s provinces. Java and Madura had recorded an overall 
prevalence rate of 0.23% whereas in parts of West Irian province, approximately 18.33% of the 
population was infected by yaws, constituting a potential reservoir for transmission.
143
  The sub-
district of Losari in East Java was representative of the declining prevalence of yaws in 
Indonesia. When the TCPS was introduced in Losari in 1958, overall prevalence was 19.5%. By 
1963, the figure for Losari had declined to 0.77%.
144
  However, by 1965, following the 
suspension of UNICEF financial assistance to the program, the detection and treatment of yaws 
cases was suspended throughout Indonesia. In 1968, the year Kodijat died, a flare-up of the 
disease was reported in Losari.
145
  Of the 243 new cases detected there, 155 were infectious. The 
prevalence of yaws in the sub-district of Losari was over 2%, with 86% of cases occurring in 
children below the age of fourteen. A major factor contributing to the outbreak of yaws in Losari 
was the inability of the TCPS staff to contain the importation of infection from outside.
146
  Latent 
cases of yaws—even when detected—were not promptly treated according to the Kodijat 
Method.  PAM injections administered without adequate supervision, contributed to relapses of 
yaws infections.  
Yaws eradication in Indonesia was internationally well-recognised, albeit it was far from 
perfect. The Kodijat Method that involved the detection of yaws cases and the treatment of only 
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infectious (active) cases using PAM. Re-examination of the entire village population at regular 
intervals for relapses and the effectiveness of treatment were cost-effective public health 
measures that optimised the utilisation of scarce supplies of penicillin in the 1950s.  The 
successful execution of the campaign relied upon the djuru pateks, who were recruited from 
amongst the villagers themselves. The efficacy of yaws treatment was self-evident with the 
administration of PAM treatment; and, the villagers regularly for follow-up.  The chief 
shortcomings of the Kodijat Method were: (a) its inability to contain the transmission of latent 
yaws; and, (b) its restriction to the densely populated island of Java. In the sparsely populated 
Outer Islands which suffered from an acute shortage of medical and paramedical personnel, 
timely detection of yaws cases could not be carried out. As a result, international agencies, in 
conjunction with the Indonesian Ministry of Health, adopted the Total Mass Treatment strategy 
to treat entire populations of yaws-affected villages with penicillin. The Total Mass Treatment of 
yaws was based on two principles: (a) treatment of the entire village population using penicillin; 
and, (b) breaking the chain of transmission of yaws through effective surveillance. But, 
surveillance was a weak arm of the TCPS program in Indonesia, particularly in the Outer Islands. 
Due to the unsettled political conditions in the Outer Islands during the Soekarno era, and the 
suspension of international aid during the mid-1960s, effective surveillance and Total Mass 
Treatment of the population using penicillin could not be fully implemented.  
 
Leprosy 
 
Unlike the other three endemic diseases, that is, malaria, tuberculosis, and, to a lesser extent 
yaws—the prevalence of which was directly correlated with the loss of economic productivity— 
the economic loss caused by leprosy was negligible. However, leprosy patients were stigmatised 
in Indonesia due to popular superstition.
147
 The Bahasa Indonesia word for leprosy is kusta, 
derived from the Sanskrit term kusnati (eating away), associated with the disfigurement of 
patients’ bodies. Indonesian leprosy patients often refer to their broken bodies, alluding to the 
permanent impairment of their bodily functions and social isolation.
148
 Many leprosy patients in 
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Indonesia attribute the disease to God’s will, or the result of sinful deeds in one’s life. The 
images of leprosy internalised in society, or the notion that leprosy is a highly contagious disease 
give rise to fear. For the Indonesian Ministry of Health, overcoming superstitions associated with 
leprosy, and rehabilitating former patients was invested with symbolic significance in terms of 
transforming Indonesia into a modern society based on the foundations of science. 
  As the prevalence of leprosy across Indonesia was patchy—with some villages 
registering a significantly higher prevalence than others—epidemiological strategies for 
executing leprosy control varied considerably. Prior to 1956, leprosy patients were isolated in 
leprosaria and treated with chaulmoogra oil to minimise the transmission of infection. However, 
as leprosaria beds were in short supply, Indonesian physicians designed a two-pronged approach 
to leprosy control which they adapted to varying population densities across the archipelago 
namely: (a) detection of leprosy cases; and, (b) breaking the chain of transmission of infection 
through the treatment of patients with Diamine Diphenyl Sulphone (DDS). In densely populated 
regencies, leprosy cases were detected by paramedical personnel. They were generally treated 
using DDS tablets; but, in regencies where the populations were scattered, the disease would be 
detected at polyclinics and treated with DDS injections.  
Leprosy research post-World War II was conducted at the Lembaga Kusta (Leprosy 
Institute), Jakarta, by Indonesian leprologists including R. Boenjamin, who conducted research 
on mycobacterium leprae in buffaloes and rats, determined the level of vitamins in the blood of 
patients, and investigated the role of contacts in the spread of the disease. In the early 1950s, 
Indonesia had approximately 80,000 leprosy patients, only about an eighth of whom were 
receiving any form of treatment in leprosaria and polyclinics.  Isolation of infectious patients in 
leprosaria was impracticable due to the acute shortage of beds.  In Indonesia, a combination of 
ambulatory treatment, which facilitated the treatment of infected individuals in the family using 
DDS, and an approach that focused on the detection of infectious cases and isolating them in 
leprosaria was carried out in pilot leprosy control projects initiated by the Indonesian 
government, with technical advice from the WHO. These programs were introduced in Blora 
(Central Java), Menganti (East Java), and Bekasi in 1956.  
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Leprosy control at this time was strongly influenced by nationalist rhetoric, which 
expressed optimism that the introduction of modern treatment methods, for example, sulphone 
drugs, would contribute to surmounting leprosy which contaminated all layers of society.
149
 The 
nationalist narrative on leprosy stated that scientific research related to leprosy had been 
conducted by Sardjito, Achmad Mochtar, Soetopo, J. Sitanala and R. Boenjamin in the spirit of 
the Indonesian revolution. Indonesia was on the threshold of solving the leprosy problem; but, 
the implementation of this solution was constrained by conservative ideas and popular 
superstitions which had to be uprooted by modern science.
150
 Leprosy control in Indonesia was 
thus framed not only as a purely medical problem, but as a national undertaking which focused 
on transforming Indonesia into a modern society based on scientific knowledge. Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer recounts to his son Yudi, in The Mute’s Soliloquy, that leprosy was contracted in 
Javanese prayer houses due to the close proximity of infected patients with others. The more 
religious Santri Javanese regarded contracting bodok (the initial stages of leprosy) as evidence of 
true faith.
151
  Devotees would get treated in hospitals only when instructed by their superiors. In 
these ways, superstition led to the enslavement of people by fear, ignorance, and illness and 
stymied them of their individual initiative.  
In the early 1950s, leprosy control program in Indonesia was influenced by the thinking 
of leprologist Jacub Bernadus Sitanala (who graduated from the STOVIA in 1912 and later 
earned his doctorate in Leprology from the Tropen Instituut in Leiden in 1927) and R. 
Boenjamin, who graduated from the NIAS in 1926 and was director of the Leprosy Institute from 
1945 to 1959. In 1949, Boenjamin discovered that leprosy was most commonly transmitted in 
Indonesia through bedside contact between leprous and non-leprous individuals. Therefore, 
Sitanala’s method, which consisted of treating leprosy patients with chaulmoogra oil and 
containing the spread of infection by isolating the more infectious cases in leprosaria, was 
practiced until 1956.  Boenjamin estimated that, in the early 1950s, Indonesia had approximately 
80,000 leprosy patients, 22,000 of whom were registered. Of those, only 10,000 were receiving 
any form of treatment, either in leprosaria or polyclinics.
152
 Therefore, institutional treatment of 
patients in leprosaria was impractical.  Boenjamin, who framed leprosy as a social disease, 
156 
 
argued that apart from preventing the transmission of the disease from infected to healthy 
individuals, leprosy patients needed to be rehabilitated into mainstream society after they were 
rendered non-infectious through a program of work therapy.
153
 As children under the age of 
fifteen were highly susceptible to contracting leprosy from infected parents, Boenjamin 
recommended isolating parents in leprosaria and administered BCG vaccines as a prophylactic 
measure to children who demonstrated a negative reading on the lepromin test (indicating no 
prior history of leprosy). This, he suggested, should break the chain of infection.
154
  
At the time, the Leprosy Institute in Jakarta was one of the best in Southeast Asia.
155
  
Boenjamin became a member of the WHO Expert Panel on Leprosy in 1952 and communicated 
the research findings of the Institute to an international audience through scholarly articles in the 
International Journal of Leprosy.
156
 The Leprosy Institute, which comprised the Institute of 
Leprology, a large polyclinic, laboratories, a fifty-bed clinic, lecture halls, administrative offices, 
a pharmacy for drug distribution, and a model leprosarium in Tangerang, housed 300 patients. It 
conducted epidemiological studies in Tanah Abang (Jakarta) and Bekasi. The principal research 
project investigated the influence of the BCG vaccine on the lepromin test, with a view to 
investigating the effect of vaccination in treating borderline leprosy cases. The Institute also 
studied the posology (part of medicine that is concerned with dosage) of different leprosy drugs 
and compared their therapeutic efficacy. As well, it undertook the training of all medical students 
in Jakarta in leprology (as the Department of Dermatology at Universitas Indonesia did not offer 
this course).  
By the mid-1950s, the operation of leprosy campaigns in Indonesia was decentralised to 
the provinces.  Provincial health inspectors, who had considerable autonomy in allocating funds 
for leprosy control from provincial health budgets.  The regency administration was entrusted 
with the responsibility to forming a leprosy unit: each unit would spread awareness on the 
prevention of leprosy, undertake surveillance of infected individuals, isolate infected individuals 
to break the chain of transmission, and administer treatment to the detected patients. But, due to 
the acute shortage of medical personnel, only one leprosy unit in Indonesia (in the regency of 
Blora) was fully functional by 1955.
157
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In February 1958, the WHO and the Indonesian government signed a basic agreement to 
undertake leprosy control in Indonesia. The WHO would assist the Indonesian government in 
demonstrating the modern methods of leprosy control by employing an institutional approach 
(detection of infected individuals and treating them in the leprosaria with sulphones).
158
  In 1959, 
the Indonesian leprosy control program obtained supplies of DDS from UNICEF. For the pilot 
project, four locations in Java were chosen—Bekasi (West Java), Kampong Melayu (Jakarta), 
Menganti (regency of Surabaya), and Blora (Central Java).  
The archipelagic nature of Indonesia, in terms of varying population densities and 
epidemiological distribution of leprosy across the islands, was crucial in determining specific 
epidemiological strategies for executing leprosy control. The prevalence of leprosy in Indonesia 
was patchy. Some villages reported a prevalence rate of 15.81 patients per thousand people 
whereas others registered no cases at all.
159
  In the more densely populated areas with a high 
prevalence of leprosy, surveillance was used to trace the infected patient and contacts. Once the 
former were located, they were treated with DDS tablets to prevent the transmission of infection. 
In sparsely populated areas, or areas with a scattered prevalence of leprosy, undertaking surveys 
proved more difficult. Leprosy cases detected at local polyclinics were administered intramacular 
DDS injections.  In the urban areas, leprosy control programs used ‘focal surveys’ to 
systematically examine not only household contacts, but all persons living within the Rukun 
Tetangga (urban neighbourhood). These surveys led to total population coverage.  
Focal surveys were used in the pilot projects at Bekasi and Kampong Melaju. In 
Menganti, the leprosy control program was integrated into the TCPS as the prevalence of 
infectious yaws was less than 0.5% by 1958. The djuru pateks were involved in leprosy surveys 
in Menganti. The Director of the TCPS, Raden Kodijat, reached an agreement with Boenjamin, 
the Director of the Leprosy Institute, that if the prevalence of yaws dropped below 0.5%, the 
djuru pateks would have a limited case-load and could therefore look for leprosy lesions after 
receiving basic training in the diagnosis of leprosy.
160
  The djuru patek’s task was to report 
suspected leprosy cases to the mantri kusta (leprosy nurse).  The integration of leprosy control 
activities into the overall activities of the TCPS in Menganti reduced the cost of the control 
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project fourfold.
161
  In the regency of Blora, case finding activities were undertaken by djuru 
penerangan kusta (leprosy information assistants), who would also educate the village 
population about leprosy.  Pilot projects revealed that the prevalence of leprosy in Central and 
East Java was higher than West Java.
162
 Therefore, the WHO recommended that the pilot 
projects in Central and East Java be expanded to cover the whole province by 1960.  
Leprosy treatment recorded good progress in the province of East Java. In the regency of 
Menganti, 529 patients were treated in 1960: 86% were cured after 18 months of medication with 
DDS.
163
 The Venereal Disease Institute at Surabaya offered refresher courses for medical 
students, nurses, and regency health officers in East Java. The courses consisted of theoretical 
lectures, films, demonstration of patients, and visits to the pilot project at Menganti. In the 
regency of Bangkalan (Madura), the regency medical officer trained nurses to undertake the 
detection of leprosy cases. However, a major bottleneck affecting the progress of leprosy control 
operations in East and Central Java was the reporting system. The mantri kusta had to fill out 
individual forms, specifying the case history of each detected patient and send them to the 
Leprosy Health Service of the province, a task that was time consuming and interfered with 
successful examination and treatment of the entire population. The training program of the djuru 
pateks to detect leprosy cases was time consuming as well:  they were given six hours of training 
in anatomy and physiology, two hours in epidemiology, two hours in bacteriology, and eight 
hours learning to understand leprosy. These courses were given at the Venereal Disease Institute 
in Surabaya.
164
  But, while the djuru pateks were given only a theoretical instruction in leprosy 
treatment, there was no scientific rationale for how the target patient population would be chosen 
for examination.   
Although leprosy surveys were carried out efficiently in East Java with the assistance of 
djuru pateks, many patients opted not to report regularly for treatment, particularly those from 
the regencies of Madura.  Their excuse was that the treatment centres were located at a distance 
of over three kilometres from their homes. To alleviate the situation, the WHO recommended 
appointing drug distributors to supply DDS to patients who were either unwilling or unable to 
visit the treatment centres.
165
  The medication of patients would be monitored on a regular basis 
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by village heads who would report the result of DDS treatment to the mantri kusta. Apart from 
educating the personnel of the leprosy control program, e.g., the mantri kustas, the djuru 
penerangan kustas and the djuru pateks, no systematic efforts were made by the provincial 
health authorities across Indonesia to educate the population on the infectiousness of leprosy or 
eradicate stigma associated with the disease. 
Boenjamin advocated the rehabilitation of leprosy patients with the overall vision of 
integrating them into mainstream society.  He proposed teaching them vocations such as 
carpentry tailoring, and educating the children of leprosy patients in community schools.
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Boenjamin’s approach of leprosy was to impart religious education to patients with a view to 
dispelling the popular belief that ‘leprosy was a commandment of God’ and to strengthen the 
afflicted’s self-confidence. Boenjamin conceived of rehabilitating leprosy patients from a holistic 
perspective, not only through physical restoration, but also through restoring the normal social 
life of the person. Arrested cases of leprosy that were no longer contagious could be rehabilitated 
as well. For Satrio (who was the Minister of Health in 1961), rehabilitating leprosy patients was 
a part of the broader program of national reconstruction.  
The rehabilitation of leprosy patients proved to be a major bone of contention between 
the Ministry of Health and the WHO Senior Leprologist M. Blanc, Leprosy Advisor to the 
Indonesian government, on the one hand, and the WHO headquarters (located in Geneva) on the 
other. Unlike the WHO headquarters, which prioritised case-finding and treatment of leprosy 
patients, the Indonesian Ministry of Health and Blanc showed considerable independence and 
initiative in executing a plan of rehabilitation of leprosy patients without first consulting Geneva. 
Like Boenjamin, Blanc envisioned the assimilation of leprosy patients into mainstream society 
and overcoming stigma.
167
 The WHO headquarters were disturbed because Blanc did not first 
consult them for advice about rehabilitation.
168
  In its correspondence, the WHO headquarters 
explicitly stressed that they had no objection to the Indonesian government creating a large scale 
rehabilitation scheme; but, they could not financially support the various referral levels of 
rehabilitation which Blanc had suggested.
169
 The WHO prioritised case finding and individual 
treatment in the execution of leprosy control in Indonesia.  By 1961, only 1.4 million Indonesian 
160 
 
people out of a total population of over 70 million were examined for leprosy. As the country’s 
leprosy control program was in the preliminary stage in the early 1960s, the WHO focused on 
prioritising case findings and treatment, not rehabilitation. The WHO sponsored overseas 
fellowships for Indonesian medical students to undertake studies in reconstructive surgery and 
physiotherapy but considered any plan of rehabilitation of leprosy patients within the broad 
framework of treatment.
170
 It was not merely the financial question that underlay the differences 
between the WHO and the Indonesian Ministry of Health; that is not simply the cost of 
rehabilitating leprosy patients but a broader tension in public health between a narrow 
biomedical approach that emphasised the prevention and treatment of leprosy, and a holistic 
approach that envisioned overcoming stigma and integrating former patients into mainstream 
society.  
Indonesian physicians were pondering of optimal ways of resolving the unfavourable 
leprosy patients-to-beds ratio. One influential leprologist, M. Arif, who was Director of the 
Leprosy Institute in 1961, supported by Blanc, conceptualised an ambitious scheme of leprosy 
rehabilitation at the village, regency, provincial, and national levels that involved not only curing 
patients of their disease but also integrating former patients into mainstream society. This 
approach was tested through a pilot project at the Sitanala Hospital, Tangerang, and served as the 
nucleus of leprosy rehabilitation for Indonesia as a whole.
171
  Provincial rehabilitation centres 
would be located in the provincial capitals and would be assisted by the rehabilitation team at 
Sitanala hospital. Regency clinics would treat trophic ulcers and refer more complex cases to the 
provincial rehabilitation centre. The lowest referral centre for rehabilitation was the village. 
Mantri kustas would train leprosy patients under treatment (with or without deformities), to 
examine their limbs, avoid burns, and perform simple exercises.   
In 1963, the leprosy control program was extended to the Outer Islands, including 
Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Maluku, based on detecting leprosy cases at the polyclinics 
and the intention to cover a fifth of the population every year through case finding operations.
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Again, the program was not fully implemented across all the regencies, especially in the Outer 
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Islands such as Kalimantan and Nusa Tenggara. These areas lacked provincial leprologists to 
supervise the activities of leprosy nurses at the sub-district level.  
Between 1956 and 1967, the obstacles associated with leprosy in Indonesia were largely 
archipelagic, due to the varying population densities, and the prevalence of leprosy that 
influenced the method of treatment. The execution of the leprosy control program was 
decentralised to the regency doctor and to the mantri kusta. Individual factors such as the 
enthusiasm of the regency doctor or the mantri kusta for educating the villagers about leprosy or 
the importance of early treatment were central factors in ensuring regular attendance at the sub-
district polyclinic.  However, the inability of the provincial departments to implement leprosy 
education effectively resulted in the non-compliance of the patients with treatment.  Many 
remained unconvinced regarding the efficacy of the treatment.  
Unlike the control of malaria, tuberculosis, and, to a lesser extent, yaws—which were of 
direct economic importance according to the US, the WHO, and the Indonesian Ministry of 
Health—the control of leprosy in Indonesia received minimal financial support from the WHO. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health perceived the symbolic value of curing leprosy patients and 
integrating them into mainstream society as an initiative to create a modern Indonesian society 
free of superstition. In this section, I want to stress that although Indonesia was a recipient of 
technical assistance from the WHO, it did not uncritically accept recommendations from the 
organisation’s headquarters but pragmatically tailored WHO recommendations on leprosy to suit 
its own ideas, in particular those appertaining to rehabilitation and epidemiological requirements. 
In 1958, when the WHO entered into an agreement with the Indonesian government to 
demonstrate modern methods of leprosy control to the Government of Indonesia, it advocated an 
institutional approach; that is, treatment that involved isolation of leprosy cases in leprosaria and 
administration of sulphone drugs. In contrast to this approach, Indonesian physicians—ever 
aware of the acute shortage of beds in leprosaria and varying population densities across the 
archipelago—designed a flexible two-pronged approach that consisted of: (a) detection of 
leprosy cases; and, (b) containment of infection and treating patients using DDS. In the densely 
populated areas, the leprosy control program utilised the services of paramedical personnel to 
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detect cases. They dispensed DDS tablets to cure individual patients whereas in areas where the 
populations were dispersed, leprosy cases were detected in polyclinics and administered DDS 
injections. Additionally, the Indonesian Ministry of Health optimised the utilisation of scarce 
financial resources by integrating leprosy control into the activities of the anti-yaws campaign. 
The chief bone of contention between the Indonesian Ministry of Health and the WHO was not 
so much about the financial costs involved in rehabilitating leprosy patients as about the 
fundamental differences in public health; that is, between the holistic and the narrow biomedical 
approaches in public health. The Indonesian physicians and the Ministry of Health instead 
elected for a holistic approach in public health that symbolically related leprosy control and 
rehabilitation of the individual patient with nation-building and recreating a modern society 
based on science. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Starting in the early 1950s, Indonesia has been increasingly open to receiving international 
developmental assistance, particularly in the field of health, provided by UN agencies such as the 
WHO and UNICEF. But the ways in which Indonesians appropriated international aid and the 
ideas that were associated with it were dictated by political calculations and national concerns. In 
particular, the United States was motivated by the politics surrounding the Cold War, while 
Indonesia’s focus was on the task of nation-building. In the post-World War II era—
characterised by rivalry between the USA and the USSR—international aid was seen as a 
bargaining chip to purchase the allegiance of the newly-independent states of Asia and Africa. 
The US perceived the strategic significance of supporting the campaign against disease in 
developing countries—with aid funnelled through UN aid agencies—as a means to counteract 
the rising influence of communism in Asia and Africa. The US equated disease with 
underdevelopment in order to persuade the leaders of Asia and Africa to accept disease 
eradication campaigns and to steer postcolonial societies towards a Western-led model of 
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development. Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders were astute in perceiving that uncritical 
acceptance of foreign aid would lead to the erosion of Indonesia’s political sovereignty.  
In this chapter I argue that Indonesia neither universally accepted nor welcomed 
international aid. Rather, Indonesia’s leaders creatively appropriated overseas assistance in 
health in order to suit its own requirements in health that were in accord with the Bandung spirit, 
which emphasised technological self-sufficiency and solidarity with other developing nations. In 
the post-World War II era, the were two competing approaches to disease eradication, broadly in 
tension with each other: (a) the narrow biomedical approach that emphasised technological 
solutions such as DDT or vaccination against disease; and, (b) the holistic approach that 
emphasised raising the living standards of the people and inculcating health education. 
Indonesian physicians opted in favour of the holistic approach to health that incorporated health 
into the agenda of nation-building. The nationalist rhetoric surrounding the Indonesian struggle 
for independence was appropriated by Indonesian physicians, who depicted disease eradication 
campaigns as battles that would lead to victories of the nation against poverty, illiteracy and 
disease and cultivate a strong and healthy citizenry. In 1950, Abdul Halim’s cabinet viewed the 
symbolic significance of framing malaria, tuberculosis, yaws and leprosy as the ‘big four’ 
endemic diseases affecting the overall vitality of the population.  
Indonesia’s malaria eradication program was the second largest in Southeast Asia after 
India. The Malaria Institute at Jakarta had undertaken thorough epidemiological studies related 
to the resistance of mosquitoes to DDT; but, unfortunately the knowledge was not applied in the 
actual eradication campaign. The failure of the malaria eradication campaign was not so much 
due to the resistance of the anopheline species to DDT; rather, the program was impeded by 
organisational factors such as negotiating the bureaucratic labyrinths of the Indonesian 
government that interfered with particular aspects of the eradication program such as spraying 
DDT.  
Similar to Indonesia’s malaria eradication campaign, Indonesia’s tuberculosis eradication 
program was frustrated by organisational factors related to negotiating the byzantine maze that 
was the Indonesian bureaucracy, i.e. achieving coordination between the Tuberculosis Institute at 
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Yogyakarta, the headquarters of the BCG campaign at Bandung and the Ministry of Health based 
in Jakarta. Although tuberculosis control in Indonesia was closely aligned to WHO prescriptions 
that sought to use BCG vaccine as a prophylactic measure against the disease, the low take rate 
of the vaccine forced the Ministry of Health to reassess the feasibility of using BCG. The unique 
nature of Indonesia’s ambulatory treatment was a response to the lack of medical personnel and 
the shortage of hospital beds. By 1956, the Indonesian pilot project for tuberculosis had informed 
WHO circles about the practicality of using such an approach; that is, administering isoniazid or 
streptomycin to the infected patients, educating the patient’s family about the importance of 
nutrition and hygiene and following up on treatment, was the first program of its kind in the 
Southeast Asian region and to inform the WHO how tuberculosis control should be undertaken 
in a resource-poor setting.   
The Indonesian anti-yaws campaign was the world’s largest when it was inaugurated in 1949. 
Led by retired Indonesian physician Kodijat, the campaign, which consisted of examination of 
all yaws cases and treatment of only infectious cases using penicillin, was based on voluntary 
examination of village populations for the disease.  But, the Kodijat method was far from perfect 
as it treated only active cases: passive cases were left behind. In addition, the implementation of 
this method was heavily dependent upon the recruitment of nurses and paramedical personnel 
who were in short supply in islands outside Java. For reducing the prevalence of yaws 
throughout Indonesia, the Ministry of Health adopted a two-pronged strategy: (a) the adoption of 
the Kodijat method on the island of Java, which had a high population density; and (b) total mass 
treatment involving the administration of penicillin injections to patients and their contacts in the 
Outer Islands where the population was dispersed and the availability of paramedical personnel 
rare. The Kodijat method resulted in a spectacular twentyfold decline in the prevalence of yaws 
between 1951 and 1956 such that neighbouring Malaya, which was yaws endemic during the 
mid-1950s, upon noting its promise also adopted the Kodijat method. The success of the anti-
yaws campaign was apparent. Whereas statistical figures revealed the absolute decline in yaws 
prevalence throughout Indonesia, latent cases were missed out. Therefore, transmission of 
infection continued among untreated individuals suffering from latent infection and as a result,  
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the prevalence of yaws continued to remain patchy in Indonesia. The originality of the 
Indonesian yaws eradication campaign was its response to the shortage of medical personnel: 
assistants (djuru pateks) were educated specifically to fill this void.  
Unlike malaria, tuberculosis and yaws, the economic losses sustained in connection with 
leprosy were insignificant. Nevertheless, it was incorporated into the agenda of the ‘big four’ 
campaign as the eradication of superstition (associated with the social stigma of leprosy patients) 
was perceived as central in recreating a modern Indonesia based on scientific principles. Leprosy 
control was one area of public health where the Indonesian Ministry of Health diverged 
considerably from the WHO recommendations. Because the prevalence of leprosy across the 
Indonesian archipelago was uneven—with some regencies recording a higher prevalence than 
others—the Ministry of Health engineered a two-pronged strategy: (a) in the densely populated 
regencies of Java, detection of leprosy cases with the assistance of paramedical personnel and 
prevention of infection using DDS tablets; and, (b) in the regencies of the Outer Islands, where 
the population was relatively dispersed, detection of leprosy cases in polyclinics and 
administration of DDS injections. Additionally, the leprosy control program utilised the services 
of paramedical personnel engaged in the anti-yaws campaign in certain regencies where the 
prevalence of yaws had declined to negligible levels. They were free to engage in leprosy work, 
a strategy that intended to optimise the use of scarce financial resources available to the Ministry 
of Health. The WHO, in contrast, advocated a standardised approach of isolating leprosy patients 
in leprosaria where they would be administered DDS tablets to break the chain of infection. 
Rehabilitation of leprosy patients was a major bone of contention between the Ministry of Health 
and the WHO headquarters at Geneva. Whereas Geneva conceptualised the rehabilitation of 
leprosy patients as a component of medical treatment, the Ministry of Health advocated not only 
treatment of leprosy patients, but also their integration into mainstream society. Leprosy control 
in Indonesia illustrated the tension between the narrow biomedical approach of the WHO (that 
emphasised the treatment and containment of the disease) and the holistic approach of the 
Ministry of Health (that emphasised not only treatment, but also the integration of patients into 
mainstream society).  
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This chapter highlights the paradox that despite the Indonesian physicians’ adoption of a 
holistic approach to public health that related health to nation-building, and developing unique 
approaches suited to Indonesian conditions, the actual implementation of the ‘big four’ 
campaigns often tended to address the symptoms, not the causes of disease. Both the Ministry of 
Health and the WHO papered over the socio-economic and political conditions that affected the 
overall well-being of the population. For example, patients suffering from malnutrition were 
treated for malaria based on the identical symptoms of these two diseases. The malaria 
eradication program did not address issues such as inadequate distribution and consumption of 
food. WHO consultants and Indonesian physicians had undertaken comprehensive surveys that 
established a correlation between inadequate hygiene and nutrition and the prevalence of 
tuberculosis. In practice, however, educating the public about preventive measures against 
tuberculosis was contingent upon the support of local governments that was lacking in most parts 
of Indonesia. The country’s anti-yaws campaign, while successful in drastically reducing the 
prevalence of the disease, overlooked the rising cost of living.  
What I have called Indonesia’s ‘Bandung approach’, which sought to reconcile 
Indonesia’s ambition to exercise its control over its health policy while remaining open to 
international assistance, was reflected in the actual implementation of the ‘big four’ campaigns. 
Indonesia did not adopt a standard epidemiological strategy advocated by the WHO in its disease 
eradication campaigns. Rather, the Ministry of Health pragmatically tailored the WHO’s 
recommendations to suit the archipelagic nation’s requirements in terms of varying population 
densities and epidemiological conditions in instances where a standard epidemiological strategy 
would not work. In addition, it developed new strategies that took into account the shortage of 
health personnel and the lack of beds in institutional settings.  
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Indonesia: Malaria by the Sea  
 
 
 
Above: Dr. Fritz Ronnefeldt, WHO malariologist in Indonesia, carries out an inquiry into the lifecycle and habits of 
the anopheles sundaicus mosquito in the Java Sea region and crosses a tambak (dyke/ shallow estuary) where fish 
are bred in a flat-bottomed boat (1957).  
 
Source: File 6130, Binder 205 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva).  
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President Soekarno inaugurates Indonesia’s malaria eradication program at Desa Tirtomartani, Yogyakarta on 12 
November 1959. 
Source: Satrio and Mona Lohanda, Perjuangan dan Pengabdian: Mosaik Kenangan Prof. Dr. Satrio, Penerbitan 
Sejarah Lisan Nomor 3 (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1986).  
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Above: Malaria Eradication, Indonesia: DDT spraying in progress (12 November 1960). This image elucidates that 
malaria eradication in Indonesia was organised as a military campaign.  
Source: Departemen Kesehatan, Sejarah Kesehatan Nasional Indonesia, Volume II (Jakarta: Departemen 
Kesehatan, 1980).  
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Magsaysay Award Recipient Raden Kodijat: Architect of the Indonesian Treponematoses Control Program 
 
 
 
 
Raden Kodijat (then aged 71) was the 1961 recipient of the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service.  
Source: ‘Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation,’ last accessed 22 February 2013, 
http://www.designbluemanila.com/test/rmaf/main/awardees/awardee/profile/107.  
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Where the Road Ends, Yaws Begin: Images from the Indonesian Anti-Yaws Campaign during the 1950s   
 
The Kodijat Method of Yaws Control  
 
 
 
Above: In the central Javanese desa of Getas, villagers hear a talk by their headman about the approaching visit of 
the anti-yaws team. Earlier, the team leader had explained the campaign to the headman, who now passes on the 
information to his village and pleads for full cooperation.   
 
Source: File 37458, Binder 245 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
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The Kodijat Method of Yaws Control 
 
 
 
Detection of yaws cases in the village in the sub-district of Cerme (under the jurisdiction of the regency of Gresik, 
East Java). Only patients with active lesions are treated with penicillin (see the next photo).  
 
Source: File 4529, Binder 178 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
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The Kodijat Method of Yaws Control 
 
 
 
A Javanese nurse (left) treats a young boy with penicillin in the regency of Karangsem, Bali.  
 
Source: File 37435, Binder 245 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
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Yaws Control: the Outer Islands, 1957  
 
b  
 
PAM (short for Procaine Penicillin with Aluminium Monostearate, which cures yaws lesions in a few days), is the 
name of a steam launch which takes a yaws eradication team to remote islands in Indonesia. As the PAM 
approaches the island the captain checks the approach channel with his glasses. 
Source: Yaws on the island and the "PAM": Indonesia, 1957, WHO website, accessed February 20 2013, 
http://www.who.int/features/2009/photoarchives/tropical_diseases/photo_story/en/index1.html.  
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Yaws Control: the Outer Islands, 1957 
 
Below: Mass Treatment of Yaws Patients 
 
The 299 villagers of Njamplang are examined. Forty-seven persons, of whom nine are infectious, are given an 
injection of repository penicillin. Often, a preventive injection is given to the entire village population. 
Source: Source: Yaws on the island and the "PAM": Indonesia, 1957, WHO website, accessed 20 February 2013, 
http://www.who.int/features/2009/photoarchives/tropical_diseases/photo_story/en/index7.html 
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Yaws Control:  the Outer Islands, 1957 
 
Juvenile mass examination and treatment of all children (the island of Sapudi) using penicillin.  
Source: Binder 245, File 7765 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
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Yaws, Before and After Treatment: Penicillin a Magic Bullet 
                
 
 
The photograph on the left depicts a yaws-afflicted infant who is treated with penicillin. The results of the cure are 
self-evident (right).  
 
Source: Binders 169 and 170 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
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A Symbolic Victory against Yaws: WHO Propaganda 
 
 
 
This photo frames the anti-yaws campaign in Indonesia as a battle that will lead to further victories of the nation 
against poverty, disease and illiteracy. After eradicating yaws, farmers develop initiatives to improve their socio-
economic conditions.   
 
Source: Binder 178, File 37329 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
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SEARO Leprosy  
 
 
In Indonesia, the national leprosy campaign set underway by the Indonesian government (photo taken in 1959) 
includes a program of rehabilitation.  
Source:  Image WHO_A_008747 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEARO Leprosy  
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Beginning 1956, the Indonesian government initiated a national campaign against leprosy in collaboration with the 
WHO that involved the detection of leprosy patients and treating them with sulphones. For the Indonesian 
government, the campaign against leprosy embodied the recreation of a modern society free from superstition and to 
eradicate the prevalent stigma associated with the disease. For these reasons, the Indonesian government accorded 
primacy to rehabilitation of leprosy patients.  
 
Above: A school for leprous children (1959). The teacher of this school is an ex-sufferer of leprosy.  
 
Source: Image WHO_A_008744 (WHO Photo Archives, Geneva).  
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 CHAPTER FIVE  
EXPANSION AND TRANSFORMATION OF MEDICAL EDUCATION IN INDONESIA 
 
After Indonesia gained independence, the country suffered from an acute shortage of physicians. 
After 1945, most Dutch physicians had left; and to compound the shortage, the medical schools 
in the Dutch East Indies only graduated a modest number of Indonesian physicians. During most 
of the 1950s, the country’s three medical schools (Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta) only 
graduated a disappointing number of approximately thirty physicians annually. Indonesia 
attempted to remedy this shortage by changing the curricula at the existing medical schools and 
by founding new medical schools on the Outer Islands. The Indonesians had inherited the Dutch 
model of medical education, a model that followed the German model which emphasised 
research and individual study, allowing students to sit their examinations whenever they felt 
adequately prepared.  Starting in 1952, proposals were made to remodel the medical curricula on 
the American model, which fostered problem solving and critical thinking, and introduced 
cohort-based rather than individual examinations. Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta; UI) and 
Universitas Airlangga (Surabaya; UNAIR) affiliated themselves with the University of 
California medical school with the aim of implementing the American model. At the same time, 
during the 1950s, new medical faculties were established on the islands of Sumatra and 
Sulawesi. 
 In reality, the American model was neither implemented in the leading Indonesian 
medical schools (UI, UNAIR, and Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta; UGM)), nor in those 
founded on the Outer Islands. Initiatives were contingent to political factors, especially US-
Indonesian relations and the political differences between Java and the Outer Islands. Starting in 
1955, affiliation of the UI and the University of California’s medical school commenced, leading 
to the restructuring of the former’s curriculum. President Soekarno’s suspension of parliamentary 
democracy in 1957, and the subsequent deterioration of relations between the US and Indonesia, 
led to the postponement of the affiliation of the UNAIR medical school with the University of 
California until 1959; until that time, the former continued to follow the Dutch model. The 
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medical faculty at UGM was not affiliated to the University of California but restructured its 
curriculum independently following the American model in 1965. The founding of medical 
schools in the Outer Islands was largely the outcome of private initiatives and funding from 
international agencies. The central government’s involvement in the establishment of medical 
faculties on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi was minimal and half-hearted at best. The 
medical faculties at Medan, Bukittinggi and Makassar followed a variant of the Dutch model of 
medical education. At the same time as the organisation and restructuring of Indonesian medical 
education took place, increased emphasis was placed upon public health.  
 Several obstacles impeded the implementation of the American model of medical 
education in Indonesia, in particular the lack of infrastructure and the shortage of qualified 
teachers. The transition from the Dutch to the American model was unevenly implemented, in 
particular at UNAIR and the medical schools on the Outer Islands due to lack of adequate 
administrative support from the Ministry of Education. Since there was hardly any process of 
selection to enter the medical school, attrition rates remained high, especially during the 
premedical year. Cohort-based teaching could not be successfully implemented due to the 
shortage of Indonesian academic staff. By 1969, the American model proved unsustainable at 
UNAIR and the medical school reverted to the Dutch curriculum. Because of these reasons, the 
implementation of the American model in Indonesian medical schools failed to maximise the 
output of physicians across Indonesia.  
 
Medical Education in Jakarta: Transition from the Dutch to the American Model of 
Medical Education 
 
Between 1927 and 1942, the medical faculty at Batavia (Geneeskundige Hoogeschool, GH) and 
subsequently the UI in Jakarta (1950-54) utilised the Dutch model of medical education, which 
was patterned along German lines.  In this Dutch model, examinations were on an individual 
basis and could be taken whenever the student felt prepared. The curriculum was rigorous: it 
emphasised extensive theoretical grounding in the natural sciences followed by a written 
examination. The course of study was completed with an oral examination.
1
 As a result of the 
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rigorous curriculum, approximately eighty per cent of students failed, both at the GH and at the 
UI medical school.  Consequently, the latter graduated only a modest number of approximately 
thirty physicians annually during the early and mid-1950s. Starting in 1952, in line with the 
initiatives of Indonesian academics including Soetomo Tjokronegoro, proposals were made to 
introduce the American model of medical education, which consisted of a guided curriculum that 
emphasized cohort-based teaching and encouraged the development of problem solving skills. 
By 1954-55, the medical faculty at UI had introduced the American model, which required 
affiliation with the University of California. Increased emphasis on public health—although not 
technically emphasised in the American model—was incorporated in 1954-55 at all levels of 
medical study; this was initiated by UI academics such as Raden Mochtar. The aim was to orient 
future physicians to health problems peculiar to Indonesia such as the high prevalence of 
maternal and infant mortality and infant malnutrition.  
In 1851, the Dokter Djawa School was established at Batavia. The School was an 
initiative of Willem Bosch, the head of the Netherlands Indies medical service, and the Dutch 
East Indies colonial government and aimed to train local medical personnel to be employed as 
smallpox vaccinators.
2
  The training course at the Dokter Djawa School lasted two years, at the 
end of which medical graduates were awarded the title of Dokter Djawa (Javanese doctor). In the 
beginning, Malay was the language of instruction. In the mid-1870s it was replaced by Dutch , 
because the teachers at the school were convinced that Malay did not suffice as a language of 
scientific instruction. In 1875, the duration of the training program was raised from two to seven 
years, of which two years were for preparatory courses science and five for medical training.
3
 In 
addition, starting in 1890, students were given outpatient training for surgery and eye diseases.  
In 1902, the school was renamed STOVIA (School ter Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen) 
and the curriculum was revised once again. STOVIA students who successfully passed all of 
their examinations were awarded the title of Inlandsch Arts [Native Physician].  In 1913, the 
NIAS (Nederlandsch-Indische Artsen School) was established in Surabaya, patterned on the 
STOVIA curriculum. Students who successfully completed their medical training at NIAS were 
conferred with the title of Indisch Arts [Indies Physician] (from that date, the STOVIA also 
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awarded this degree).
4
  In 1927, the GH opened, awarding the same medical degrees as 
universities in the Netherlands. At this time, the STOVIA no longer accepted new students, but 
students who had already enrolled could finish their study or transfer to the GH. The NIAS did 
not change; consequently, there were two different courses of study open to students in 
Indonesia.  
 Following the Japanese occupation in 1942, the medical schools in Jakarta and Surabaya 
were closed for one year. In 1943, the Japanese established the Ika Daigaku (Medical Academy) 
in Jakarta. The duration of medical education at this school was five years.
5
 Thirteen STOVIA 
and GH graduates, including Abdul Rasjid, Bahder Djohan, Boentaran Martoatmodjo, Soetomo 
Tjokronegoro and Sardjito were appointed lecturers. They also became members of the Izi Hoko 
Kai, which was a precursor to the Indonesian Medical Association [Ikatan Dokter Indonesia], 
which was established in 1950. Shortly after the defeat of the Japanese in August 1945, the Balai 
Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia—The Institute of Higher Education of the Indonesian 
Republic, and precursor to the UGM—with its faculties of medicine and law, was inaugurated at 
Jakarta by Soetomo Tjokronegoro.
6
  In early October 1945, the Dutch returned to the Indonesian 
archipelago; by this time, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) had established 
control over Jakarta. Due to the political uncertainty in the period that followed, the Balai 
Perguruan Tinggi’s Faculty of Medicine was transferred to Yogyakarta and Klaten in central 
Java, areas that were under the control of the revolutionaries.
7
   
In 1946, the Dutch established the Nooduniversiteit (Emergency University) in Jakarta. It 
consisted of Faculties of Medicine, Law, Humanities, Agriculture and Technical Education.  In 
1947, its name was changed to Universiteit van Indonesië. Gradually, as the Dutch reasserted 
their control over the Indonesian archipelago, they established Faculties of Mathematics and 
Physics in Bandung (using the former Technical College buildings), Faculties of Veterinary 
Medicine and Agriculture in Bogor, a second Medical Faculty in Surabaya, and a Faculty of 
Economics at Makassar, all of which were affiliated to the newly-established Universiteit van 
Indonesië.
8
 The Universiteit was able to continue its educational programs uninterrupted until 
December 1949.   
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In 1950, the Universiteit van Indonesië was renamed Universitet Indonesia (UI), before it 
was again renamed Universitas Indonesia in 1954.
9
  By now, the Republic of Indonesia had three 
medical schools, i.e., the Faculty of Medicine at Yogyakarta (UGM), the Faculty of Medicine at 
Jakarta, and the Faculty of Medicine at Surabaya. All three came under UI administration from 
1950 to 1954, when the Faculty of Medicine at Surabaya was amalgamated with Universitas 
Airlangga (UNAIR) in 1954.  
From 1950 to 1954, the medical schools of the UI at Jakarta and Surabaya followed the 
Dutch medical model. The Dutch medical schools’ curriculum allowed considerable flexibility: 
students were neither compelled to attend lectures nor did they have to appear for examinations 
when they were not adequately prepared. The curriculum was theoretical, combined teaching 
with research, and emphasised basic medical sciences, in particular anatomy and physiology.
10
  
The Dutch model laid less emphasis upon apprenticeship as a means for medical students to gain 
practical experience as it primarily educated students to become medical researchers.  
Technically, any student who passed the high school examination was accepted into the 
premedical year. Consequently, the number of students who were admitted into the premedical 
year by far exceeded the physical capacity of the available classrooms, which also included a 
number of students who had to repeat classes.
11
  The premedical curriculum was a burden for the 
medical schools at Jakarta and Surabaya as the instruction in botany, zoology, chemistry and 
physics did not strictly constitute a part of the medical curriculum. The teachers were recruited 
on a part-time basis from other institutions, e.g., the School of Natural Sciences, or the School of 
Technology; thus, they could not devote their full attention to develop a strong academic 
foundation.  
Unfortunately, during the early 1950s, there was a steady exodus of Dutch lecturers and 
other scientists to the Netherlands as the monthly remuneration of Dutch academics in post-
independent Indonesia could not keep pace with the rising inflation. In addition, the Indonesian 
Decree (1946) stipulated that all academic lectures had to be delivered in Bahasa Indonesia.
12
 
Many of the Dutch had experienced considerable hostility from Indonesians and were eager to 
leave the country.  Running the medical school following their departure became very difficult as 
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vacancies could not be filled by Indonesian academics. The number of physicians graduating 
from the medical schools at Jakarta and Surabaya remained small (estimated at less than thirty 
for the early 1950s). Most of the new medical graduates preferred to work as private practitioners 
in urban areas where salaries were higher, thereby creating a gap in the availability of physicians 
between the rural and urban areas of Indonesia.  
To change this situation, in 1952, Professor of Pathology Soetomo Tjokronegoro 
(Universitas Indonesia) approached Francis Scott Smyth, the chairperson of the Foreign 
Graduate Student Committee at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) with a 
proposal to affiliate the UI Faculties of Medicine at Jakarta and Surabaya with the UCSF. His 
aim was to remodel the medical curriculum based on the American model, which intended to 
deepen the student’s conceptual understanding of the structure, function and behaviour of the 
human organism in health and disease.  The lectures, which emphasised active learning through 
laboratories, internships and small group discussions, were designed to teach students how to 
acquire knowledge essential to facilitating their solving of problems. However, the training of 
medical students in universities in the US did not emphasise preventive medicine, occupational 
medicine, and the doctor-patient relationship. These were incorporated into the revised medical 
curricula patterned on the American model at the initiative of UI academics, in particular Raden 
Mochtar, to sensitise the future medical student to the public health problems of Indonesia.   
During the 1950s, Indonesia was the focus of several international aid-based 
organisations including the TCA (Technical Cooperation Administration of the American 
government), Australian Aid (administered through the Colombo Plan), the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), and private philanthropies such as the Ford Foundation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Their interest in Indonesia was related to its geopolitical significance 
during the Cold War era, particularly after the Communist victory in mainland China.  Because 
the US was apprehensive about the spread of communism to Southeast Asia, as a preventative 
strategy it utilised technical assistance, particularly Harry Truman’s Point Four Program, to 
advance the economic and social development of the newly-decolonised Southeast Asian 
nations, especially Indonesia.
13
 In 1951, Indonesian foreign minister Achmad Subardjo 
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committed Indonesia to Section 511a (Economic and Technical Assistance of the US Military 
Security Act), a US technical assistance package, without sanction from the parliament. This led 
to a general fear that Indonesian foreign policy would become entangled with the politics of the 
Western Bloc.
14
 Indonesians were initially sceptical of accepting any form of American aid, 
including education personnel, out of fear that US technical aid could have political or military 
strings attached.  
The affiliation between the medical schools at UI and the UCSF was implemented in the 
volatile political context of Cold War Politics. E. Ross Jenney (Chief of the US Technical 
Mission to Indonesia and Head of the Public Health Division from 1950-1953) proposed the 
‘adoption’ of Indonesian universities by their American counterparts as part of the technical 
assistance program. The Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture expressed reservations 
about the use of the word ‘adoption,’ stating that this notion signified that Indonesian universities 
were subservient to their American counterparts.
15
  For this reason, the word ‘adoption,’ was 
dropped from the American proposal when the question of affiliating the UI medical school with 
the UCSF was proposed in 1952.
16
  However, problems arose on the American side. The Regents 
of the University of California argued that their local medical faculties were burdened with 
returned World War II veterans. They also questioned the feasibility of transplanting the 
American medical education model to the Indonesian medical schools given that Indonesia’s 
public health conditions differed drastically from those in America.
17
 As a result of mutual 
misgivings, no agreement could be brokered at the official level.
18
 Yet, progress towards 
affiliation was evident at the level of academics, beginning in 1952 with Soetomo 
Tjokronegoro’s proposal.19 Smyth, however, was initially unprepared to advocate affiliation 
between the two faculties as the Regents of the University of California lacked sufficient 
information pertinent to Indonesia’s health conditions. In anticipation of the proposal to affiliate, 
in 1953, Dr Nathaniel Burbridge of the Department of Pharmacology, University of California, 
was sent to Jakarta to reorganise the Department of Pharmacology at UI.   
 The Memorandum of Understanding between the University of California Medical 
School and the Faculty of Medicine at UI was officially signed on 29 June 1954 and effective 
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from 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1957. Completely financed by the ICA (International Cooperation 
Administration), it involved affiliating the Medical Faculty at Jakarta with the Faculty of 
Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco.  As per the provisions of the contract, 
31 US medical educators with expertise in basic medical and clinical fields were deputed to 
Indonesia for periods ranging from six months to seven years.
20
 The University of California 
team of visiting lecturers offered assistance to the medical faculty of UI in the selection of 
prospective medical students and the reorganisation of the medical curriculum. The latter could 
not be implemented until 1955 as American lecturers could not be recruited at short term notice.  
On 17 December 1954, the UI medical faculty appointed a committee consisting of 
Sarwono Prawirohardjo, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology; Soedjono Djoened 
Poesponegoro, Dean of the Medical School and Professor of Paediatrics; Edwin Schultz, 
Chairman of the University of California-Field Staff and Visiting Professor of Pathology; 
Sutarman, Professor of Physiology; Satrio, Associate Professor of Anatomy; Raden Mochtar, 
Associate Professor of Public Health; and Sujito Danusuproto, Associate Professor of Physics.
21
  
The function of this committee was to propose changes to the medical curriculum and increase 
the supply of doctors. The committee proposed that the duration of medical training be reduced 
to six years and specifically recommended the introduction of the American model. The medical 
school’s adoption of the American curriculum in 1955 was intended to foster problem-based 
experiential learning and initiate cohort-based—rather than individual—examinations so that an 
entire batch of doctors could graduate from the medical school each year.  
The American medical model emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. Medical educators 
in the US deemphasised didactic teaching by lecturers, instead advocating medical education that 
produced problem-solvers and critical thinkers who could evaluate information independently.
22
  
Clinical research required making meticulous bedside observations of patients. In every 
department of the medical school, there was congruence between teaching required courses and 
the specific research interests of the teaching faculty.
23
 Instructors were passionate about alerting 
students about the research problems they themselves had encountered when pursuing their own 
research.  The medical curriculum in the US was arranged logically: i.e., the preclinical subjects, 
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namely anatomy, biochemistry, physiology, bacteriology and pharmacology, oriented the 
medical student for clinical study.
24
 The courses undertaken during the preclinical and clinical 
years were intended to familiarise medical students with the basic processes governing the 
functioning of structure, function and behaviour of the human organism in health and disease. 
Instruction emphasised active learning through small group-discussions during which students 
practiced to problem-solving skills. A great deficiency of the American model of medical 
education was the scant attention devoted to issues such as preventive medicine, occupational 
medicine, and the doctor-patient relationship.
25
 
The most noticeable change associated with the switch from the Dutch to the American 
curriculum at the UI medical school was the structuring of the lectures. Under the old approach, 
lectures were delivered in classical didactic style with very little input from the students. The 
number of hours devoted to premedical, preclinical and clinical subjects was flexible and 
students could choose not to attend classes. Teaching at the premedical level largely emphasised 
anatomy and histology; there was no integration of the lectures with the laboratory. With the 
introduction of the American model in 1955, lectures were structured around the semester. At the 
preclinical level, the teaching hours dedicated to physiology and biochemistry equalled those of 
anatomy and histology with the objective of deepening the student’s conceptual understanding of 
metabolic processes.
26
  Beginning in 1955, training of medical students in public health 
commenced during the preclinical (second) year and included instruction in public health theory, 
medical ecology, demography, home economics, social anthropology, and statistics.  During the 
third year, students were trained in the prevention of infectious diseases, health education, 
interpretation of epidemiological data, and smallpox vaccination. Theoretical training in public 
health synchronised well with practical training such as administering vaccinations. At the 
commencement of clinical study (the fourth year), students received instruction in social 
medicine. During the clerkship period (fifth year), students would be posted to maternal and 
child health centres where they assisted with pilot demonstration projects and subsequently 
discussed their field experiences in class.  Students also conducted surveys related to the impact 
of socio-economic factors affecting the general health at the household level. In the sixth year, 
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they undertook internships in public health lasting two months, worked as general practitioners 
and held discussions with regency health officers on public health questions.  
Premedical training under the American curriculum was implemented at the 
commencement of their medical education and consisted of instruction in physics, chemistry and 
biology. The first phase of preclinical training consisted of coursework in anatomy, histology, 
physiology, biochemistry, public health and nutrition, followed by instruction in anatomical 
pathology, parasitology, microbiology, pharmacology, clinical pathology, public health, nutrition 
and psychiatry. The preclinical examinations were marked by a high attrition rate, as coursework 
was intensive. Unfortunately, reliable statistics regarding the performance of students at each 
level of medical study for the mid and late1950s and 1960s are not available.
27
 The fourth, fifth 
and sixth years were devoted to clinical studies in surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics and 
gynaecology, psychiatry, public health, dermatology, ophthalmology, dentistry, and forensic 
medicine.
28
 In addition to their field experiences and group discussions, students discussed the 
latest scientific literature.  
Firman Lubis, formerly Professor of Public Health and Preventive Medicine at UI, 
recounts in his memoirs  that during his student days at the Faculty of Medicine, UI,  subsequent 
to the introduction of the American model, practicals supplemented lectures in biology, 
chemistry and physics even during the premedical year.
29
 Medical training was intensive. 
Students had to prepare themselves for periodic tests by consulting recommended readings in the 
library. However, some had difficulty following the textbooks as these were published either in 
English or German, both of which were languages most students were not familiar with. With the 
commencement of preclinical study, students were oriented to theories within public health and 
took practicals in anatomy.  In the third year, they were introduced to biochemistry with a special 
focus on enzymes, vitamins and metabolism.  Although medical students were introduced to 
various aspects of public health in the preclinical year, the teaching of epidemiology and public 
health statistics proved unsatisfactory as the majority of students lacked the mathematical 
foundation to comprehend the lectures.
30
 Clinical instruction at the UI—intended to facilitate 
comprehension of the lectures—was organized into watertight compartments, often led by 
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faculty members who jealously safeguarded their disciplinary boundaries.
31
 Clinical training in 
paediatrics, midwifery and surgery afforded an opportunity for medical students to apply 
theoretical knowledge gained during the first three years of premedical and preclinical study 
through careful bedside observation of patients.
32
 During the internship training in midwifery, 
students studied cases of septic abortion at Rumah Sakit Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, the UI 
medical school’s teaching hospital. Soon after attending such cases, the lecturers would organise 
students into small groups and initiate a discussion focusing on the socio-economic factors 
affecting the prevalence of septic abortion, associated risks, and the necessity to introduce birth 
control as a prophylactic measure.
33
  The Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at UI 
initiated a pilot project using midwives to train dukun bayis (Traditional Birth Attendants) in 
scientific birthing practices. Medical students assisted midwives during obstetrical emergencies. 
The clinical training of medical students at the UI thus afforded an opportunity for problem-
based experiential learning that sought to situate public health problems within their broader 
socio-economic contexts and develop pragmatic solutions.  
In accordance with the terms of the affiliation, a number of Indonesian students received 
advanced instruction at UCSF. In late 1967, John S. Wellington—Associate Dean of the UCSF 
medical school who had earlier worked in Jakarta during the 1950s as a UCSF adviser—
interviewed 36 Indonesians who had undergone one-year postgraduate training in pathology and 
clinical medicine. His aim was to gauge the relevance of the American model of medical 
education to Indonesia. Wellington’s interviews revealed that trainees were frequently 
disappointed on their return to Indonesia as they perceived a difference between American 
medical education and practice in Indonesia.
34
  They were unable to apply the basic principles 
learnt during their training, especially critical thinking, as they were not habituated to 
independent learning and consulting the library. The trainees were also faced with colleagues 
who were unreceptive to new initiatives such as the establishment of a new specialty.
35
   
The introduction of the American curriculum at UI since 1954-55 was criticised by 
Slamet Iman Santoso—President of UI from 1958-1965—in his autobiography Warna Warni 
Pengalaman Hidup (Colourful Life Experiences). According to Santoso, the execution of the 
 199 
 
American model at UI was such that when students failed a single course, they had to repeat the 
whole year.
36
 As a result, less than one-fifth of the class managed to reach the clinical level of 
study. In addition, the high standards of the American curriculum could not be sustained as most 
lectures were delivered by graduate assistants.  The number of graduates from the medical school 
had more than doubled with the introduction of the American curriculum in 1954-55, an 
initiative that saw the first batch of doctors graduate in 1959.The introduction of the American 
curriculum at the UI was unable to establish an equitable distribution of physicians between rural 
and urban areas of Indonesia. Even during the late 1960s, Indonesia had one of the lowest ratios 
of physicians to total population in the world, estimated at one doctor per 25,000 people, roughly 
translating into 4,000 doctors for a population of approximately 100 million, mostly concentrated 
in the country’s urban areas.37  
The transition from the Dutch to the American curriculum at UI was completed by 1955 
and involved the reorganisation of the preclinical and clinical levels of study. The duration of 
medical training was reduced from seven years under the Dutch model to six years under the 
newly-introduced American model.  Examinations under the new curriculum were cohort-based 
rather than individualised and intended to test students’ application of knowledge gained through 
lectures and classroom discussions. Due to the difficulties encountered by most students in 
appropriating textual knowledge gained in English into Bahasa Indonesia, small group 
discussions could not be sustained in preclinical classes and attrition rates were high. In contrast, 
at the clinical level, problem-based learning centred on careful bedside observation of patients. 
Group discussions proved successful due to a critical adaptation of public health into the 
American model by Raden Mochtar.  Under the new curriculum, the first batch of 157 students 
graduated in 1959 in contrast to 59 graduates a year earlier under the Dutch curriculum. 
However, because the majority of physicians remained concentrated in the urban areas of 
Indonesia, the implementation of the American curriculum in the medical faculty at UI was 
unsuccessful in achieving an acceptable doctor to population ratio.
38
 A critical orientation of the 
American model to the health conditions of Indonesia—accomplished at the clinical level of 
study—ensured that medical graduates were in a position to critically evaluate the impact of 
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public health programs initiated by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with the WHO. For 
these reasons, medical education at UI, patterned on the American model, has continued 
uninterrupted to the present.  
 
Medical Education in Surabaya 
 
The history of medical education in Surabaya began in 1913 with the establishment of the NIAS, 
the curriculum of which was similar to that of STOVIA and continued until the outbreak of the 
War in the Pacific in 1941. Medical education in Surabaya was suspended from 1942 until the 
Dutch military action (1948).  In 1948, the Dutch established the Faculteit der Geneeskunde 
(Faculty of Medicine), which was then affiliated to the Universiteit van Indonesië under the 
leadership of A.B. Droogleever Fortuyn, who was Professor of Genetics and Veterinary 
Science.
39
 Soon after the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic in December 1949, 
the medical faculty at Surabaya was transferred to the newly-established UNAIR and continued 
to employ the Dutch model of medical education until 1960.  
 However, the examination system under the Dutch model had its shortcomings as it did 
not foster verbal skills through classroom-based learning that would otherwise facilitate the 
preparation of the student for the annual examination. David F. Opdyke, Visiting Professor of 
Physiology at UNAIR during the academic years 1962 to 1964, reflected on the shortcomings of 
the Dutch model as follows: 
 No one can possibly master every fact and idea in medical science today. There must be a 
selection of facts and ideas that form the hard core of our working knowledge; at best, we 
can only show where other less essential details may be found. A student must be 
examined on this hard core of knowledge only, regardless of what type of examination is 
used. (It is easy to prove statistically that the oral examination works to the disadvantage 
of the student as the amount of material he is expected to know increases.) The greatest 
unfairness to the student is to give him an all-or- nothing oral examination when he is 
deficient in oral skill. He is showered with kindness and solicitude but is crucified by the 
system.
40
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The above quote illustrates that the Dutch model was too heavily dependent upon verbal skills. 
High school education in Surabaya did not promote problem-solving skills among students. 
Thus, incoming medical students lacked a conceptual understanding of physics, chemistry, 
biology and mathematics, essential for success in the premedical examinations. As result, 
approximately 60 to 70 per cent of students failed the premedical and preclinical examinations.
41
 
From 1952 to 1957, UNAIR graduated only 63 physicians from its medical school.
42
 
  The main factor contributing to the high attrition rates at all levels of medical study was the 
system of selection of medical students. Technically, any student who passed the Sekolah 
Mengenah Atas (SMA, equivalent to university preparatory school) examinations was eligible 
for entry into the UNAIR medical school. In 1954, 400 graduates from SMA gained admission 
into the medical faculty. In the academic year 1955, 600 students were enrolled.
43
 In 1954-55, 
due to space constraints, the UNAIR medical school was housed in the old NIAS building and 
was unable to accommodate the approximately 1800 students from the incoming group and 
repeaters from the previous years. In 1956, entrance examinations were conducted at the medical 
school, as a preliminary step towards selecting students based on their aptitude and reducing the 
high failure rate.  
    At the same time as the UI restructured its medical curriculum based on the American 
model, beginning in 1955, academics from the medical faculty at the newly-constituted UNAIR, 
particularly M. Soetojo (Professor of Surgery and Visiting Scholar at Johns Hopkins University 
in 1955) and Oey Hway Kiem (Lecturer of Physiology at UNAIR), proposed introducing the 
American medical curriculum. Their aim was to advance the development of problem-based 
learning so that students could apply principles learnt in the classroom to solve entrenched 
problems such as maternal mortality and malnutrition among infants. The American model at 
UNAIR was intended to design well-structured coursework at the premedical, preclinical and 
clinical levels of study with the objective of facilitating greater student participation in learning. 
Periodic tests would be conducted throughout the course in order to gauge the effectiveness of 
learning strategies and provide feedback on teaching. The entire class would sit a final written 
examination towards the end of the course. The assumption was that if the students spent more 
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time on preparation, they would perform better in lectures and classroom discussions. The 
adoption of the American model of medical education at UNAIR was a practical strategy 
intended to maximise the output of physicians. It was accomplished through affiliating UNAIR 
with UCSF, although political uncertainties in Indonesia during the period 1955 to 1960 delayed 
the remodelling of the undergraduate medical curriculum by five years.  
  The contract to affiliate the UNAIR medical school with the University of California 
medical school remained suspended until 1959 due to strained US-Indonesian relations following 
Soekarno’s move towards ‘guided democracy’ and the abrogation of Indonesian parliamentary 
institutions.
44
 As a result, the existing contract of the University of California with the UI 
medical school came under scrutiny in the US. Due to the volatile political situation, Soedjono 
Djoened Poesponegoro, Dean of Medicine at the UI, recommended that Dr Smyth cancel his 
visit to Jakarta in 1958, work out a phase-out program with the UI medical school, and sign a 
contract affiliating the UNAIR and the University of California medical schools.
45
 Despite the 
strained political relationship and UNAIR medical school Dean J.C. Kapitan’s unexpected 
demise in October 1959, the UNAIR medical faculty signed a six year contract (1960-1966) with 
the University of California to restructure the curriculum.  
  The introduction of the American curriculum at UNAIR was constrained by several 
financial and administrative bottlenecks, which were largely attributable to Indonesia’s high 
inflation rate, the depreciation of the rupiah in 1960, and the procedural difficulties encountered 
in securing counterpart funding from the University of California which was disbursed in 
rupiahs. By 1960, the University of California had disbursed 7.5 million rupiahs (equivalent to a 
little less than US$70,000) via the Indonesian Ministry of Education, a sum that was inadequate 
considering the prevailing inflation rate of approximately 100% and the eightfold depreciation in 
the international exchange value of the rupiah between 1952 and 1959.
46
 For example, the 
Microbiology Department had only basic amenities and was accommodated in the premises of 
the East Java Public Health Department until 1961. Then it was moved into the newly- 
constructed building at Karangmendjangan, which was originally intended to house chemistry.
47
  
Due to inadequate space, the Departments of Biology and Zoology were merged into the 
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Department of General Biology and moved into the space designated for the library. The 
academic heads within the medical school had little say in the annual budget that was proposed 
by the Dean of the UNAIR Medical Faculty and sent to the Ministry of Education, Jakarta, for 
approval. The centralisation of the administrative apparatus at Jakarta proved a hindrance to the 
timely disbursement of funds requested by the various departments of the medical faculty. For 
these reasons, the American model was introduced piecemeal into the UNAIR medical school 
between 1959 and 1964.  
  For the first year of the affiliation (1959) the UNAIR medical school curriculum was 
divided into one year courses dedicated to premedical sciences such as physics, chemistry, and 
biology: eighteen months were allocated to basic medical sciences particularly anatomy, 
physiology and biochemistry; one year to preclinical sciences, e.g., pathology, microbiology, 
pharmacy and internal medicine; and, two years to clinical studies, including internship.
48
 Under 
the American model at UNAIR, students would be awarded their medical degrees after six years 
of study. The new curriculum was first implemented in 1959 in accordance with the clerkship 
system whereby sixth year students were assigned to work in general hospitals.
49
 The 
introduction of the American model in the sixth year, prior to the reconstruction of the 
premedical and preclinical levels of study, was somewhat premature as the sixth year students, 
who had been schooled according to the Dutch curriculum, were not adequately prepared for the 
clerkships. Soon after the implementation of the curriculum in the sixth year, the premedical 
curriculum was revised to include instruction in physics, chemistry, biology, English, Pantjasila 
ideology and religion. The premedical education in the revised curriculum constituted the 
weakest link in the student’s learning as sufficient time could not be devoted to the study of 
premedical sciences particularly physics, chemistry, and biology, due to religion and Pantjasila 
ideology being incorporated into the curriculum.  By 1964, the transition from the Dutch to the 
American curriculum was fully implemented at UNAIR. It involved the shortening of the 
duration of the preclinical courses from eighteen months to twelve months, the addition of public 
health and psychiatry as well as instruction in anatomy, physiology and biochemistry.
50
 
However, due to the reduction of the course duration for preclinical subjects, the teaching of 
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physiology suffered. As a result, the students lacked the strong foundation required to undertake 
clinical studies. From 1962 to 1967, only one-sixth of the students managed to pass the 
preclinical examinations.
51
   
  The implementation of the American model at UNAIR was impeded by the passive 
resistance of medical students who opposed the enforcement of compulsory attendance at 
lectures.
52
 Opdyke had structured the third-year preclinical curriculum in physiology in 1962 and 
supervised the training of Indonesian faculty members. The physiology students’ were assessed 
according to their performance in periodic tests which were graded objectively.
53
 Opdyke 
discovered that the grades obtained by the physiology class at UNAIR were ten percentage 
points below those of their American counterparts examined on identical issues.
54
 With the 
introduction of the American curriculum, textbooks supplemented classroom learning. But, 
because the physiology and other premedical and preclinical textbooks were published in 
English, a foreign language to the UNAIR students; they were unable to complete their reading 
assignments. They proved unable to weave facts into a coherent argument due to deficiencies in 
verbal reasoning that could be traced to the high school education in Indonesia, which largely 
emphasised rote learning and the accumulation of knowledge. Students at UNAIR thought that 
the basic information and ideas could be gained through the lectures. Opdyke faced considerable 
cultural resistance when attempting to inculcate reading habits in the students, to pose questions 
based on textbook material during lecture hours and to propagate the notion that timely 
completion of their medical education was essential.
55
 In order to stimulate students to think 
critically, lectures were delivered in Bahasa Indonesia and note-taking was forbidden during the 
lectures. But, the students violently objected to the latter proposal.
56
  
  In January 1965, the Student Senate of the Medical Faculty at Airlangga urged the 
Indonesian government to abrogate the affiliation of the UNAIR medical school with the 
University of California. The Student Senate also supported President Soekarno’s proposal to 
withdraw Indonesia from the UN.
57
 The activities of the UNAIR Student Senate strained the 
affiliation project, so much so that towards mid-1965, the USAID (United States Agency for 
International Development) office in Jakarta instructed the University of California to withdraw 
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its academic staff from Indonesia.
58
 In 1966, the affiliation of UNAIR medical school with the 
University of California officially ended, although the American curriculum continued to be 
utilised until 1969.  
    Twelve physicians graduated every year from the UNAIR medical school prior to 1959; 
but, with the complete restructuring of the curriculum based on the American model, by 1964 the 
medical school managed to graduate 188 physicians each year (from 1964 until 1967).
59
  Nearly 
all of the graduates from the UNAIR medical school elected to set up private practice in the 
country’s urban centres where remuneration was considerably higher than in the rural areas. As a 
result, the acute shortage of physicians in the rural areas of Indonesia persisted even with the 
rising number of students graduating from the UNAIR medical school. Thus, health conditions in 
the countryside remained poor.  
  The American model was unsuited to Indonesian conditions. Most US medical schools 
required a four year undergraduate degree before entering medical school, but during that degree 
they mastered physics, chemistry, mathematics, and many liberal arts subjects. In contrast, 
incoming medical students at UNAIR were admitted soon after they graduated from high school. 
As a result, they lacked the verbal skills critical to success in the medical school. The American 
curriculum intended to foster problem-based learning through intensive student participation in 
coursework and written examinations. UNAIR students, however, were not only unaccustomed 
to initiating discussions in the classroom but also lacked an adequate command of English. Even 
with the introduction of periodic tests, structured readings and academic discussions in the 
classroom, medical students continued to view study only as a means of passing examinations.  
Ultimately, the American curriculum was considered unsuited to the prevailing academic climate 
at the UNAIR medical school. In 1969, it was abrogated in favour of the older Dutch model.  
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Establishment and Transformation of Medical Education at UGM: Dutch to American 
Curriculum, 1950-1965 
 
From the time of its recognition as a university by the Indonesian Ministry of Education in 1950 
up until 1965, the UGM medical school followed the Dutch curriculum. Lectures were 
unstructured and students could elect when to appear for the annual examinations. As a result, 
not more than ten students from the medical school, in any given year during the 1950s, ever 
managed to graduate. As a remedial measure, M. Sardjito (President of the UGM from 1950 until 
1961) approached international agencies, for example the WHO in 1952, to recruit short-term 
visiting faculty members who would structure the preclinical and clinical courses. The 
recruitment of short-term visiting faculty staff was little more than a band-aid measure as the 
UGM medical school was unable to recruit new academics once the original short-term contracts 
expired. As a result, the medical school was unable to ensure continuity of teaching. At the 
preclinical and clinical levels, attrition rates continued to remain particularly high. In order to 
maximise the graduation of physicians, the Faculty of Medicine introduced the American 
curriculum during the academic year 1965 with assistance from the WHO. But a complete 
transformation of the medical curriculum based on the American model could not be 
accomplished in 1965 due to a shortage of teaching staff and the reenrolment of a large number 
of students who had failed the examinations under the Dutch model. With the introduction of the 
American curriculum, the number of physicians graduating annually from the medical school 
showed a moderate increase.  
The UGM became a public university in 1950. In his annual address to the University, 
Sardjito reported that the UGM was undergoing a process of bangunan or construction of 
university buildings, laboratories, libraries, and university hospitals. In other words, a microcosm 
of nation-building was in progress in the newly-independent Indonesia.
60
 The enrolments in all 
faculties including medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, agriculture, veterinary science, engineering, 
education, law and philosophy had grown by almost 500 per cent over a three year period from 
nearly 500 students in late 1949 to over 2500 students by 1953. As a result, the existing 
laboratories and classrooms were unable to cope with the increase in student numbers.
61
  For 
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example, the premedical batch for the Faculties of Medicine, Dentistry and Pharmacy for the 
academic year 1952-53 totalled approximately 600. Students had to share classroom space with 
students in veterinary science and agriculture because these two faculties shared a common first 
year curriculum including biology, chemistry, and physics. Also, due to the resultant 
overcrowding, the laboratories faced shortages of experimental equipment. 
 Between 1952 and 1953, the UGM was a significant recipient of international assistance 
in the form of grants-in-aid administered through philanthropic foundations such as the China 
Medical Board, and the British Council, and visiting fellowships awarded by UN agencies such 
as the WHO, FAO and UNESCO. In the same year, Harold Loucks of the China Medical Board 
donated 10,000 US dollars for the purchase of essential textbooks for the medical library. During 
the academic year 1952-53, Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro (Professor of Paediatrics at UI) 
delivered weekly lectures on paediatrics at the UGM medical school.  K. Hill, WHO Visiting 
Professor from Jamaica for 1952-53, not only delivered public lectures on the prevalence of 
yaws in Indonesia, but also supervised the construction of the university hospital in 1953.
62
  
During the 1953-54 academic year, T.N. Seth from India, a Visiting Professor on a WHO 
fellowship, delivered lectures on biochemistry.
63
   
Franz Parabo, a Professor of Paediatrics who visited UGM during the academic year 
1954-55, helped to reorganise its paediatrics department by establishing close coordination with 
the maternal and child health consultancy bureaus in Yogyakarta.
64
 Parabo noted that during the 
academic year 1954 to 1955, UGM lacked a fulltime undergraduate teacher of paediatrics. 
Although the Chair of Paediatrics at UGM was offered to paediatricians working under 
Poesponegoro at the UI, they were unwilling to accept the offer as Yogyakarta did not offer 
opportunities for private paediatric practice.
65
 During his stay at UGM (1954-55), Parabo 
instituted the clinical teaching of paediatrics and forged collaboration with Bethesda Hospital 
(which was run by missionaries) so that patients could be taken regularly for clinical 
demonstrations.
66
 The WHO sponsorship of visiting professors contributed to the development of 
academic specialties within UGM such as paediatrics, for example. Academics were able to 
establish a good rapport with students, especially at the clinical level of study. But, because the 
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visiting fellowships were offered on a short term basis, students lacked continuity of instruction 
especially at the preclinical and the clinical levels. Instructors would depart for their countries of 
origin as soon as their contracts were completed.  
From the 1950s until 1965, UGM was unable to develop either research capacity of its 
own, or prepare existing medical students for future academic or medical careers given the 
constraints of the Dutch curriculum. As a result, less than two per cent of incoming classes ever 
managed to graduate from the medical school at UGM. For example, during the academic year 
1952-53, of the approximately 150 students who registered for the propaedeuse (premedical) 
examination, only 73 passed whereas of the 24 students registered for the clinical examination, 
approximately two-thirds were successful.
67
  Regarding the physician examination during the 
same year, two students appeared for the examination and only one successfully managed to 
graduate with a medical degree.
68
 For the academic year 1953-54, 299 candidates registered for 
the premedical examination (including those who had failed the examination in the first attempt). 
Less than a third managed to clear the premedical year whereas at the clinical stage nine students 
attempted the examination and seven passed but only two candidates managed to clear the final 
examination.
69
  In 1957-58, a record number of 761 students appeared for the premedical 
examination with an attrition rate of nearly 80 per cent. Not one passed the clinical examination 
and only seven graduated with the medical degrees.
70
 Scrutiny of the annual results of the UGM 
medical school for the 1950s reveals that the number of graduates produced by the UGM 
medical school failed to meet Indonesia’s growing demand for physicians. Newly- graduated 
physicians mostly chose to work as general practitioners in the urban areas of Indonesia rather 
than become teachers in medical schools. This left very little scope for training a future cadre of 
Indonesian doctors.  
The American curriculum was introduced for the first time at the UGM medical school 
during the academic year 1965-66.  The revised syllabus was initially implemented at the 
preclinical level, which had a regrettable history of high attrition rates. The major constraints to 
the transformation from the Dutch to the American model included: (i) the nature of the new 
syllabus, which was based on the integration of classroom lectures with practical experience; 
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and, (ii) the reenrolment of 237 students who had failed the premedical and preclinical 
examinations under the Dutch curriculum, resulting in the overcrowding of classrooms and 
laboratories.
71
 During this period, the Dutch model continued at the clinical level.
72
  With the 
transition of the curriculum from the Dutch to the American model, the total number of 
physicians graduating from the UGM medical school registered a moderate increase from 101 in 
1964 to 127 by 1966-67. But, the attrition rates in the first semester of premedical study 
remained high.
73
   
From 1964 to 1967, the WHO sponsored A.M. Trzebski, a Visiting Professor of 
Physiology, to improve the preclinical training of medical students in physiology, their post-
graduate education in physiology, and to foster collaboration with the teaching staff of the 
various departments, especially the Department of Biophysics. The aim was to encourage the 
development of an interdisciplinary approach to physiology.
74
  The WHO assistance to the 
Physiology Department was intended to bridge the gap between the premedical and clinical 
subjects, and to orient medical students to the changing physical and social environment that 
affected bodily functions. The revised syllabus implemented by Trzebski reformed the 
administration of the physiology examination at the preclinical level, sharply reducing the 
overall attrition rate.
75
 Multiple choice tests were introduced in the six-monthly and final 
examinations to objectively assess students’ basic knowledge of physiology and to eliminate any 
linguistic difficulties. At the postgraduate level, Trezebski oriented the students towards research 
methodology in physiology by teaching topics such as instrumentation, error, accuracy of 
measurements and sampling. Students were also expected to deliver presentations showcasing 
the progress achieved in selected branches of physiology such as the general concepts of 
regulation, cardiovascular and respiratory physiology, and neurophysiology.
76
 The WHO 
supplied physiology journals to the UGM library from 1964-68 to acquaint staff members, post-
graduate students and assistants with the latest developments within the discipline. Trezebski’s 
visit to UGM was successful. The five senior post-graduate assistants who obtained certificates 
of specialisation in physiology were hired as lecturers in the physiology department.
77
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 From 1950-1965, the UGM adopted the Dutch curriculum; but only approximately two 
per cent of the enrolled medical students managed to graduate. During the 1950s, the UGM was 
the recipient of technical assistance, particularly from the WHO. Visiting faculty staffs 
sponsored by the WHO were instrumental in giving the existing medical curriculum a definitive 
shape. But, despite delivering periodic lectures and conducting clinical demonstrations, student 
participation remained minimal. In addition, the appointment of visiting faculty staff was a 
stopgap measure designed to address the shortage of teaching staff in the medical faculty at the 
UGM and the continuity of instruction at the premedical, preclinical and clinical levels suffered 
once the short-term contracts of the visiting academic was finished. Graduates from UI were 
unwilling to teach at UGM as the monthly salaries were lower than those that could be obtained 
in private practice. In order to improve the graduation rate of the medical school, UGM 
introduced the American model in 1965. Unlike the UI and UNAIR, UGM was not affiliated to 
the University of California: it had implemented the American model with assistance of the 
WHO. During the transition from the Dutch to the American model, the UGM was unable to 
cope with (a) the reenrolment of students who had failed under the Dutch curriculum; and, (b) 
the shortage of teaching staff. As a result, the complete transformation of the medical curriculum 
based on the American curriculum could not be accomplished.  
 
Medical Education and the WHO Initiative: The Medan Medical School 
 
In 1952, a medical school was established in Medan with financial assistance from Jajasan 
Sumatera Utara, a foundation spearheaded by the Governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim to 
fulfil the educational aspirations of the people of that province. In 1957, the Faculties of Law, 
Education, and Agriculture merged to constitute Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU). Surgeon 
Tengkoe Mansoer (1897-1953)—who graduated from STOVIA in 1920—and Governor Abdul 
Hakim were the founding fathers of USU medical school. The school, which followed the Dutch 
curriculum, suffered from a shortage of teaching staff, particularly at the premedical and 
preclinical levels of study. To remedy this situation, the Indonesian government approached the 
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WHO for technical assistance; that is, for the recruitment of short-term WHO Visiting Professors 
from 1956 to 1960 who would develop Indonesian teaching capacity. Although the Visiting 
Professors were successful in structuring the medical curriculum, particularly at the preclinical 
level, they were unable to train Indonesian academics who would take over teaching 
responsibilities once they left. The political differences between Jakarta and the Outer Islands, 
particularly Sumatra, affected the smooth administration of the Medan medical school. For these 
reasons, the school failed to graduate physicians until 1960.  
 Medical study at Medan was patterned according to the Dutch model. The duration of 
study was seven years with the first year devoted to premedical subjects; specifically, physics, 
botany, zoology and chemistry. During the second and third (preclinical) years, students were 
instructed in anatomy, physiology, biochemistry and general pathology.
78
 The preclinical years 
were followed by two years of theoretical instruction in clinical subjects followed by annual 
examinations.
79
  The sixth and seventh years were devoted to the practical training of medical 
students in clinical subjects. At the end of the seventh year, the student sat a final examination, 
hopefully culminating in graduation. Examinations were administered orally and students could 
choose when they wanted to appear.  
 From the time of its establishment, the Medan medical faculty suffered from an acute 
shortage of teaching staff, particularly at the premedical and preclinical levels of study. The 
professors teaching the premedical courses were Dutch nationals. Prior to 1956, the preclinical 
courses in anatomy, histology and physiology were delivered by a Professor of Internal 
Medicine, an Indonesian national who was assisted by a lecturer without any specialist training.
80
 
Teaching in the medical school was largely conducted in Bahasa Indonesia except for the 
premedical lectures which were delivered in English.  Lecturers at the Medan medical school 
supplemented their meagre salaries by working private practice; for this reason they were unable 
to devote full attention to their teaching responsibilities. The Medan medical school did not 
follow a policy of screening prospective students. Technically, any student who had graduated 
from SMA was eligible for admission.  The school gained notoriety for accepting ‘failed’ 
medical students from Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta.
81
 Due to a combination of inadequate 
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instruction, lack of essential textbooks and the weak scientific background of most of the 
incoming students, less than one-sixth of the students managed to pass the premedical 
examination.
82
 The Medical Faculty followed a policy of promoting several preclinical students, 
who obtained ‘marginal marks’ to the clinical level of study.83 With their weak conceptual 
foundation in preclinical subjects, students were unable to cope with the rigours of clinical study.  
In order to upgrade the quality of preclinical teaching, the Indonesian government enlisted the 
technical assistance of the WHO for a four year period from 1956 to 1960.
84
 The WHO recruited 
short-term Visiting Professors of Physiology (Paul Kruhffer, 1956 to 1958) and Anatomy (E. 
Landboe Christensen, 1956 to 1960) to structure the preclinical courses. At the time of his 
recruitment as WHO Visiting Professor of Anatomy at the Medan medical school, Christensen 
was Head of the Institute of Medical Anatomy at the University of Copenhagen.  
From 1952-1957, effective teaching of physiology was constrained by a shortage of 
classrooms. Consequently, preclinical lectures in physiology for second and third year students 
were conducted jointly, with the first eight months of the academic year dedicated to the teaching 
of third year students.
85
 The teaching of the basic principles of physiology, intended for the 
second year, was, therefore neglected. Because the Medan medical school library was under-
resourced in terms of textbooks for preclinical subjects, students were dependent upon their 
lecture notes. Kruhffer sought to structure the physiology examination to include problem 
solving skills. But the execution of his plan was constrained by particular aspects of the Dutch 
model. For example, students were given the freedom to withhold the results of the examination 
even after registering for the preclinical courses. Some may not have even taken part in the 
examination. In the academic year 1956, 110 students registered for the preclinical examinations; 
fewer than 10% of candidates were successful.
86
  Kruhffer accordingly restructured the 
physiology examination to incorporate written examinations which tested the student’s 
understanding of basic physiological processes and a final oral examination. Attendance at 
lectures improved. By 1958, 60% of the candidates (who had registered for the preclinical 
examinations) were successful.
87
 Despite an improved pass percentage at the preclinical level in 
the physiology course, achieved through the improvisation of teaching and the restructuring of 
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the examination, problems persisted. Infrastructural bottlenecks, most notably shortages of 
apparatus and textbooks and the absence of regulation limiting the timeframe of medical study 
inhibited effective classroom learning.
88
   
  The Anatomy Department at the Medan medical school was severely under-resourced 
evident in the fact that it was housed in an old Dutch school and shared rooms with premedical 
courses.
89
 In 1959, the USU financed the construction of an anatomy complex. But, the 
construction could not be completed as the Dutch architect who had designed the building 
departed for the Netherlands. The administration of the Medan medical school developed 
differences with the Public Works Department at Jakarta that delayed the completion of the 
building.
90
 The departments of anatomy and histology were subsequently shifted to the office of 
the governor of North Sumatra province.
91
 However, rooms allocated to the departments of 
anatomy and histology for conducting lectures within the Governor of North Sumatra’s office 
were not always accessible as they shared space with premedical classes. The Department of 
Anatomy did not have sufficient equipment for conducting dissections.  Lecturers often used 
anatomical papier mâché models in demonstrations and lectures, a temporary measure unsuited 
to a preclinical class. And, preclinical students often had to borrow microscopes from the biology 
department. 
 Christensen oriented the anatomy lectures with a view to generating critical thinking, 
group discussions and experimentation; but, his plan proved overambitious as there was a 
shortage of specimens available for dissection. To compensate for the shortage, student assistants 
would demonstrate dissections, and then distribute topographical anatomical instructions among 
small groups of students. However using student assistants for demonstrations in the preclinical 
class was not sustainable given that the majority had failed the clinical examinations and were 
therefore unable to find adequate time to participate in the demonstrations. Prior to 1957, 
preclinical examinations in anatomy and histology were administered jointly as oral 
examinations. In conformity with Christensen’s initiative, the anatomy and histology 
examinations were reorganised as written and practical examinations and added to the oral 
examinations.
92
 He was also instrumental in setting up the histological laboratory that specialised 
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in making micro slides and the histological staining methods used in general histology. Under his 
supervision, a photographic laboratory was established that specialized in making lantern slides 
for teaching purposes.   
 After Christensen’s departure in 1960, the department of anatomy was staffed by a single 
staff member, a UI graduate who had only one year of experience in anatomy as a preclinical 
student and post graduate training at the University of California. But, he had no training in 
histology whatsoever.
93
 In 1961, for the first time in its history, the Medan medical school 
graduated six physicians.
94
 One of them, S. Djamaluddin, was sent to the US for postgraduate 
training in psychiatry in 1963 funded by USAID. Upon his return, he was appointed as the Dean 
of the USU Medical School.
95
 During his tenure from 1965-67, the medical faculty introduced 
postgraduate courses. Far from being alleviated by two isolated cases of Indonesian doctors who 
returned to Medan after undergoing postgraduate training in US universities, the chronic 
shortage of academic staff remained a serious concern into the late-1960s.  
 Given that the WHO program of technical assistance to the preclinical departments of the 
Medan medical school was administered within the framework of the Dutch curriculum, 
enforcing the compulsory attendance of students during lectures could not be achieved even after 
restructuring the coursework and the examination pattern. Attrition rates continued to remain 
high at the preclinical and clinical levels. The visiting academics sponsored by the WHO were 
unable to train advanced-level medical students to undertake full-time teaching responsibilities 
as they had failed the clinical courses. Political differences between Jakarta and the Outer Islands 
delayed the timely disbursements of grant-in-aid from the central government.  The WHO 
program of technical assistance for the Medan medical faculty proved unsustainable. With the 
expiry of the short-term contracts of the WHO faculty staff, there were instances of preclinical 
departments that were staffed by a single academic.  
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Initiating Medical Education in Makassar 
 
Medical education in Sulawesi began in 1956 with the inauguration of the Makassar medical 
school that came under the jurisdiction of Universitas Hasanuddin. Soegiono Djoened 
Poesponegoro, the older brother of Djoened Soedjono Poesponegoro, was the first dean of the 
medical faculty. The Makassar medical school adopted the Dutch model until 1958. Aspiring 
students were selected based upon the marks they had obtained in the SMA examination.  But, 
the medical school was unable to cope with the increasing enrolment of students at the 
premedical level. Incoming students, who were fully funded by the Indonesian government, were 
free to take the premedical examination whenever they were ready. The attrition rates at the 
premedical level were high (although reliable statistical figures were not available) due to a 
shortage of essential textbooks and the departure of reputed Dutch professors during the 
academic year 1958.  Among those who left was J.A.W. Groenewegen, who had taught biology 
at the premedical level.
96
 As a result, the Makassar medical school was unable to sustain the high 
academic standards required of the Dutch curriculum. It was unable to graduate the required 
number of physicians annually who would serve in the rural areas of Sulawesi.  The school was 
not in a position to hire overseas academics on a contractual basis to staff its premedical and 
preclinical departments due to financial constraints.  
In 1958, the Makassar medical faculty signed an agreement to affiliate the medical school 
with the UI. The UI medical school would serve as a feeder faculty, viz. provide dosen terbang 
(flying lecturers, particularly Sarwono Prawirohardjo and Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro) to 
deliver lectures in premedical and preclinical subjects on a short term basis.
97
  In the same year, 
the Makassar medical school introduced the American model at all levels of medical study and 
instituted entrance examinations. But, the introduction of the dosen terbang scheme could not be 
implemented smoothly as UI professors from Jakarta often had to cancel their flights to 
Makassar due to flight delays and other commitments, forcing the rescheduling of premedical 
and preclinical classes. The provincial pride of Makassar prevented Universitas Hasanuddin from 
hiring lecturers who had graduated from UI on a permanent basis.
98
 The introduction of the 
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American model registered some success by 1960 when 50 students cleared the clinical 
examinations and obtained doctorandi status. Their achievement was all the more noteworthy 
considering the difficulties they had to contend with, e.g., irregular premedical, preclinical, and 
clinical lecture schedules and lack of adequate library facilities.
99
 By the early 1960s, the medical 
school at Makassar had developed specialties in ophthalmology and paediatrics, evidenced from 
the academic journal Madjalah Universitas Hasanuddin.  The staff of the department of 
ophthalmology, including Soenarso and Oemar Fauzy under the leadership of S.J. Warouw, 
published articles on the prevalence of glaucoma in Makassar and on trachoma in central 
Maluku. They explored the social factors affecting the prevalence of eye diseases and the 
importance of preventative measures.
100
 
 The UI and the UNAIR medical schools, restructured their curricula, which were based 
on the American model through affiliation with UCSF (or Medan, which had received technical 
assistance from the WHO in the form of recruitment of short-term overseas academics who 
would develop teaching capacity in the preclinical fields). Unlike the above two schools, the 
Makassar medical school lacked finances required to facilitate the recruitment of foreign faculty 
staff on a contractual basis. As a cost-effective alternative, the faculty affiliated itself with the 
UI, which provided visiting lecturers (most notably Sarwono Prawirohardjo and Soedjono 
Djoened Poesponegoro), and restructured its curriculum based on the American model. 
However, the political differentiation between Jakarta and the Outer Islands, particularly 
Sulawesi, prevented the full-time hiring of academics from UI.  But, family ties with Jakarta, in 
particular Dean Soegiono’s relationship with Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro (the Dean of the 
UI medical school) allowed partial ironing out of the political differences between Sulawesi and 
Jakarta and expedited the introduction of the American curriculum at the Makassar medical 
school. As a consequence of the transformation of its medical education, the Makassar medical 
school managed to lower its attrition rates at the preclinical level.  
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The Establishment of the Bukittinggi Medical School: The Failure of International 
Technical Assistance 
 
Subsequent to the establishment of the medical school in Bukittinggi (West Sumatra) in 1955, 
the Indonesian government approached Australia seeking technical expertise to assist in the 
development of various departments under the Colombo Plan. Australia’s interest in the 
Bukittinggi project was shaped by its desire to stem the rising communist influence that had 
threatened Indonesian politics during the mid-1950s. In order to expedite the Bukittinggi project, 
the Australian government approached the University of Melbourne with a proposal to recruit 
academics on a short-term contractual basis who would assist with the development of various 
departments that would constitute the medical faculty. The political differences between Java 
and Sumatra that persisted in 1957 were in part attributable to the anti-communist uprising in 
West Sumatra. Supported by the Masjumi, the uprising challenged Soekarno’s proclamation of 
Guided Democracy and alliance with the Communists.  The central government’s suspected that 
Australia was circumventing the authority of Jakarta by establishing a medical school in 
Bukittinggi (and also supporting the rebels). A combination of these suspicions resulted in the   
abrogation of the Australian proposal to assist the Bukittinggi medical school by 1958. The 
failure of the Bukittinggi project was symptomatic of the political differences that persisted 
between Java and the Outer Islands.  
The Bukittinggi medical school, which was established in 1955 with assistance from the 
local Minangkabau community of West Sumatra, was subsequently incorporated into the newly-
constituted University of Andalas. The 58 students who had enrolled during the academic year 
1955-56 had commenced premedical work in physics, chemistry, and biology.
101
 But, newly-
enrolled premedical students lacked practical training. Lectures in physics, chemistry and botany 
were provided by visiting lecturers, and at the preclinical level, instruction in anatomy was 
provided by visiting professors from the newly-established Faculty of Agriculture at 
Payakumbuh and a local physician.
102
   
In 1956, the Indonesian government approached the Australian government with a 
request for technical assistance to assist in the development of the Bukittinggi medical school 
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under the Colombo Plan.  Since 1951, the latter had offered technical and material assistance to 
the countries of Southeast Asia such as funding infrastructural projects including dams, power 
plants and the mechanisation of agriculture. The Colombo Plan was financially supported by 
Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Its implicit intention was to coerce newly- 
independent South and Southeast Asian nations into an alliance with the Western bloc through 
developmental aid that would buttress Southeast Asia against communist infiltration.
103
  On 
behalf of Australian government, which was desirous of proceeding with a plan of limited 
assistance for the Bukittinggi project, the Department of External Affairs approached Sydney 
Sunderland, Professor of Anatomy at the University of Melbourne (1940-1961) for assistance 
with the project. However, misgivings regarding the proposed project developed on both the 
Australian and Indonesian sides.
104
  
In 1956, Frank Fenner, who was then Professor of Microbiology at the Australian 
National University, together with Sunderland, represented the Australian Medical Mission 
which travelled to Indonesia in July 1956 to assess the immediate needs of the Bukittinggi 
medical school. When the Australian Department of External Affairs initially approached the 
Universities of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide for assistance on the Bukittinggi project, it 
concluded that only the University of Melbourne could respond to Indonesia’s request for 
assistance.
105
 The Department proposed that N.D. Crosby, who was then the outgoing Reader of 
Physiology at the University of Western Australia, should serve as the adviser to Bukittinggi 
medical school.
106
   
Within Indonesia, especially in West Sumatra, misunderstanding prevailed that the 
Australians were planning to ‘establish’ a medical school. The central government at Jakarta was 
sceptical of foreign intervention in Indonesian affairs in the late 1950s that coincided with the 
West Sumatran Rebellion.
107
 The rebellion had the support of the moderate Islamic Masjumi 
party, which voiced the grievances of the Outer Islands, particularly of Sumatra against 
Soekarno’s over centralisation, bureaucracy, neglect of the area and overt tolerance of the 
communists.
108
  In 1957, army-led councils forced the civilian government of West Sumatra to 
abdicate. Jakarta was unable to assert its control over West Sumatra and entered into negotiation 
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with the military rebels, who stressed that they did not intend to undermine the unity of 
Indonesia. They insisted that former Vice President Hatta return to the post of Prime Minister. 
President Soekarno, however, was opposed to brokering a solution with the rebels as he had 
personally introduced the notion of Guided Democracy in 1957 which undermined the 
functioning of political parties. In December 1957, top Masjumi leaders including former Prime 
Ministers Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (the then governor of the 
reserve bank) fled to West Sumatra. The rebels declared Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as Prime 
Minister at Padang in February 1958.
109
  Foreign support to the Revolutionary Government 
(Padang) continued albeit in covert forms, especially from the US.  
 The University of Melbourne stressed that its medical faculty was involved in setting up 
new medical faculties at both Monash University; and the University of New South Wales; thus 
there was already competition for recruiting staff from the Melbourne medical school.
110
 Thus, 
the University of Melbourne had to postpone recruitment of its medical staff for the Bukittinggi 
medical school by at least one year; but, it expressed its willingness to train Indonesian 
technicians and demonstrators for the project locally in Australia, instead, under the Colombo 
Plan.
111
  Fenner maintained that medical education in Australia was designed to train local 
physicians: it was not suited to training doctors in ‘tropical countries remote from the laboratory 
and other settings of a big city.’112  He expressed the reservation that Indonesian undergraduate 
medical students trained overseas in nations such as Australia would be uprooted from the 
context of their social structure and may return to Indonesia quite unsuited for work in the 
country’s rural areas. Under such circumstances, discontented undergraduate medical students 
could develop antisocial behaviour.
113
   
In July 1956, Fenner organised a meeting with the ICA staff and the University of 
California medical faculty in Jakarta. His purpose was to obtain first-hand assessment of how the 
affiliation scheme of the UI with the University of California was implemented between 1954 
and 1956 and whether the affiliation scheme had any lessons to offer the proposed assistance of 
the Melbourne medical school to the Bukittinggi project.
114
 The meeting revealed that the ICA 
had spent close to 700,000 US dollars during the period from 1954-56 on providing technical 
 220 
 
assistance to UI and despatched undergraduate medical students to the US for further preclinical 
training.
115
 Fenner’s conversation with Schultz revealed that the affiliation of UI with the 
University of California had failed due to Indonesia’s inability to provide accommodation for 
visiting professors and its lack of relevant apparatuses for premedical and preclinical 
practicals.
116
  Fenner was of the opinion that the UI dean was a mere figurehead:  that real 
control was in the hands of foreign experts.
117
 Unlike the medical school at UI which inherited 
the legacy of the Dutch medical model, the Bukittinggi medical school had to start from scratch 
and the Australians were expected to temporarily staff the entire university, establish a 
curriculum and train undergraduate students which were difficult for Australia, given the 
domestic commitments of the medical faculty at Melbourne. The ICA was willing to plug any 
holes in the Bukittinggi project and expressed its willingness to supply equipment such as 
microscopes needed for premedical biology classes as Australia was only able to meet little more 
than half the project costs.
118
 
By 1957, Australia had proposed delivering assistance to the medical faculty at 
Bukittinggi in the form of premedical textbooks (physics, chemistry, and biology) and preclinical 
textbooks in anatomy.
119
 Australian academics including Fenner advocated that a modified 
version of the American model be implemented for medical education at Bukittinggi, which 
would integrate lectures and practicals. The duration of study would be six years. Lectures in 
preclinical subjects, e.g. anatomy, biochemistry and physiology would be delivered by the 
visiting Australian professors over a four month period. They would be followed by 
examinations, a so-called block system of lecturing that would prevent academics long periods of 
absence from Melbourne University.
120
 The proposed curriculum for the first year (premedical 
year) would incorporate instruction in physics, chemistry, biology and English; during the 
preclinical year, students would be taught anatomy, physiology, biochemistry and pathology; the 
third year would consist of lectures in clinical pathology, parasitology, bacteriology, introduction 
to clinical subjects and public health; the fourth would be devoted exclusively to medical 
surgery; internal medicine would be introduced in the fifth year when students would be trained 
in the practical aspects of public health; during the final year, students would be expected to 
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work as interns prior to graduation. Fenner recommended that the intake of the first year class 
should be capped at fifty students, a move that was resented by the Indonesians.
121
 Due to the 
tense political relationship between Java and the Outer Islands, and the uncertainties of inter-
island shipping, the ICA and the Australian External Affairs Department intended to route the 
shipments of laboratory equipment to Bukittinggi via Singapore bypassing Jakarta, a move that 
was resented by the Indonesian central government.  
The materialisation of Australian technical assistance to the Bukittinggi medical school 
through the Colombo Plan in 1958 came into jeopardy, given the progress of the West Sumatran 
rebellion. In April 1958, Bahder Djohan, who was originally from West Sumatra and was the 
then President of the UI, resigned from his academic position in protest at the central 
government’s bombing of suspect rebel areas in Bukittinggi. It was rumoured locally in West 
Sumatra that Djohan would take over as President of Andalas University; but, this did not 
materialise.
122
 By June 1958, the Indonesian government had banned all diplomatic travel on the 
Outer Islands. The Ministry of Education at Jakarta recommended that aid for the Bukittinggi 
medical school under the Colombo Plan be diverted to another university.  
 
Conclusion 
The transformation of the existing medical curriculum at the faculties of medicine in Indonesia 
into one based upon the American model, along with the establishment of new medical schools, 
especially in the Outer Islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi, were two strategies employed to 
increase the number of graduating physicians. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the 
transformation of the medical curriculum failed to maximise the output of physicians. Several 
problems were encountered: for example, the new curriculum was implemented unevenly across 
the medical faculties at UI, UNAIR, and UGM. All medical schools had a shortage of teaching 
staff, insufficient infrastructure, and lacked administrative support from the Indonesian Ministry 
of Education. As entrance examinations were not fully implemented throughout Indonesia, 
students with weak mathematical backgrounds were often enrolled at the premedical and 
preclinical levels. Consequently, they were unable to cope with epidemiology, statistics and 
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demography which were introduced at the preclinical levels as a part of public health training. 
Medical education in the new medical schools in the Outer Islands, which was loosely patterned 
on the Dutch model, was developed with technical assistance from international agencies in the 
form of overseas visiting academics. The latter would develop Indonesian teaching capabilities at 
the preclinical level. But, there were insufficient physicians in Indonesia to staff these schools; 
and, because the prevailing Dutch model emphasized individual study over demonstrations and 
discussions, the medical undergraduates from the Outer Islands lacked practical experience, both 
of working in pilot health demonstration centres and of conducting vaccinations. The ongoing 
political differences between Java and the Outer Islands inhibited coordination between Jakarta 
and the medical faculties which, by extension, prevented the recruitment of graduates from UI to 
staff the preclinical faculties. For these reasons, the expansion of medical education on the Outer 
Islands continued to be constrained.  
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Medical Education at Universitas Indonesia: The Introduction of the American Curriculum  
 
 
 
 
Premedical practicum in biology, Universitas Indonesia.  
 
Source: Buku Tahunan, 1964-1965: Universitas Indonesia Fakultas Kedokteran (Djakarta: Fakultas Kedokteran 
Universitas Indonesia, 1965). 
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Premedical practicum in chemistry, Universitas Indonesia. 
 
Source: Buku Tahunan, 1964-1965: Universitas Indonesia Fakultas Kedokteran (Djakarta: Fakultas Kedokteran 
Universitas Indonesia, 1965). 
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Problem-based Experiential Learning: An extant characteristic of the American model of medical education at 
Universitas Indonesia (1965). 
 
Source: Buku Tahunan, 1964-1965: Universitas Indonesia Fakultas Kedokteran (Djakarta: Fakultas Kedokteran 
Universitas Indonesia, 1965). 
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Clinical Training in Ophthalmology, Universitas Indonesia (1965).  
 
Source: Buku Tahunan, 1964-1965: Universitas Indonesia Fakultas Kedokteran (Djakarta: Fakultas Kedokteran 
Universitas Indonesia, 1965). 
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CHAPTER SIX  
 
SCIENCE IN THE SOEKARNO ERA  
 
At the closing reception of the First Indonesian National Science Conference in Malang in 1958, 
President Soekarno connected the ideals of the Indonesian revolution to science for the very first 
time. He expressed confidence in the contribution that science could make to the realisation of a 
just and prosperous society. Scientific training promised to lead to the development of technical 
skills, which were a crucial element in achieving Indonesian economic independence and self-
sufficiency (berdiri di atas kaki sendiri). It could also help to make Indonesia self-sufficient with 
respect to food. In his address, Soekarno focused in particular on industrialisation and increasing 
the production of rice. Two years earlier, science in Indonesian had been institutionalised 
through the establishment of the Madjelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (MIPI, Indonesian 
Council of Scientific Research). The aims of this organisation were to further science in 
Indonesia and to assist the Indonesian government to develop policy associated with science and 
technology. In the aftermath of Soekarno’s speech, MIPI had a much broader mandate. 
 Eight years earlier, in 1951, the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (IDI; Indonesian Medical 
Association) was established, led by Sarwono Prawirohardjo, Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro 
and Poorwo Soedarmo. The IDI was instrumental in establishing minimum standards of medical 
practice in Indonesia and in developing local medical vocabulary by appropriating scientific 
terminology from Dutch, Latin and English in order to aid the Indonesianisation of medical 
research and practice. Paediatrics and nutrition received special attention during the Soekarno era 
as the ideal of promoting children’s health converged with Soekarno’s call for the Indonesian 
revolution as a period of investment for the future. Long before Soekarno’s speech, eager to 
contribute, Indonesian physicians had connected their work with the ideals of the Indonesian 
revolution. 
 Within the existing historiography appertaining to science, technology and society in 
post-World War II Indonesia, the role played by technology in the formation of the national 
identity and the institutional growth of Indonesian science have received much attention. The 
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contribution of physicians to the institutional growth of Indonesian science, although significant, 
receives scant attention compared to the career of biologists.
1
 The symbolic role played by 
medicine in furthering the Bandung spirit—in this context, the nation’s aspirations of ensuring 
self-sufficiency by eliminating dependence on the Cold War superpowers and strengthening its 
solidarity with newly-independent countries of Africa and Asia—remains overlooked.2  This 
chapter explores the specific ways in which Indonesian physicians presented medical problems 
as national problems, aligning their practice, teaching, and research rhetorically with Soekarno’s 
interpretation of science. 
 Indonesian Thinking on Science 
 
During the Soekarno era, applied and problem-oriented science, for example nutrition, which 
physicians symbolically related to the nationalist vision of achieving the country’s self-
sufficiency in economic affairs, shaped the course of Indonesian scientific thinking.  Soekarno 
advocated the development of science which, he maintained, would address the country’s 
entrenched problems such as food scarcity because of its significance in realising the nationalist 
ideal of achieving a just and prosperous society.
3
  Science was important to Soekarno because it 
would help realise pembangunan (nation-building).  If it were to accelerate the role of science in 
the service of the nation, Indonesia needed to invest in human skills (technical expertise) and to 
orient the minds of scientists and Indonesians alike towards possible solutions to existing 
problems such as food scarcity. Soekarno perceived a deeper challenge in orienting the minds of 
scientists and Indonesians alike towards both existing and emergent problems.  
 Amongst the most pressing of these priorities was food. The importation of rice had 
drained Indonesia of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign reserves. Soekarno claimed that the 
nation’s food shortage could be eliminated by employing three approaches: opening up new land 
for cultivation in the Outer Islands; maximising agricultural productivity through the use of 
fertilisers; and, changing the dietary habits of the people.
4
 He observed that the national diet had 
become predominantly rice-based since World War II and, as a consequence, Indonesians had 
become ‘rice minded.’5  The diet of average Indonesian citizens had become homogeneous as a 
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result and the populace had become prone to nutritional disorders. Soekarno recommended that 
Indonesians diversify their existing rice-based diet, stressing that technology alone could provide 
the solution to Indonesia’s food problem. The Soviet Union had offered the results of its rice 
research to Indonesia in the late 1950s; but, Soekarno was dissatisfied and stressed that research 
into high yielding varieties of rice should be undertaken in Indonesia itself:  
Yes, we have received an offer of a good variety of rice from the Soviet Union, but this is 
a gift from someone else. We will be happy if we can discover the new variety of rice 
ourselves. Multaluli, a well-known Dutch writer once said, that happiness is not only in 
cutting the rice, but lies in cutting the rice one has planted in one’s own ricefield. Yes, we 
have our own ricefield, our own State. Let us seriously devote ourselves to the 
community in our state through our own strength and genius.
6
 
 
This notion of science sought to cautiously strike a balance between increased openness to 
foreign technical assistance and the notion of berdiri di atas kaki sendiri (self-reliance in 
economic matters).  
As Mochtar Lubis pointed out in his novel Twilight in Djakarta, the main problem 
confronting Indonesia with respect to its relationship to the West was which external values the 
country should embrace.
7
 Within Indonesia there were tensions regarding whether the country 
should adapt to the modern technology of the West or whether technology should be selected to 
conform to Indonesian patterns of living. The local intelligentsia preferred the first approach, i.e., 
bringing about a psychological change in the people and making them more adaptable to modern 
technology.  For Pranoto, one of the characters in the novel, the acceptance of Western 
technology was a necessary prerequisite to ensuring Indonesia as a strong and independent 
nation.
8
  Most Indonesian intellectuals of the 1950s were very accepting of modern technology; 
but, for a small minority claimed that uncritical acceptance of Western values would not lead 
Indonesians anywhere. Instead, they advocated a blend of the spiritualism of Islam and modern 
technology.  
 During the 1950s, Indonesian physicians, in particular M. Sardjito, Sarwono 
Prawirohardjo and Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro, emerged as influential thinkers in science 
due to their nationalist antecedents.  During their student days at the medical school in Batavia in 
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the late 1920s, Prawirohardjo and Poesponegoro became actively involved in the activities of 
Jong Java, a nationalist youth organisation focused on fostering awareness of Java’s cultural 
heritage. Sardjito was active in Boedi Oetomo during the mid and late-1920s (a nationalist 
organisation founded at the medical school). Unlike Prawirohardjo and Sardjito, who developed 
the institutional foundations of Indonesian science, Poesponegoro rose to prominence in 
Indonesian politics as Minister of Research from 1962 to1966.  As Soekarno’s family 
paediatrician, Poesponegoro garnered support because he related paediatrics to the President’s 
conceptualisation of the Indonesian revolution as a period of investment in the human skills of 
the population.
9
 
 
M. Sardjito’s Contribution to Indonesian Science 
 
M. Sardjito, who was founder and President of UGM from 1950-1961, developed a nationalist 
interpretation of science through his association with Boedi Oetomo, a Java-based nationalist 
organisation founded at the STOVIA. In 1943, during the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian 
archipelago, he was active in Izi Hoko Kai (Association of Medical Doctors), an organisation 
which actively promoted research into cost-effective indigenous herbal remedies (djamu). 
Shortly after the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, he directed the Pasteur 
Institute at Bandung, became involved with the Indonesian Red Cross program of supplying 
vaccines from the newly-translocated Pasteur Institute based at Klaten, and established the Balai 
Perguruan Tinggi, the precursor to UGM and the first Indonesian-founded higher academy of its 
kind. For Sardjito, the initiation of laboratory-based research in post-independent Indonesia was 
symbolic of Indonesian achievement of self-sufficiency in science. He perceived science as a 
tool for achieving social improvement. Sardjito, the founding president of UGM, advocated a 
greater niche for Indonesian universities in solving national problems, particularly in the area of 
disease eradication. During the mid-1950s, he undertook research into serum used in the anti-
yaws campaign and discovered the potential of djamu for treating diabetes and kidney 
disorders.
10
  For these reasons, he was nominated to the MIPI in 1956.  
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   In 1958, MIPI convened the First National Science Congress in Malang to critically 
evaluate how Indonesian scientists applied science to solve the nation’s problems and address 
ethical dilemmas.
11
 In his address to this Congress, Sardjito speculated as to whether science had 
furthered the cause of human happiness.
12
 He observed that, subsequent to World War II, the 
threat of nuclear warfare emerged between the US and the USSR. Sardjito, lamenting that 
science had a potential to be misused, stated: ‘Thus at present [the 1950s], we [humankind] no 
longer control science, but science controls us.’13  He exhorted the world’s scientists to resolve 
the impending nuclear crisis. Although his speech did not directly relate to the contribution of 
medical sciences in addressing the nation’s problems, it illustrated the influence of the Bandung 
spirit on Indonesian science. The Bandung spirit in Indonesian science was reflected through a 
non-aligned Indonesian foreign policy that sought to minimise the country’s technological 
dependence on either the USSR or the US that involved a creative reorientation of Western 
technology to Indonesian conditions.  
 At the First National Science Congress, Soekarno was convinced by Sardjito’s argument 
that, in the midst of the advancements in nuclear science, the world’s scientists needed to 
evaluate to what degree science was directed towards the pursuit of human happiness.
14
  He saw 
the need to use science as a tool to further the aims of the Indonesian Revolution, i.e., the 
creation of a just and prosperous society. For the successful utilisation of science in the 
furtherance of the country’s revolutionary objectives, Soekarno argued that science needed to be 
built to address social problems.  
 
 Sarwono Prawirohardjo: The Institutionalisation of Indonesian Science  
 
Sarwono Prawirohardjo, who was Professor of Obstetrics at UI and founder of MIPI, was 
undoubtedly one of the most influential Indonesian thinkers in the area of science during the 
Soekarno era. Prawirohardjo graduated from the GH as Indonesia’s first obstetrician and 
gynaecologist. Founder of the Balai Perguruan Tinggi, he viewed science as a means to combat 
Indonesia’s national problems, particularly food scarcity. Prawirohardjo prioritised applied over 
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basic science. Adopting a cautious approach to foreign aid’s furthering the development of 
Indonesia’s scientific capabilities, Prawirohardjo sought to establish Indonesian pre-eminence in 
scientific research, particularly in the fields of botany, zoology and geology. His focus was upon 
imbuing Indonesians with a scientific mindset.  
A major constraint that impeded the growth of scientific temper during the Soekarno era 
was the traditional Indonesian obsession with titles. Education was traditionally seen in 
Indonesian society in terms of enhancing one’s social prestige rather than cultivating problem-
solving skills.
15
 Indonesia made remarkable strides in primary school enrolment during the early 
1950s, with over 630,000 pupils enrolled by 1955 in contrast to 2 million during the colonial 
period (1940).
16
 Technical education, to say the least, was devalued due to a traditional contempt 
for manual labour and could not relate to the needs of Indonesian society. In 1954, of the 14,622 
enrolled students at UI and UGM, 3,467 attended engineering courses. But, for the decade 1945-
1955, Indonesia managed to graduate only seven engineers, in contrast to approximately thirty 
physicians who graduated from the medical schools. In 1955, the Ministry of Education—as a 
populist measure to satisfy the nation’s thirst for degrees and titles declared that any student who 
appeared for the high school comprehensive examinations would pass by default in mathematics 
and physics.   
  In 1951, Prawirohardjo was chosen as the head of a nine-member committee appointed 
by the Minister of Education to investigate the founding of the MIPI. Sardjito was also included 
in this committee.
17
 In April 1956, MIPI was formally established in accordance with 
Presidential Decree No. 118.
18
 As a central body, (i) it would be dedicated to developing and 
coordinating all scientific endeavours undertaken within Indonesia; (ii) it would establish 
Indonesia’s reputation in science internationally; and, (iii) MIPI would be an autonomous 
institution intended to promote research in Indonesia without undue interference from the 
government.
19
 The MIPI saw advancements in science as a means to further national 
development. Prawirohardjo envisioned that it would complement Indonesian universities by 
making scientific research relevant to Indonesia’s needs.20 Eminent Indonesian professors, 
particularly Prawirohardjo, Poorwo Soedarmo and Sardjito, helped to coordinate research 
 238 
 
undertaken in the universities in accordance with the objectives of the MIPI. Unfortunately, the 
initiative was yet another bureaucratic elephant; it failed to succeed fully although its aims and 
ideals had been lofty. The major obstacle faced by the MIPI was financial.
21
  Research in 
Indonesia was inhibited by lack of financial support: i.e. the low salaries paid to academics and 
the stringent foreign exchange regulations that hampered the purchase of textbooks from 
overseas.  
 Prawirohardjo maintained that the main issue inhibiting the development of research in 
Indonesia was the shortage of scientific manpower.
22
 After the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch 
scientists, who had formed the backbone of scientific research during the colonial period, 
departed for the Netherlands. As a result, Indonesia experienced a great shortage of scientific 
personnel. The few established Indonesian physicians, notably Sardjito, Prawirohardjo and 
Poesponegoro, were faced with the challenge of developing Indonesia’s research capabilities. 
Prawirohardjo recommended that if the research gap between senior and junior scientists was to 
be bridged, Indonesia would need to introduce postgraduate training fellowships that would 
allow promising students to study abroad.
23
 By, Indonesia witnessed an extraordinary growth in 
higher education with the establishment of 55 new universities. In the late 1950s, due to the 
devaluation of the rupiah, the salaries of scientists were no longer competitive. By the early 
1960s, as most of the senior scientists of Indonesia were approaching retirement, research 
institutions recruited inexperienced graduates who were unable to train their younger colleagues 
in research.
24
  
 Apart from his involvement in the MIPI, Prawirohardjo was active in Indonesia’s family 
planning program. He established the Perhimpunan Keluarga Berentjana Indonesia (Indonesian 
Planned Parenthood Association or PKBI), which was aided by the US-based Brush Foundation. 
Its overall aim was to promote family welfare through the use of birth control as a means of 
limiting family size.
25
 He persuaded Soekarno that birth control was a preventative measure that 
could save mothers’ lives or prevent unplanned pregnancies.26 But, Soekarno was dismissive of 
Prawirohardjo’s ideas: he feared antagonising religious groups. Also, as president of Indonesia, 
he did not want to be seen accepting advice from international organisations.
27
 Although 
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Prawirohardjo’s differences with Soekarno did not impede the functioning of the MIPI, it cost 
him his political career. He was, for example, not considered for the newly-created ministerial 
portfolio for research created by Soekarno in 1962. 
 
The Influence of Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro on Indonesian Medical and Scientific Life 
 
Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro (Professor of Paediatrics at the UI) was undoubtedly 
the most influential Indonesian scientist during the Soekarno era, mainly because his notions 
regarding science converged with those of President Soekarno.  As Soekarno’s family 
paediatrician, he was able to relate paediatrics to Soekarno’s conceptualisation of the Indonesian 
Revolution as a period of investment in the human skills of the population. In other words, 
paediatrics was a good illustration of science in relation to nation-building.  
 Poesponegoro’s nationalist credentials were shaped by his experience at the medical 
school at the GH, Batavia, beginning in 1927. After graduating from the GH in 1934, he 
undertook postgraduate training in paediatrics at Leiden University and established himself as a 
paediatrician in Semarang between 1938 and 1945. Soon after the transfer of sovereignty, 
Poesponegoro realised that with the deteriorating Dutch-Indonesian relations and the exodus of 
Dutch scientists and academics to the Netherlands, Indonesia would suffer from a leadership 
vacuum in the spheres of medicine and other scientific establishments that would inhibit the 
training of the next generation of professionals.
28
 As a part of his commitment to develop 
Indonesia’s capabilities in medical research, he joined the newly-constituted Faculty of Medicine 
at UI as a lecturer of paediatric diseases in 1950. Due to his leadership capabilities, he was 
appointed as dean of the medical school at UI from 1952-1960.  His influential role as 
Soekarno’s family paediatrician, together with his leadership skills, saw him appointed Minister 
of Research in 1962.  
Poesponegoro’s idea of undergraduate medical education reflected Soekarno’s notion of 
pembangunan (nation-building). The latter saw pembangunan as a dynamic process involving 
social, political and economic change that created its own problems.
29
 Based on the assumption 
 240 
 
that pembangunan involved socio-economic change, Poesponegoro argued that such change 
could have repercussions on the overall health and well-being of the community.
30
 If 
undergraduate medical students were to gain a better understanding of the socio-economic 
factors determining the prevalence of disease in a given community, and of how to initiate 
preventative measures, it was essential that they gain training in the social and behavioural 
sciences, particularly in sociology, anthropology and psychology. To this end, Poesponegoro 
encouraged the stimulation of scientific curiosity among students through independent study and 
the identification of the dominant health issues affecting the community.  
Poesponegoro was influenced by Soekarno’s proposition that every citizen of Indonesia 
had a stake in the latest scientific developments.
31
  He acknowledged utility of the dictum 
‘science for society,’ advocating that liaisons be formed between medical education at 
Indonesian universities and the Ministry of Health for purposes of identification of public health 
problems. 
32
  
Poesponegoro saw the Indonesian revolution as reflecting the rising demands of the 
population in pursuit of a higher standard of living.
33
 Investment in paediatrics as a nation-
building endeavour was directed towards creating a strong and healthy future citizenry free of 
disease. In his inaugural address at the UI in 1953, Poesponegoro expressed hope (mudah 
mudahan) no less than four times that, with the advancement of paediatrics as an academic 
specialty in Indonesia’s medical schools, members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat would 
become sensitised towards the issue of children’s health. With women’s organisations 
volunteering to participate in children’s health issues, the Ministry of Health would no longer 
have to focus on addressing issues such as malnutrition or neonatal and infant mortality. 
Indonesia would become negara kuat dan sehat (a strong and healthy nation) if it could 
successfully deal with neonatal and infant mortality.
34
 Poesponegoro’s inaugural address 
represented the advancement of paediatrics as a nation-building endeavour.  
 The Department of Paediatrics at the UI, under the leadership of Poesponegoro, initiated 
interdisciplinary research into nutrition in conjunction with the Nutrition Institute (Lembaga 
Makanan Rakjat, an autonomous research institute established in 1950) in Jakarta which was 
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directed by Poorwo Soedarmo. The aim was to discover cost-effective substitutes for milk that 
would help to combat kwashiorkor (protein energy malnutrition) and xeropthalmia (vitamin A 
deficiency) in Indonesian infants. This collaboration, in effect, initiated and demonstrated a 
model of collaboration between Indonesian universities and research institutes. At the Nutrition 
Institute, Poorwo Soedarmo developed fish flour as a protein substitute for milk.
35
 Subsequently, 
the Department of Paediatrics at UI unsuccessfully conducted clinical trials using fish flour to 
treat kwashiorkor patients.
36
  Paediatricians at the UI, who attributed the prevalence of 
kwashiorkor and vitamin A deficiency to the colonial period, appealed to the medical profession 
saying that if Indonesians sought to create a strong and healthy citizenry free of nutritional 
deficiencies, they needed to intensify their efforts to increase the production of animal protein 
and foods rich in vitamin A.
37
  
 Poesponegoro’s initiatives in paediatrics converged with Soekarno’s understanding of the 
Indonesian Revolution after 1956, i.e., as a period of investment in the human skills of the 
population and a socio-economic revolution that intended to fulfil the basic needs of the 
Indonesian people. The overall vision was to create a just and prosperous society based on 
Pantjasila principles.
38
  At the Second Afro-Asian Congress of Paediatrics held in Jakarta in 
1964, he related paediatrics to Soekarno’s notion of pembangunan and the Indonesian 
Revolution. For Soekarno, pembangunan reflected multiple possibilities such as the eradication 
of illiteracy, increasing the production of food grains, and forging solidarity with Afro-Asian 
nations that shared a common legacy of resistance to colonialism. The Afro-Asian or Bandung 
Conference of 1955 advocated that the destinies of the newly-independent African and Asian 
nations would not be dictated by either the US or the USSR but by the leaders of Egypt, India 
and Indonesia. The Second Afro-Asian Congress of Paediatrics convened in Jakarta (1964) built 
upon the social solidarity forged between newly-decolonised nations of Africa and Asia at 
Bandung a decade earlier.  
 Delegates to the Second Afro-Asian Congress of Paediatrics unanimously resolved that 
determined effort towards eliminating the social and economic causes of ill health among 
children would achieve social welfare, raise the living standards of the people, and consolidate 
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the gains of national independence.
39
 The Congress claimed that malnutrition was not only a 
medical but also a social, agricultural and educational problem. It could be alleviated by the self-
help initiatives of the people themselves without international assistance. Poesponegoro held that 
paediatrics provided a powerful force for emancipating the people of Africa and Asia from the 
scourge of poverty. In his address delivered at the opening ceremony, Poesponegoro commented:  
In short, the reality of political independence and its consolidation with economic and 
social imperatives have unleashed in Indonesia, like in most countries of the African and 
Asian continents, the pent-up stream of scientific creativity for the benefit of all peoples. 
It is here that lies the significance of the Second Afro-Asian Pediatric Congress for which 
we are gathered here today. Although most of the Afro-Asian countries hold membership 
in the International Paediatric Association and do value the importance and the high 
quality of its thee-yearly sessions, the idea of holding an Afro-Asian Paediatrics Congress 
originated from the fact that International Pediatric Congress was not always concerned 
with child health related to Afro-Asian conditions.
40
 
 Although Indonesia’s leaders, particularly Soekarno and Poesponegoro, recognised the symbolic 
value of paediatrics for moulding future citizens free of disease and as an investment in human 
skills, by 1964 their ideas had become congruent with those of the leaders of Africa and Asia. 
Poesponegoro, demonstrating his capability as a statesman, consolidated the political gains of 
Soekarno at the Bandung Conference (1955) by relating paediatrics to Indonesia’s commitment 
to furthering human happiness through investment in child health.  
 Poesponegoro was appointed Minister of Research in 1962, a position he held until 1966. 
As Minister of Research, he was head of the Departemen Urusan Research Nasional 
(DURENAS or Department of National Research), which sought to coordinate research 
undertaken in Indonesian universities with the activities of the research institutes, particularly the 
Nutrition Institute (Jakarta), the National Institute of Biology, and the Department of 
Agriculture, all three of which came under the umbrella of MIPI.
41
 DURENAS sought to 
establish a liaison between the Department of Agriculture and agricultural research undertaken 
by Indonesian universities, with the aim of transferring research undertaken at the universities to 
institutes under the jurisdiction of the MIPI.
42
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 Because the heads of both organisations were physicians, DURENAS was able to achieve 
a good working relationship with the MIPI by establishing a liaison between Indonesian 
universities and research institutes that were under the jurisdiction of MIPI. In 1962, 
overshadowed by his country’s confrontation with Malaysia and the mobilisation of the military 
on the West Irian question, Soekarno stressed that following the normalisation of the political 
situation the government would allocate a greater proportion of the budget to scientific 
research.
43
  Despite its promise, the Ministry of National Research was severely underfunded due 
to the seventeen-fold depreciation in the value of the Indonesian rupiah from 1962-1965.
44
 
Prawirohardjo identified the salient factors, notably a shortage of scientific manpower that 
inhibited the growth of research in Indonesia during the 1950s. Nevertheless, he was not an 
articulate speaker. Moreover, his controversial position of advocating birth control as a means to 
promote family planning had cost him his political career. In contrast, Poesponegoro emerged as 
politically influential within Indonesia’s scientific establishment due to his closeness to 
Soekarno’s family and his statesmanship; that is, his relating of paediatrics to the nation-building 
agenda.  
Nutrition and Nation-Building 
 
During the Soekarno era, nutrition was invested with a symbolic significance of achieving 
Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in food, particularly rice. The Nutrition Institute was established in 
1950 in Jakarta under the leadership of Poorwo Soedarmo, the Institute’s Director, who also was 
Professor of Nutrition at the UI. The Institute, which undertook an interdisciplinary and problem-
oriented approach to research, tried to address issues that were relevant at the time.  From the 
early 1950s on, it undertook collaborative studies with the WHO to investigate how protein-
energy malnutrition (kwashiorkor) and vitamin A deficiency could be addressed by 
understanding the specific nutritional requirements of children and developing cost-effective and 
nutritive alternatives to support their diet. Research into nutrition in Indonesia during the 1950s 
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was aligned with Soekarno’s dream of achieving social justice for all Indonesians, and based on 
the aphorism murah sandang murah pangan (cheap clothing, cheap food).
45
  
           Between 1952 and 1961, under the leadership of Poorwo Soedarmo, SEARO, in 
collaboration with the Nutrition Institute, undertook one of the world’s most comprehensive 
research projects, investigating protein-energy malnutrition, avitaminosis of vitamin A (vitamin 
A deficiency) and cheap protein-rich foods. H.A.P.C Oomen, a WHO consultant to the Nutrition 
Institute from 1952-53, undertook a preliminary survey of malignant malnutrition in Jakarta 
toddlers.  His results showed that the incidence of kwashiorkor was influenced by faulty feeding 
practices.
46
  He attributed the malnutrition problem in Indonesia to a deficiency of protein and 
vitamin A, and an inadequate calorie intake. Oomen recommended that all doctors in Indonesia 
should be trained to recognise the symptomatology of malnutrition, e.g., xerophthalmia and 
keratomalacia, and in the effective treatment of xerophthalmia.
47
  Viewing nutrition as a public 
health problem, he advocated that physicians should be oriented to nutrition problems through 
postgraduate courses. He further advocated that preventive medicine in Indonesia should aim to 
create a better understanding of the food requirements of small children and ensure that they had 
adequate access to a protein-rich diet. 
Oomen proposed the inclusion of a social medicine approach towards nutrition in the 
clinical training of medical students that would broaden their intellectual horizons, enabling 
them to critically examine the influence of social structure such as family size and population 
density on land use patterns and the availability of food. He argued to the effect that: 
Everyone should know that meat, liver, fish, and eggs are recommendable foods, both for 
adults and small children. It is not wise to promote the use of cow’s milk and other 
expensive foods among people who are unable to purchase them.  To advise an increase 
in milk production is dangerous in a densely populated country where every acre is 
needed for foodstuffs with a more generous yield. Cow’s milk has proved the solution of 
the problem of infant malnutrition in some countries, but other remedies must be found 
for the general population of Indonesia.
48
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Oomen advocated for insights into nutrition that demonstrated simple cost-effective methods of 
preparing nutritious meals that were culturally acceptable by the general populace, especially by 
the country’s rural dwellers. 
  In 1952, the Nutrition Institute conducted three short-term courses on nutritional 
disorders for newly-recruited doctors.
49
 The Institute, in conjunction with the WHO, initiated 
clinical trials incorporating protein-rich adult foods such as tempe to children’s diet. Poesponegoro 
commenced clinical trials of saridele (a soy-based substitute for milk) as a substitute for animal 
protein in the children’s diet.50 Apart from conducting clinical trials, the Nutrition Institute also 
trained djuru penerangan makanan (assistant dieticians).  
  In 1952, Poorwo Soedarmo wrote Dapur Indonesia Dalam Djaman Baru (Indonesian 
Kitchen in the New Age), a series of plays intended to educate expectant and nursing mothers 
about the importance of a balanced diet.
51
 The plays illustrated how food choices at the household 
level were determined by cultural preferences and the purchasing power of the people during the 
early 1950s. In one play, Sukarsih, a dietician from the Nutrition Institute, educates Noor (an 
expectant mother) and Njonja Rachim (a nursing mother) regarding the nutritional value of 
vegetables, milk and meat, and recommends the addition of milk and eggs to supplement the 
meagre amount of  protein derived from an otherwise essentially rice-based diet.
52
  Their 
conversations reveal that urban households were unable to afford fruit, milk, meat and eggs.
53
 The 
role plays were intended for medical students and not for the general public.  
  In 1953, when discussing Indonesia’s nutritional problems with Poorwo Soedarmo, the 
Director of the Nutrition Institute, Frederick Stare (Professor of Nutrition at Harvard) argued that 
the Indonesian people’s nutritional problems could variously be attributed to their rice-based diet, 
an overall shortage of rice, the people’s ignorance of what constituted a balanced diet, and the 
inadequate purchasing power of a vast majority of the people. Taken together, these factors 
constrained the food choices of many.
54
  Stare’s discussion revealed that the incidence of 
xerophthalmia in Java was much higher in boys than in girls in the 1-5 age group, echoing the 
Javanese saying that ‘vegetables were not proper food for men.’55 Vegetables, as a matter of fact, 
did not form a significant component of the diet of male infants. In Indonesia, xeropthalmia 
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occurred in conjunction with kwashiorkor, a trend witnessed neither in Africa nor in Latin 
America during the 1950s.
56
  The breast milk of Indonesian and Chinese women was deficient in 
vitamin A as their diet lacked adequate consumption of fruits and vegetables.
57
 Xerophthalmia was 
thus a consequence of the breastfeeding of infants.  Due to the deficiencies of breastfeeding, 
infants had a lowered intake of calories and proteins during the weaning period.  
  Between July 1955 and January 1956, social anthropologist Maurice Freedman engaged 
in  collaborative investigations with the Ministry of Health and the Nutrition Institute in Jakarta, 
Semarang and the village of Sungei Puar in West Sumatra, in a bid to understand how social 
variables such as class, gender and income affected households’ essential nutrients intake. 
Freedman observed that during the weaning of infants between the ages of six and eight months, 
fish, meat and protein-rich foods such as beans were not fed to children as there was a general 
misconception that the consumption of ikan asin (dried salted fish) would lead to worms and 
blindness.
58
  Doctors educated mothers regarding the nutritive value of adding eggs to children’s 
diets; but, most households could not afford to buy them.
59
  
        The Nutrition Institute initiated educational propaganda in the form of posters, leaflets, 
radio talks, a nutritional film and verbal communication delivered through dieticians (ahli diet) 
and assistant dieticians.
60
 But, as nearly half of the Indonesian population was still illiterate in the 
mid-1950s, few people were able to understand the significance of the message. Poorwo 
Soedarmo disseminated health slogans such as empat sehat, lima sempurna—four traditional 
foods for good health including rice, singkong (vegetable), fish, and tempe with milk added for 
achieving perfect health—but the message was not clear due to the poor composition of  the 
message.
61
 The Nutrition Institute failed to train dieticians and assistant dieticians to understand 
the socio-economic and cultural factors affecting food preferences. As a part of its teaching 
activities, it organised several food demonstrations throughout Indonesia during the 1950s to 
demonstrate the preparation of a balanced diet for nursing mothers. The basic diet included a 
variety of cooked Indonesian dishes including rice, fish, meat, tempe, fruit, vegetables, milk and 
tea.
62
 Assistant dieticians explained the importance of a balanced diet and stressed the contrast 
between the right and wrong kinds of foods to nursing mothers albeit the presentation of the food 
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items was somewhat disorganised.
63
  But, despite their efforts, dieticians and assistant dieticians 
were unable to persuade nursing mothers to adopt a balanced diet. Nutrition demonstrations did 
not involve the participation of the public and were delivered in the form of didactic lectures. For 
this reason, they failed to induce behavioural changes in the population vis-à-vis adopting a 
balanced diet.  
  B. Napitupulu, a Veterinary Doctor at the Nutrition Institute, estimated that polished rice 
that was deficient in vitamin B accounted for approximately 90% of the protein and calorie intake 
in Indonesia whereas meat contributed to less than 5% of the protein requirement.
64
 During the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, due to high inflation, Indonesians increasingly turned to cassava, 
which is relatively poor in protein, as a cheaper dietary alternative to rice and meat.
65
 As a result, 
Indonesian diets lacked adequate protein variation.  
  In December 1959, four months after the inauguration of Kabinet Kerja Pertama (First 
Working Cabinet), the government initiated Operasi Makmur (Prosperity Operation), intended to 
further the First Working Cabinet’s agenda of satisfying basic needs of the people in relation to 
food and clothing in accordance with the Pantjasila principle that enshrines social justice for all 
Indonesians. The program was ambitious and intended to make Indonesia self-sufficient with 
respect to food by November 1960 and improving the composition of people’s food both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.
66
 The objectives of Operasi Makmur were threefold: (a) 
increasing food production through improved irrigation; (b) preserving soil fertility; and, (c) 
educating Indonesian farmers about the latest developments in agricultural science. To this end, 
the Cabinet established a Centralised Food Command (Komando Operasi Gerakan Makmur) that 
mobilised the Indonesian population through student and farmer organisations based on the 
Javanese principle of gotong rojong (mutual cooperation). Additionally, Komando Operasi 
Gerakan Makmur envisioned achieving coordination between the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Labour, Public Works, and Education in order to mobilise people’s potential in increasing the 
country’s agricultural capacity. In the provinces, Komando Operasi Gerakan Makmur was 
supervised by provincial governors and district heads. As the target for realising Indonesia’s self-
sufficiency in food was strictly time-bound, the government proposed to reward model farmers. In 
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his radio broadcast to the Indonesian nation on 10 November 1959, commemorating Heroes’ Day, 
President Soekarno pointed out that besides national heroes, there were heroes in the field of 
production, distribution, development, and other sectors.
67
 Although the First Working Cabinet 
was imbued with revolutionary fervour in making Indonesia self-sufficient in food by 1960, 
Indonesia continued to import food for two reasons: (a) price fixing of rice by the government 
served as a deterrent to farmers to increase acreage under cultivation; and, (b) a precarious balance 
between Indonesia’s population growth and food supply.  
  President Soekarno argued that despite Indonesia’s soil fertility (loh djinawi) and 
political independence, it continued to remain dependent upon foreign countries to meet its 
annual shortfall of rice. From 1900 to the early 1960s, Indonesia’s population doubled from 50 
million to 100 million.
68
  As a result, Indonesians were unable to subsist on the land. Soekarno 
saw the industrialisation of agriculture, and the substitution of rice with maize, tubers, peanuts 
and other locally grown crops as the key to achieving Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in food.  
  In March 1964, Satrio, who was then the country’s Minister of Health, observed that the 
country’s ever-increasing population (estimated at 2.5% during the mid-1960s) decreased the per 
capita availability of food.
69
 As a solution to Indonesia’s food problem, Satrio recommended the 
initiation of the People’s Food Revolution Project (Revolusi Makanan Rakjat) in July 1964, the 
main aim of which was to ensure the affordability of food for every Indonesian through a 
mechanism that ensured equitable production and distribution.
70
  In order to implement this 
program, the Indonesian Department of Health introduced the Operasi Pemberantasan Buta Gizi 
(Operation to Eradicate Ignorance in Nutrition) at the provincial and district levels, based on the 
slogan empat sehat lima sempurna that emphasised a balanced diet.
71
 The Operation was 
intended to engender mass awareness of nutrition among schoolchildren, expectant and nursing 
mothers, and to usher in dietary change. As Indonesia’s staple diet varied considerably across the 
archipelago, the Department of Health devolved considerable autonomy to the district authorities 
to determine how the slogan empat sehat lima sempurna would be executed.  For example, in 
areas suffering from a rice shortage, maize would substitute for rice as the primary source of 
carbohydrate. 
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  The Operation to Eradicate Ignorance in Nutrition was initially implemented in the 
famine-affected West Java province in 1964 with the introduction of a high-yielding variety of 
maize. Since that year, instances of food scarcity were never again reported in West Java;
72
  in 
fact, the distribution of food grains improved in that province. But, because the Food Revolution 
was implemented during the konfrontasi (confrontation) with Malaysia, it was only partially 
successful. During the confrontation, Satrio envisioned the nurturing of a strong and healthy 
future generation free of disease through implementation of the Operation to Eradicate Ignorance 
in Nutrition. As well, he aimed to mobilise potensi rakjat (people’s potential) on the war front.73 
Although this Operation was successful in mobilising women’s organisations to undertake 
nutrition education, particularly Kongres Wanita Indonesia on the principle of gotong rojong, 
introducing variation into people’s diets, i.e., including animal protein, proved unachievable. The 
reality was that for many, meat was unaffordable given the difficult economic conditions 
precipitated by the country’s confrontation with Malaysia.  
  Between 1959 and 1964, both Operasi Makmur, and the Operation to Eradicate 
Ignorance in Nutrition—imbued with revolutionary ideals—envisioned the creation of a strong 
and healthy population free of disease and began campaigns to make Indonesia self-sufficient 
with respect to food. Yet, these campaigns were of symbolic significance and did not alleviate 
poverty. The failure of both campaigns could be attributed to a combination of high inflation and 
the fragile balance that existed between population growth and increase in food production. The 
implementation of both campaigns was contingent upon the cooperation of district and provincial 
governments that was lacking in most parts of Indonesia at the time.
74
  
  Research undertaken by the Nutrition Institute conformed to the Soekarno era notion of 
self-sufficiency in economic affairs, particularly its efforts to ameliorate Indonesia’s food 
scarcity. Apart from initiating dietary surveys that established a vicious cyclical relationship 
between poverty, food preferences and malnutrition, the Institute recreated the Indonesian 
balanced diet. In addition, it coined slogans in Bahasa Indonesia that sought to correct popular 
misgivings regarding the consumption of fish and vegetables. But, despite all efforts, the 
Institute’s educational program—which was administered by the Indonesian Department of 
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Health— to change food habits by using slogans failed due to the weak purchasing power of the 
people.  
 
 
Assessing the Contributions of IDI 
 
The Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (The Indonesian Medical Association, henceforth the IDI) was an 
independent medical society established by Indonesian physicians in September 1950. Its aims 
were: (a) to advocate better salaries for doctors employed in the public service; (b) to formulate 
recommendations on changes to the medical curriculum; (c) to recommend the enshrinement of 
the human right to health within the Indonesian constitution; (d) to improve the standard of 
public health; and, (e) to enrich the scientific vocabulary of Bahasa Indonesia by appropriating 
biomedical terms from European languages. The IDI was influential within the Indonesian 
Ministry of Health given that the Ministers of Health, particularly Johannes Leimena, Azis Saleh 
and Satrio, were all members of the society.  
With the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic completed by 1950, the 
activities of the Society for the Advancement of Medical Sciences (Vereeniging tot Bevordering 
der Geneeskundige Wetenschappen in Indonesië), which was founded in the former Dutch East 
Indies, were terminated in November 1950. This was done to facilitate closer collaboration 
amongst Indonesian scientists instituted through the IDI, and included Indonesian physicians 
such as Sarwono Prawirohardjo (founder and chairperson), Soedjono Djoened Poesponegoro and 
Poorwo Soedarmo.
75
  The relationship between the Society for the Advancement of Medical 
Sciences and the IDI was initially strained when IDI introduced a policy of adopting Bahasa 
Indonesia as the lingua franca at its meetings and in its publications, and followed a policy of 
excluding Dutch physicians from assuming full membership.  
   The IDI played a significant role in ushering in the transformation of Indonesia’s 
medical education from the Dutch to the American model. Prawirohardjo was undoubtedly the 
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most influential member of this association due to his connections with President Soekarno, the 
then Minister of Health, Johannes Leimena, and his standing as Professor of Obstetrics at the UI. 
He was instrumental in introducing the American curriculum into Indonesian medical schools. 
At the third annual session of  the IDI convened in Bandung in 1952, Prawirohardjo advised the 
Ministry of Health and the medical schools at Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta that in order to 
solve Indonesia’s adverse doctor-to-patient ratio, which was estimated at one doctor per 60,000 
people in the early 1950s, the medical faculties needed to shorten the duration of the 
undergraduate curriculum from seven years to less than six years, improve the quality of 
teaching, and increase the strength of the teaching staff.
76
  Regarding the orientation of 
Indonesian undergraduate medical education towards health problems in the rural areas, 
Prawirohardjo advocated that medical education should cultivate communication and leadership 
skills amongst future doctors who could bring about behavioural change amongst the local 
population in the interests of adopting healthy lifestyles. The third annual session of IDI 
sensitised the Ministry of Health to the high fees and lack of scholarships for incoming medical 
students that forced several young aspiring physicians to pursue lucrative private practice in the 
country’s urban areas as a means of repaying their student loans. But, conditions only worked to 
exacerbate the existing shortage of skilled medical professionals in the rural areas where their 
skills were most urgently needed.
77
 IDI recommended to the Ministry of Health that, in order to 
ameliorate the acute shortage of doctors in the countryside, the Ministry should facilitate the 
training of paramedical personnel.   
In 1953, the IDI liaised with the WHO to persuade the Indonesian Ministry of Health to 
allocate a greater proportion of the health budget to the issue of malnutrition. IDI appealed to the 
spirit of internationalism and social conscience of humankind as follows:  
I understand that the UNO is based on the same principles as the League of Nations, 
namely on more or less equality of sovereign states. But the UNO has something more as 
it is not only founded on international law alone, but also on Social Conscience and on 
the acknowledgement of human rights. 
The Social Conscience demands relief from extremities of luxury and want, and 
concerning health, it is the inalienable right of every human being to achieve a reasonable 
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standard of health, without discrimination according to race, religion, political affiliation, 
etc.
78
 
 
The IDI identified malnutrition as Indonesia’s most significant health problem of the 1950s, 
claiming that it de-enervated the productive capacity of the Indonesian peoples. It urged the 
WHO to convince the Ministry of Health to act on the question of improving the nutritional 
standards of the people.   
At the Fifth Annual Meeting of IDI, convened in Semarang in 1954, President Soekarno, 
in his inaugural address, stated that although he had not entered the ‘Halls of Science’, he was 
nonetheless interested in employing science as a tool for the upliftment of the living standards of 
the population in accordance with the realisation of the Marhaenist ideology.
79
 Soekarno 
conceptualised a wider social role for doctors in representing the cause of the underprivileged 
and urged them to focus on cultivating problem-solving skills.  
At the Fifth Session of IDI, delegates Prawirohardjo and Poesponegoro in particular, 
pointed out that as Indonesia did not have a code of medical ethics in the early 1950s, e.g., the 
establishment of medical practice, doctor-patient relationships, and general practitioner-specialist 
relationships, they recommended that Indonesia subscribe to the International Code of Medical 
Ethics.
80
 In accordance with the IDI’s recommendations, the Indonesian government established 
the Madjelis Pertimbangan Kesehatan dan Sjarah (Indonesian Committee on Bioethics) in 1954 
to address controversial medical procedures such as artificial insemination or blood transfusions 
through the issue of fatwas (decrees) in consultation with ulama. These IDI initiatives, at least in 
principle, sought to establish minimum ethical standards for the medical profession in 
conformity with Islamic laws. 
The IDI had observed the correlation between good health and enhanced national 
productivity in nations such as Japan, the Soviet Union and China, all of which had made great 
strides in public health after the conclusion of World War II. In addition, it had drawn the 
attention of the Ministry of Health to the need to guarantee the ‘right to health’ which the 1945 
constitution did not explicitly mention.
81
 With input from the IDI, the Ministry of Health enacted 
the Undang Undang Tentang Pokok Pokok Kesehatan (Basic Law on Health, No 9, 1960), which 
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explicitly stated that the Indonesian government would guarantee the highest possible level of 
healthcare to the country’s citizens. The law intended to mobilise private initiatives in preventive 
and curative public health based on the notion of gotong rojong.
82
 It also envisioned combining 
the results of modern medical knowledge with comprehensive pembangunan, and 
acknowledging the utility of Indonesian traditional wisdom, especially in medicine (djamu), as 
an effective palliative for psychosomatic illnesses.
83
  
In 1951, the IDI launched the Madjalah Kedokteran Indonesia, an initiative aimed at 
promoting the use of Bahasa Indonesia in academic circles. As well, it coined scientific 
equivalents for biomedical terms where none had hitherto existed before. In 1954, Soetomo 
Tjokronegoro (Professor of Pathology at UI from 1951-69), who was influential in transforming 
the medical education at UI and UNAIR, promoted the use of Bahasa Indonesia in lectures. 
Tjokronegoro was also instrumental in revising the Kamus Istilah Kedokteran (Dictionary of 
Indonesian Medical Terms, published during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia in 1943) in an 
attempt to bring about greater conceptual clarity of biomedical vocabulary. In his Tjukupkah 
Saudara Membina Bahasa Kesatuan Kita (Fostering a Unified National Language), he 
standardized the lexical usage of Bahasa Indonesia.
84
 Physicians employed by IDI, particularly 
Tjokronegoro, were confronted with the challenge of critically adapting foreign biomedical 
vocabulary into Indonesian.
85
  
The IDI positioned itself between Soekarno’s notions of problem-oriented science, social 
justice, and the international framework of human rights while liaising with the WHO to 
persuade the Ministry of Health to devote a greater proportion of the budget allocated to public 
health to preventing malnutrition. As an intermediary between the WHO and the Ministry of 
Health, the IDI was instrumental in enacting the Basic Law on Health that redefined the state’s 
role in guaranteeing a minimum standard of health for its citizens.  
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Conclusion 
 
Soekarno hoped that science would support the Indonesian revolution by discovering new 
solutions to Indonesia’s many problems. To this end, he urged Indonesian scientists to 
contemplate how science could further the achievement of a just and prosperous society. 
Physicians hoping to enhance the public reputation of their work and find funding for their 
research related it to the goals of the Indonesian revolution.  Research into nutrition and 
paediatrics, which could quite easily be related to Soekarno’s conceptualisation of the Indonesian 
Revolution as a period of investment in human skills and aspirations to attaining economic self-
sufficiency, received considerable attention.  
 The characteristics of the Soekarno era science can be summed up under several points. 
The first was the reflection of the Bandung spirit that emphasised Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in 
technology, and its solidarity with newly-independent countries in a similar economic position. 
The second was the tension between whether Indonesians should adapt to the modern technology 
of the West, or whether technology should conform to the Indonesian way of life. Indonesian 
intellectuals advocated that the country should accept modern technology of the West; but at the 
same time it should follow its own trajectory to modernity, independent of Western influences. 
The third was the influential role of physicians in shaping the direction of post-World War II 
science in Indonesia due to their rhetorical ability to draw parallels between medical specialties 
such as paediatrics and nutrition, on the one hand, and the nationalist vision of creating a strong 
and healthy population, on the other. Connected also to the third point was the emergence of 
Poesponegoro as an influential player in Indonesian science due to his astute way of relating 
paediatrics to wider socio-economic questions—such as poverty, deprivation, and Afro-Asian 
solidarity—which had dominated the political discussions in Indonesia since the Bandung 
Conference of  1955. The fourth was a creative appropriation of Western biomedical terminology 
into the lexicon of Bahasa Indonesia to enhance its scientific status.  
In the preceding paragraphs I have highlighted that scientific initiatives during the 
Soekarno era were related symbolically to the nationalist imagination of creating a strong self-
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sufficient Indonesia that was capable of pursuing its own trajectory to modernity. Two major 
shortcomings of post-World War II Indonesian science were: (a) the emphasis of applied over 
basic sciences; and, (b) a shortage of scientific manpower. A scientific temper could not be 
cultivated among Indonesian students due to the weak background of most undergraduates in 
basic sciences. Due to the depreciation of the rupiah and the economic problems of the late 
1950s, the pursuit of scientific careers no longer attracted newly-graduated students.  
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Below: Empat Sehat Lima Sempurna ( translated into English as four essential foods for good health with milk 
added for perfect health), a nutrition slogan devised by Poorwo Soedarmo, Director of the Nutrition Institute in 
1952.  
 
Image Courtesy: From the private collection of Soemarmo Poorwo Soedarmo, son of Poorwo Soedarmo. 
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Above: Professor Sarwono Prawirohardjo, President of the MIPI (left) at the Third Regional Meeting of National 
Science Research Organisations held at Canberra between 17 and 21 February 1964 to formulate the execution of 
scientific policies for the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Source: NAA: A1501, A4893/1 (National Archives of Australia, Canberra).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a brief speech delivered at the height of the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian archipelago 
(1943), in which he reflected on the role of physicians in Indonesian society, Soekarno stated 
that the latter not only had an obligation to cure sick patients, but also to cultivate a strong and 
healthy citizenry free from disease. The slogan Rakjat Sehat, Negara Kuat (healthy people, 
strong nation), which was used extensively in public health propaganda during the 1950s to 
indicate the link between health and nation-building, had already been expressed by Soekarno 
during the Japanese occupation.
1
 Health was going to be an essential part of building an 
independent Indonesia; thus, the country’s physicians directed their personal efforts towards 
building the nation. In this thesis, I have analysed how Indonesian physicians connected their 
endeavours to the broader nationalist rhetoric on development and nation-building, and the 
extent to which those efforts were successful in gaining recognition among politicians and the 
citizenry.  I have also investigated the extent to which Indonesians were successful in 
channelling their ideas and ideals into building a health infrastructure. As I have demonstrated, 
the Soekarno era was initially characterised by high idealism and the making of bold plans; but, 
unfortunately, many were not realised due to the broader political and economic turmoil of the 
late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s.  
Subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of 
Indonesia was completed in December 1949, the country inherited a health infrastructure 
ravaged by seven years of warfare resulting from the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian 
archipelago and the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949).  At the time, there was a great shortage 
of physicians, only 1 per 60,000 people. The Indonesian Ministry of Health was forced to 
surmount innumerable challenges when addressing this situation. Particular focus was on: (a) 
addressing the acute shortage of physicians through the improvement of medical education; and, 
(b) initiating an emergency program to combat newly-resurgent epidemics of smallpox and 
plague and endemic diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and yaws. In 1951, Leimena, who had 
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been the most influential Minister of Health since Indonesian independence, introduced the 
Bandung Plan, which served as a blueprint for the country’s health policy. Unfortunately, the 
Ministry of Health lacked the adequate financial resources to implement the emergency health 
program, or to develop an adequate health infrastructure in accordance with the objectives of the 
Bandung Plan. Despite these challenges, President Soekarno and Leimena remained optimistic. 
The Indonesians had demonstrated considerable resilience in overcoming political obstacles 
imposed by two Dutch Military Actions (between July 1947 to August 1947 and December 1948 
to January 1949) and would collectively overcome challenges in public health as well. The first 
five years of independence were characterised by optimism. But from the mid-1950s onwards, 
Indonesia’s progress in public health faltered due to a constellation of reasons, among them: (a) 
political tensions between Java and the Outer Islands; (b) administrative problems, particularly 
as the provincial and local governments implemented health policy but depended on the centre 
for the disbursement of finances; (c) political deadlocks; (d) rampant corruption; (e) inflation; 
and, (f) the declining commitment of international agencies to finance Indonesia’s public health 
programs subsequent to Soekarno’s abandonment of parliamentary democracy in 1957.  
The nationalist imagery of health during the Soekarno era—which aimed to create a 
strong and healthy citizenry—was evident in the state’s response towards disease. The link 
between health and nation-building was again articulated in Soekarno’s notion of pembangunan 
that sought to promote the benefits of Western science and medicine in Indonesia but without 
external assistance; that is, as an Indonesian alternative to modernity. This thesis suggests that 
Indonesia did not blindly accept the policy prescriptions of international aid agencies but 
creatively refashioned international aid to suit its own requirements. During the1950s, 
Indonesian physicians appropriated the rhetoric of struggle, arising from Indonesia’s anti-
colonial legacy. They depicted the campaigns against diseases as battles that would lead to 
further victories of the nation against poverty and illiteracy. Prime Minister Abdul Halim viewed 
the symbolic significance of framing malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy and yaws as the ‘big four’ 
endemic diseases that affected the overall vitality of the population. During the Cold War rivalry 
between the US and the Soviet Union, the US saw the political significance of supporting disease 
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eradication in developing countries as an important step to countervail the spread of communism 
and orienting these countries to a Western model of development. But, Indonesia instead elected 
to follow the Bandung approach that advocated a non-aligned foreign policy independent of 
superpower intervention and emphasised solidarity with decolonised nations in a similar 
economic position. Indonesia did not slavishly implement WHO prescriptions on disease 
eradication. Instead, the Indonesian Ministry of Health tailored WHO recommendations to suit 
the archipelagic nation’s diversity in terms of demographic and epidemiological conditions 
where a standard epidemiological strategy would not prove effective.  
Indonesian scientific and medical initiatives were tied to the Government of Indonesia’s 
desire to carve out a niche within the international scientific community and contribute to the 
growth of applied science. This, it was assumed would enable to achieve the country’s self-
sufficiency in economic affairs. Physicians dominated the Indonesian scientific establishment 
during the 1950s not only due to their numbers but due to their ability to rhetorically relate health 
and disease to Soekarno’s nation-building (pembangunan) ideology. Consequently, research into 
paediatrics and nutrition, which was symbolically related to Soekarno’s reading of the 
Indonesian Revolution as a period of investment in the population’s human skills, received 
considerable state support.  
During the early 1950s, there were many reasons for optimism. In 1955, the average life 
expectancy of Indonesians was approximately 50 years, ten years higher than the figure for the 
mid-1930s.
2
 The number of physicians doubled from 800 to 1,600 between 1945 and 1955. The 
birth rate of 35 per 1,000 was more than double the death rate of 15 per 1,000.
3
  The rapid 
decline in the death rates for postcolonial Indonesia could be attributed largely to the successful 
control of infectious diseases such as smallpox and plague. In 1951, nearly 3,000 people died 
from plague whereas by 1954, this number had registered a thirtyfold decline.
4
  By 1955, 
Leimena expressed his optimism that the overall state of health in Indonesia could be termed as 
‘satisfactory.’  Nevertheless, after fifteen years (by 1970), Leimena was frustrated that the 
Indonesian state was unable to guarantee the highest level of health for its citizens due to the 
ever-increasing population and economic uncertainty.
5
 The promise of a healthy Indonesia, free 
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of disease, had not been realised despite the good intentions of the early years of independence 
and the progress that was made during those years.  
 Even during the early 1950s, the optimism of physicians and politicians on health matters 
might not have been fully justified. In 1952, a young Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in his short story 
‘My Kampung’—written when the campaigns against endemic diseases were launched—painted 
a picture not of progress but of pessimism and ever-present death. In sarcastic vein he wrote:  
A small guerrilla squad that is cautious is not likely to lose ten people in two years, yet in 
my peaceful kampung, with its stink and its condition, people die one after another. They 
die a cheap death, friend. Like this, at the back of my house, soon after I started living in 
Kebun Djahe Kober, one person died of a chronic venereal disease. … 
And if on one bend of the alley there are paralytics and little children whose job it is to 
cry for hours every day, on the second bend, there is another TB victim, a civil servant 
who continues to work anyway. In front of his house, there is another person in whom the 
accursed but usual disease of our kampung has lodged itself. And in the alley over there 
always lives the family of an Arab who also jolted us with a sickness that suddenly made 
him a crazy man, jumping up and down and hurting people that who fell into his hands.  
And later when Sang Djibril comes again to pick one of us up, children will jostle each 
other to enter the prayerhouse and beat the big drum, because religious teachers have 
promised them merit in the afterlife for this good deed.   
 
Such, then, is the condition of my kampung with its busy Djibril. You too, friend, can 
come to my kampung some time. My kampung can also become a soul-enriching tourist 
kampung. Finding it is not hard at all, because everyone in Jakarta knows where the 
national palace is located. Five hundred metres in a straight line toward the southwest, 
there my kampung stands in all its glory, defying all its doctors and the technical 
professionals.
6
 
 
Toer’s short story mocked the empty promises of the Indonesian state and international agencies 
in guaranteeing the right to health for the country’s poor. The kampung he described was located 
very close to the presidential palace, making the contrast even more jarring.  
In line with the multiple obstacles that it faced, Indonesian health policy during the 1950s 
continued to focus on short-term objectives such as maximising the output of doctors from the 
country’s medical schools and the prevention and control of endemic diseases than on long-term 
but more sustainable measures such as raising the living standards of the people. Disease control 
seemed easy compared to addressing widespread deprivation among the people. Within 
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Indonesian public health there was a tension between two competing approaches: (a) a narrow 
biomedical approach that advocated using a ‘magic bullet’ to disease, for example using DDT to 
combat malaria; and, (b) a holistic approach that related health to nation-building. Indonesian 
physicians, particularly Poorwo Soedarmo and Leimena, were aware that lack of adequate food 
attributable to the poor purchasing power of the people, and cultural preferences such as a 
predominantly rice-based diet, exacerbated disease. Unless the living standards of the population 
were raised, the government could not make progress in resolving the health problems of 
Indonesia in a sustainable way.  Seemingly inevitably, technologically directed campaigns 
against endemic diseases prescribed by the WHO diverted the Indonesian government’s 
resources and attention away from dealing with the socio-economic determinants of disease 
towards quick-fix solutions.  
The need to improve the overall well-being of Indonesians seldom featured in strategic 
discussions, both at Geneva and Jakarta. Instead, specific public health programs such as the 
campaign against endemic diseases, which could symbolically relate to the nationalist vision of 
creating a strong and healthy citizenry, were prioritised by the Ministry of Health. For these 
reasons, the nature of health policy during the Soekarno era can be characterised in terms of the 
functioning of a number of symbolic yet disparate public health projects that only had a marginal 
impact on the overall well-being of the population.  
This study sheds light on the nature of sovereignty and postcolonial governance in 
Indonesia. Indonesia’s sovereignty was more fractured than was generally perceived. Tensions 
between the various loci of governmental authority within Indonesia, especially between the 
provinces of the Outer Islands and the central authorities at Jakarta were heightened as a result, 
affecting policy outcomes. The fractured nature of Indonesian sovereignty was evident in the 
lack of administrative coordination between the Ministries of Health, Education, and Finance at 
Jakarta, on the one hand, and the provincial governments on the other. This stymied the 
consistent implementation of health measures as envisioned in the Leimena Plan and the 
expansion of medical education on the Outer Islands during the late 1950s. The state’s campaign 
against ill health was impeded by widespread poverty and the problems within the Indonesian 
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government during the 1950s. As health was a provincial subject, the provincial and local 
governments were financially responsible for the execution of public health programs whereas 
the Ministry of Health formulated policy guidelines. Any large-scale public health undertaking 
would have presupposed complex financial and educational requirements. The Government of 
Indonesia fared poorly in all of this; and, the Indonesian bureaucracy, which was a major 
stumbling block, hindered the implementation of public health.  
This thesis is an illustration of the fruitfulness of engaging the historiography of 
postcolonial Indonesian medicine with the political historiography of the 1950s, more generally. 
The engagement of the two streams provides a vantage point from which to examine how 
Indonesia implemented its health policy with minimal external intervention at the height of the 
Cold War. The Bandung approach, a non-aligned approach to international politics, sought to 
achieve a delicate balance between maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty in health while at the 
same time adapting the assistance in health from UN agencies to suit the country’s health 
requirements. That the achievements in public health during the Soekarno era were modest yet 
the holistic vision of public health embraced by the nationalist physicians that related health to 
nation-building form the backbone to the Ministry of Health’s Healthy Indonesia 2010 vision 
implemented at the turn of the 21
st
 century.   
This thesis, which juxtaposes the political history of Indonesia during the 1950s with the 
history of postcolonial health, underscores how the realities of disease and the implementation of 
health policy in various islands that constituted the Indonesian archipelago intersected with the 
success of Indonesia as a new and independent nation. Indonesia sought to retain its 
independence, a position it formulated during the Afro-Asian Conference of non-aligned nations 
at Bandung in 1955. It was willing to accept international aid and engage with ideas formulated 
by international health organisations; but, at the same time it wanted to retain its independence 
and formulate its own ideas. Indonesia’s position within the international community was 
enhanced with the convening of the Bandung Conference.  Indonesian health officials 
increasingly became involved in public health discussions with the WHO, particularly in 
investigating the epidemiology of malaria and yaws. In addition, they became more involved in 
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research and in hosting national and international public health conferences even if the practical 
application of the epidemiological findings and recommendations resulting from the conferences 
was rarely implemented. Little was done to improve the overall health and wellbeing of the 
population.  
This thesis explores the contradictions in policy formulation at the WHO headquarters in 
Geneva, the appropriation and implementation of WHO prescriptions by the Ministry of Health 
at Jakarta, and the local responses that it generated.  First, Indonesia’s malaria eradication 
program was the second largest in the Southeast Asian region of the WHO after India. 
Epidemiological studies the anopheline species resistance to the insecticide DDT were 
undertaken in Indonesia both by local epidemiologists at the Malaria Institute, Jakarta, and WHO 
malariologists.  But the gains of this knowledge went nowhere. Malaria eradication in Indonesia 
failed not so much due to the resistance of the anopheline species to DDT, but due to 
organisational factors such as negotiating the bureaucratic labyrinths that resulted in the 
suspension of eradication activities. Second, the country’s anti-yaws campaign under the 
initiative of retired regency physician Raden Kodijat was the world’s largest when it was 
inaugurated in 1950. The originality of the Indonesian anti-yaws campaign lay in its response to 
an acute shortage of skilled medical personnel. The use of djuru pateks (paramedical personnel) 
to detect yaws in the general population, and the treatment of active cases only with penicillin, 
led to a dramatic decline in the prevalence of the disease that saw neighbouring Malaya, which 
was yaws-endemic, adopt the epidemiological strategies of the Indonesian campaign. The anti-
yaws campaign was successful inasmuch as it drastically reduced the overall prevalence of yaws 
due to the effectiveness of penicillin shots. But, by the mid-1960s, Indonesian physicians had 
started to realise that for the successful conclusion of the disease eradication campaigns, the 
country needed to address underlying socio-economic factors such as poverty.   
The Soekarno era will be remembered in the history of Indonesian health as an era of 
bold plans and unfulfilled aspirations. Today, Indonesia is facing health problems very similar to 
those it faced during the Soekarno era: for example, in 2005 it was struggling to cope with the re-
emergence of diseases such as polio that once were thought to have been extirpated from the 
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archipelago. Between 1949 and 1967, the country’s health programs faltered because of 
disagreements between the various inextricable mazes of the administrative hierarchy that 
characterised the then politics of decentralisation, economic difficulties, massive inflation and 
waning international support.  
Almost forty-eight years have elapsed since the end of the Soekarno era. Unlike the 
authoritarian Soeharto era (1966-1998), which was relatively successful in the realm of public 
health, most notably smallpox eradication, the achievements of the Soekarno era pale in 
comparison. With the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, top-down centralised strategies of 
disease control were discredited and a policy of decentralisation was embarked upon again. Since 
1998, the financing health programs have been delegated to the provincial, regency, and village 
administrations whereas the central government issues broad directives regarding policy 
implementation, leading to a fractured administration.  The Asian financial crisis of 1997 was an 
additional drawback. Although Indonesia’s economy is performing relatively well today, funding 
for health care is grossly insufficient. This time, economic problems are not to blame. But 
corruption and nepotism—indicated in Indonesia by the well-known abbreviation KKN 
(Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotism or Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism)—continue to run rampant. 
As a recent issue of the on-line journal Inside Indonesia states it: ‘Healthcare in Indonesia suffers 
from many chronic problems that only healthier politics can cure.’7 The political system seems 
sick beyond repair, leaving little hope for medical care. Indonesian physicians appear to be 
prisoners of the country’s bureaucracy that leaves little scope for individual initiatives. The lack 
of political will and inspired visions among physicians has led to a stalemate that was almost 
impossible to resolve.  
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